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^B 30fl ^^^ 

ion* made as directed by Secretary of W* 




LeRoy Eltinoi. 

Major of Cavalry, 

tuiLructor, Department of Military Art 
The Army Service Schools 


With Appendix: 


f Ui't Leavenworth . 


Alterations made as directed bv Secretary of War 




LeRoy Eltinge 


Major of CavaWy, 

Instructor, Depay^tment of Military Art 

The Army Service Schools 


With Appendix : 


Fort Leavenworth : 


Works Most Largely Quoted 
in These Lectures 

General Psychological Subjects: 

''The Crowd,'' by GuSTAVE LeBon, published by T. F. 

Unwin, London. 
''Psychology of Peoples,'' by Gustave LeBon (out of 

print), published by McMillan Co., 1898. 
"Psychology of Suggestion," by Boris Sidis. 

Psychology of War (in the order of their value on the sub- 
ject) : 

"Etudes sur le Combat,"^ DuPiCQ — Chapelot & Cie., Paris, 
reprint 1904. 

"Psychology du Combat de I'lnfanterie,'"^ LouQUE — 
Charles-Lavauzelle, Paris, 1909. 

An article on panics in Revue d' Infanterie^ of November, 
1907, translated in Military Information Document 
No. 12149, which is on file in The Army Service 
Schools Library. 

"Les Realities du Combat,"^ General Daudignac — 
Charles-Lavauzelle, Paris. (A partial translation 
appeared in Infantry Journal of April and July, 1908.) 

"Training Soldiers for War," Fuller — Hugh Rees & 
Co., London, 1914. 

"Actual Expeynences in War," SOLOVIEV. (Translation 
given in Military Information Document No. 9 of the 
War Department, Government Printing Office, 1906.) 

Tactics," Balck (Kreuger's translation), Cavalry Jour- 
nal, 1911. 

"Infantry Masses in Attack,"- Minarelli-Fitzgerald. 

"Concerning Crowd Suggestion,"' Dr. Hans Gudden, 
Munich (a lecture). 

"A Summer Night's Dream," Anonymous, Hudson-Kim- 
berly Co. 

"A Study of the Development of Infantry Tactics," Colo- 
nel Beca — McMillan Co., 1911. 

"War and the World's Life," Maude, London. 

' In French. 
^ In German. 

The works above are all inexpensive, L e., from 50 cents to $1.25, 
except "Tactics," $3.00, and "War and the World's Life," $4.50. 


Psychology of War 

*A doctrine of tactics which v?uc'.«< 
not properly appreciate the 
psychological element ^staoimies - 
in lifeless pedantry." — BalCK. 

Part r 

IN OUR studies, we have seen much about the 
psychology of war, but most of this has been in 
the nature of general reference to the subject, such 
as Napoleon's statement, "In war the moral is to the 
physical as three to one." 

"The moral forces constitute the most powerful 
factors of success; they give life to all material 
efforts ; and dominate a commander's decisions with 
regard to the troops' every act. Honor and patriot- 
ism inspire the utmost devotion ; the spirit of sacri- 
fice and the fix^ determination to conquer, ensure 
success; discipline and steadiness guarantee the 
necessary obedience and the cooperation of every 
effort." — French Infantry Drill Regulations. 

"The modifications which periodically affect 
tactical theories are produced by the constant evolu- 
tion of the principal factors in war, i. e., the weapon 
and the man." 

"Tactical science, therefore, possesses two in- 
dispensable bases : the science of arms, and the 

'The material in these lectures is not original, but will 
be found among the works cited on the fourth page. Where 
practicable, quotations have been used. In other cases the 
same ideas as held by an author have been used, but put in 
different language. 

Part I is largely from "Psychology of Peoples" and "The 
Croivd," both by M. Gustave LeBon. 


— 6— 

science of human nature." "And these two should 
form the foundation of the instruction of all officers." 

"A leader's knowledge of war is incomplete," 
wrote Marmont, "if in addition to his skill in con- 
ceiving tecl^nicjal; combinations he does not possess a 
knowledge' df the human heart, if he have not the 
povv'^r of gauging tiie momentary temper of his own 
troops, and also that of the enemy." 

"These varied inspirations are the moral factors 
in war, mysterious forces which lend momentary 
powers to armies and which are the key to the 
reasons why at times one man is equal to ten, and at 
others ten worth no more than one." 

In our tactical problems we have been accus- 
tomed to assume that 100 men equals 100 men. This 
is essentially untrue, and is used only because in 
theoretical exercises there is no other way of decid- 
ing the matter. 

"In war there is nothing more important for a 
leader than the knowledge of the effect of certain 
things on the human mind.'' — Captain Orr. 

"Leadership, to be efficient, mfist take account 
of all moral factors. Every leader of men, from a 
troop to an army, is necessarily a student of psy- 
chology, bound up as it is with the study of all the 
moral forces which play so great a part in war. Not 
the least important is a knowledge of the manner in 
which the opinions and beliefs of the men we are to 
lead in war may be affected by the ideas engendered 
during peace. The tendency in peace is to forget 
the importance of these forces. This is partly due 
to the fact that it is only under the stress of war that 
the more important moral factors betray them- 
selves." — Captain Orr. 

"On the actual field of battle, no two bodies of 
men of equal numbers (given equal tactical training, 

equipment and physical condition — itself an impossi- 
bility) have been, or ever will be, equal in moral 
force." — Rezanof. On successive days even, the 
same body of men will break the first day with a loss 
of 5 per cent, and the next, fight its way to victory, 
in spite of a loss of 40 per cent. 

On the evening of the battle of Wagram, Napo- 
leon's right wing, possessed of a panic-like fright, 
fled .... On the very same day, these same 
troops were the ones who, by their heroic fighting, 
had won the battle. 

At Winchester, the surprised Union troops fled 
in the morning, but returned and won a victory be- 
fore night. 

There are two elements that enter to make these 
astonishing things possible: First, physical condi- 
tion; second, purely psychological conditions. The 
first to some extent tends to produce the second. 
All psychologists agree that physical condition has a 
powerful effect on psychological susceptibility. A 
crowd of men that are tired, hungry, sick, thirsty, or 
who have lost sleep, are much more susceptible to 
psychic suggestion than the same men when in nor- 
mal health and comfort. With a crowd of men who 
are worn out, sick, exhausted, the slightest sugges- 
tion is liable to produce a quick and most profound 
effect. W^hat the effect will be depends on the sug- 
gestion. This is the basis for Soult's statement, 
'The soldier before dinner, and the soldier after 
dinner, are two entirely different beings." Remem- 
bering, then, that poor physical or nervous condi- 
tion predisposes to psychic phenomena, we will ap- 
proach the real reason why the same troops break 
easily today and fight like heroes tomorrow, which 
is that soldiers in battle have the same mental char- 
acteristics as a crowd, and a crowd is easily swayed. 

— 8— 

On the first day the wrong influence swayed the 
crowd of soldiers. On that day some man said, "We 
are outflanked," or "The enemy is in our rear," and 
the whole crowd ran; no one looked to see if the 
report were true — most of the men had not even 
heard the report, but by a sort of mental telepathy 
they realized that the crowd was running away, 
and they ran also. They did not know why they 
ran, where they were running to, and most were 
even unconscious that they were running. On 
the next day they were just as easily swayed. The 
right man at the right time put in the suggestion 
that "We have them going now," — "Our other bat- 
talion is in their rear, and we will push them back 
and capture the whole outfit," — "Come on; let us 
rush them!" Exactly the same kind of blind rush, 
which yesterday was made to the rear, is today 
made — but it is made to the front. Losses are not 
noticed; the collective brain of the crowd is now 
centered on doing damage, and it forgets for the 
time that it is also suffering loss. When an officer 
commands on the firing line, he must realize that his 
men are just a croivcl, and that they must be handled 
like a crowd, not like the calm, respectful, obedient 
soldier of the drill ground. 

When one starts to investigate the psychology of 
war, he encounters the greatest difficulty in finding 
anything in English that directly treats of the sub- 
ject. The object of these papers is to give a general 
glossary of the different works that I have been able 
to find in English, French or German, and to tell 
where enough works can be found to enable the 
student to begin the study of the subject, leaving 
each one to progress further, according to his in- 
dividual desires. 

The subject of psychology of war naturally 
divides itself into certain sub-heads, viz. : 

1. Psychology of the suggestion of an idea to 
the individual man. 

2. Psychology of crowds. 

3. Psychology of crowds as modified by differ- 
ence in race — that is, difference in mental character- 

4. Psychological influence on troops of the mass 
of the population. 

5. Panics among troops. 

6. Psychology of troops in action. 

Napoleon used to deliver harangues to his 
soldiers that raised them to the highest pitch of 
enthusiasm. Such an harangue, delivered to troops 
of the typical American type, would produce only 
disgust and derision. That is a result of the dif- 
ferent mental characteristics of the two races. 

The same racial difference has led to the two 
principal schools of psychology. The French ap- 
proach the subject by abstract reasoning, reach 
conclusions therefrom, and then prove these conclu- 
sions to be sound by citing historical examples. The 
trouble with this is that, while accurate history may 
enable us to determine what physically occurred, it 
very seldom is able to show accurately the moral or 
psychological reasons therefor. An officer whose 
troops have failed him is not apt to want to talk 
about it. He is not apt to try to discover the rea- 
sons — for such an attempt means an investigation 
that publishes his shame, and the shame of his 
troops, to the world. He is far more apt to aver 
that untold hordes of the enemy appeared, and that, 
after an heroic defense, his troops were beaten by 
vastly superior numbers. Even when the cause of 
a panic becomes known to a few officers, they are 


apt to tell it in confidence to their comrades, but not 
to publish it abroad, nor put it in official documents. 
We attribute our success to our own valor, not to 
panic among the enemy. The real reasons for the 
acts of a body of troops are therefore impossible 
to ascertain. 

The German schools of psychology — as might 
be expected from the race — are more prone to pro- 
ceed, by accurate laboratory experiments, to demon- 
strate the scientific truth of some psychological pro- 
position, and, from this accurate determination of 
minor facts, proceed to reason out rules of general 
application. This method is equally unsatisfactory 
to the average mind because, while we are willing 
to accept the small facts as proven by the experi- 
ment, we have a doubt as to the universal applica- 
tion of the rules so deduced. 

Psychology is defined as ''the science of the 
phenomena of mind." — Century Dictionary. There 
are more than a dozen branches of the subject in 
which, we are not directly interested — such as crimi- 
nal psychology, infant psychology, medical psycho- 
logy, etc., but we must devote some attention to the 
"psychology of suggestion," as applied to the indi- 
vidual, the "psychology of crowds," and the "psy- 
chology of races" before we can intelligently consider 
the psychology of armies. 

The Psychology of Suggestion 

Instead of trying to define "suggestion" I will 
cite from ''Psychology of Suggestion" (SiDls) two or 
three examples of the type most familiar to us all 
and then point out their principle characteristic. 
(See ''Psychology of Suggestion," page 6.) 

"I hold a newspaper in my hands and begin to 


roll it up ; soon I find that my friend sitting opposite 
me rolls his in a similar way. That, we say, is a 
case of suggestion." 

"My friend Mr. A, is absent minded; he sits 
near the table, thinking of some abstruse mathe- 
matical problem that baffles all his efforts to solve it. 
Absorbed in the solution of th^t intricate problem, 
he in blind and deaf to what is going on around him. 
His eyes are directed on the table, but he appears 
not to see any of the objects there. I put two glasses 
of water on the table, and at short intervals 
make passes in the direction of the glasses — passes 
which he seems not to perceive; then I resolutely 
stretch out my hand, take one of the glasses, and 
begin to drink. My friend follows suit — dreamily 
he raises his hand, takes the glass, and begins to sip, 
awakening fully to consciousness when a good part 
of the tumbler is emptied." 

To take an interesting and amusing case given 
by Ochrowitz in his book ''Mental Suggestion :'' 

"My friend P, a man no less absent minded than 
he is keen of intellect, was playing chess in a neigh- 
boring room. Others of us were talking near the 
door. I had made the remark that it was my 
friend's habit when he paid the closest attention to 
the game to whistle an air from 'Madame Angot/ 
I was about to accompany him by beating time on 
the table. But this time he whistled something else 
— a march from 'Le Prophete.' 'Listen,' I said to 
my associates ; 'we are going to play a trick upon P. 
We will (mentally) order him to pass from the "Pro- 
phete" to "La Fille de Madame Angot." ' First I 
began to drum the march; then, profiting by some 
notes common to both, I passed quickly to the quick- 
er and more staccato measure of my friend's favor- 
ite air. P, on his part, suddenly changed the air 


and began to whistle ''Madame Angot," Everyone 
burst out laughing. My friend was too much ab- 
sorbed in a check to the queen to notice anything. 

" 'Let us begin again/ said I, 'and go back to 
*'Le Prophete.'' ' And straightway we had Meyer- 
beer once more. My friend knew that he had whis- 
tled something, but that was all he knew. 

These are trifling examples of suggestion, but 
they or similar ones are within our own knowledge. 
They illustrate what is meant by suggestion and 
bring out the main point connected therewith, viz. : 

In suggestion 'The subject accepts uncritically 
the idea suggested to him and carries it out almost 
automatically." — ''Psychology of Suggestion," page 

In all these examples we can see one more char- 
acteristic of suggestion, namely, that the idea was 
forced on the subject. Had the subject been com- 
manded to roll the newspaper, or drink the water,. or 
change the tune, he would not have done so. They 
were forced to do these acts in spite of their will and 
almost without their knowledge. 

We all know how the street fakir will extol the 
virtues of something we do not want till we feel 
impelled to buy it. The fakir understands the appli- 
cation of the psychology of suggestion, though he 
probably knows nothing of the subject scientifically. 
You have heard some person say of such a fakir. 
"He hypnotized me into buying it." In fact he did 
not hypnotize the buyer, but instead influenced the 
buyer's ordinary mind by suggestion. "Man be- 
lieves as much as he can, but as a gregarious animal 
(member of a crowd) man believes whatever is sug- 
gested to him." — Professor James. Psychologists 
assume that a person has two minds — the conscious 
mind, and the sub-conscious mind, and that the con- 


scions mind tvorks only during waking hours, while 
the sub-conscious mind (a sort of instinct) is always 
alive. This assumption is made because it is a the- 
ory that seems to account for all psychic phenomena 
and is similar to the atomic theory in chemistry in 
that, by its acceptance, we are able to reason cor- 
rectly, whether the theory be true or not. In dreams 
or the hypnotized state the sub-conscious mind is 
alone working. In the ordinary daily life, only the 
conscious mind works, but if, by psychic phenomena, 
the conscious mind be suppressed in the waking 
moments, then the sub-conscious mind takes control 
of the actions. 

The higher — that is, the conscious mind — is the 
mind of will and reason ; the other is the unreason- 
ing sort of instinct which makes us do the most un- 
reasonable things in response to suggestion. 

Some psychologists explain this by the double 
personality of the conscious and the sub-conscious 
personalities in the one brain. Others say the brain 
is like a huge switch-board and that ideas are due 
to simultaneous excitement of different atoms of the 
brain, this simultaneous excitement being brought 
about by the excitement of one atom being passed to 
the other or others by the connecting filaments of 
the brain tissue. One part of the brain tissue, called 
the central cortex, is the part that gives us what we 
know as consciousness. These psychologists claim 
that the different atoms or ions of the brain may 
connect directly or through the central cortex. That 
is, when the excitement of one part of the brain is 
passed along a private wire, as it were, we act or 
feel, but we are not conscious of it. When the 
central cortex is also plugged in, then we are also 
conscious of what we feel or how we act. The 
Psychology and Neurology of Fear takes the view 


that there is a part of the brain, the central cortex, 
which gives us what is known as consciousness. 
When that part is active we are conscious ; when it 
is not, we are not conscious. Both these states may- 
exist at the same time — e.g., we breathe all the time, 
but are seldom conscious of it, even when conscious 
of other things. 

In dealing with the subject of suggestion, it is 
well at the start to understand that there are two 
kinds of suggestibility to which the mind is subject, 
namely, the kind that is applied to what appears to 
be the plain, ordinary, everyday business mind — ^the 
normal mind, though here the sub-conscious mind is 
also active ; and the kind that is applied in hypnotism 
— the mind in an abnormal condition, when the con- 
scious mind is entirely suppressed. This hypothesis 
of the two minds in the one body was arrived at 
from the fact that a person who has been frequently 
hypnotized, can, in the hypnotized state, remember 
about the former hypnotic delusions, but nothing of 
real life, while, in the conscious state, the same 
person remembers all the things of real life, but 
nothing about the hypnotic delusions. 

The methods of influencing the sub-conscious 
mind in the conscious state and in the hypnotic state 
are different. 

An hypnotized person is told, "You must do so 
and so" — "You must do it" — "You cannot avoid do- 
ing it," "You MUST DO IT," ''Do it now," and it is 
done. This kind of direct suggestion is the only 
kind that is effective on the hypnotized mind, but in 
the conscious state, with the clear everyday mind 
working, this direct suggestion at once arouses oppo- 
sition, and the will says, "I won't be dictated to^— I 
will do as I please." 

The everyday, normal mind is spoken of as bar 


ing in the state of ''normal suggestibility" and that 
of the hypnotized and similar states of mind as be- 
ing in a state of "abnormal suggestibility." In a 
state of normal suggestibility the mind finds yield- 
ing to the dictates of another mind repulsive, though 
it can be cajoled into obedience. Remember the re- 
marks of the street fakir. He did not order you to 
buy, but instead pictured to you in glowing terms the 
advantages to be derived from becoming the posses- 
sor of his wares. 

The conditions of normal suggestibility — that is, 
both conscious and sub-conscious minds apparently 
active — are : 

1. Fixation of the attention on the subject of 
the experiment. 
' 2. Distraction of the attention from all else. 

3. Monotony — external surroundings must 
throughout the experiment remain the same. 

4. Limitation of voluntary movement — that is, 
a person in motion or constantly shifting his posi- 
tion is not apt to respond to suggestion. 

5. Inhibition — that is, the mind must be kept 
from wandering. 

6. Last, but most important, comes immediate 
execution. If an interval of time intervenes between 
the receipt of the suggestion and the beginning of 
the execution, then the reason takes hold, and the 
will dictates the action. If the street fakir does not 
induce you to buy at once, you do not buy at all. 

The conditions of abnormal suggestibility — that 
is, hypnosis — are the same, except the second and 
sixth, which are not essential, though the sixth is 
still a favorable condition in the hypnotic state. 

Now the soldier on the firing line, with his at- 
tention fixed on the enemy with such intensity as to 
distract it from all else : with the continuous roar of 


the battle, and his limited range of vision ; with his 
movements limited for considerable spaces of time to 
those necessary to the manipulation of the rifle — in 
the supports and reserves not even that; with the 
blank mind that always attends fear, fulfills all the 
conditions to be ripe for the receipt of suggestion. 
Furthermore, crowds are more susceptible to sug- 
gestion than individuals. So we see why the soldier 
in the firing line is a specially good subject for 
psychic suggestion. The very fact that his atten- 
tion is held without any action of his own will adds to 
the soldier's susceptibility. "The less voluntary the 
attention of a man is fixed, the easier it is held by 
exterior allurements, the larger will be the degree of 
suggestibility." — Alfred Lehman. 

The way in which suggestion must be given, to 
be effective, is different according to whether the 
subject is in a state of normal suggestibility or in 
the hypnotic state. 

"Normal suggestibility varies as indirect sug- 
gestion and inversely as direct suggestion." — SiDlS. 

Abnormal suggestibility — that is, hypnotism — 
is just the reverse of the above law, but as we are 
not much concerned therewith, that part of the sub- 
ject will be pursued no further. On the other hand, 
we may at any time find it useful to know the factors 
that enter into normal suggestibility. 

First, fix it in your mind that direct commands, 
such as military orders, are not obeyed by the sub- 
conscious mind, but that, as long as the sub-conscious 
is controlled by will and reason, so long are these 
commands obeyed by the will; there is no psychic 
phenomena about it. Remember also that sugges- 
tion acts, not on the will and reason, but on the sub- 
conscious. Then get it clearly understood that, in 
normal suggestibility, the sub-conscious mind will 


respond to indirect suggestions, hut will be revolted 
by direct suggestion. 

In normal suggestibility the strength of the 
suggestion is dependent on the following factors : 

1. Last impression — that is, of several impres- 
sions, the last is most likely to be acted upon. 

2. Frequency — that is, repetitions, not one 
after another, but at intervals separated by other 

3. Repetition — this is distinguished from fre- 
quency by being repetitions one after the other v^ith- 
out having other kinds of impressions put in be- 

''Repetition" is one third as. powerful as "fre- 
quency," and one fifth as powerful as ''last impres- 

4. The strongest suggestion is obtained by a 
combination of "frequency" and "last impression." 

The above statements are the results of 1,650 
laboratory experiments, the results of which are 
given by Boris Sidis. 

These factors seem to have the same relative 
importance, whether applied to the individual or to 
the crowd. 

The authors of speeches and writings which 
have made a powerful impression on the world have, 
consciously or unconsciously, made use of this law, 
and, curiously, the repetitions in such compositions 
are, making allowances for differences in rate of de- 
livery of different persons, at about equal time inter- 
vals or multiples thereof, and the speech always ends 
with the strongest suggestion of the whole lot. Those 
whose curiosity is aroused in this regard may try 
it for themselves by reading aloud Anthony's speech 
at the death of Caesar from Shakespeare, or Patrick 
Hehry's "Give me liberty or give me death" speech, 


and notice how the repeated suggestions are each 
made stronger than the preceding. Good musicians 
find the same thing to exist in the musical pieces 
that have made a lasting impression on the musical 

Now^ to illustrate, by an example, just what I 
take all this to mean, let us take the troops in a 
secondary attack. The men are in a state favorable 
to receiving suggestion. If the officer gives none, 
some coward's remarks may give the unfavorable 
suggestion that means panic. The officers from time 
to time repeat the statement that "As soon as the 
main attack gets in on their flank we will rush them 
and get the whole outfit." This, and similar sug- 
gestions, are frequently made. At the end the time 
to advance arrives and the order to advance gives 
the suggestion to each man, "Now we have them!" 
Under such conditions this advance will certainly 
have some vim and go to it. 

Psychology of Crowds^ 

"In its ordinary sense the word 'crowd' means 
a gathering of individuals of whatever nationality, 
profession or sex, whatever be the chances that have 
brought them together. From the psychological 
point of view, the expression 'crowd' assumes quite 
a different signification. Under certain given cir- 
cumstances, and only under these circumstances, an 
agglomeration of men presents new characteristics 
very different from those of the individuals compos- 
ing it. The sentiments and ideas of all persons in 
the gathering take one and the same direction, and 

^In order to let you know that this subject is one of im- 
portance to the military profession, I will here say that a 
chair of "The Psychology of Crowds" has been established in 
the French War College. 


their conscious personality vanishes. A collective 
mind is formed, doubtless transitory, but presenting 
very clearly defined characteristics. The gathering 
has thus become Avhat, in the absence of a better 
expression, I will call aji organized croivd, or a psy- 
chological crowd. It forms a single being, and is 
subject to the law of mental unity of crowds." — 
LeBon, ''The Crowd." We may put this in another 
way and say: "From the psychological point of 
view, we should understand 'crowd' to mean an 
assemblage of men who are imbued with a definite 
general incentive, and who become somewhat organ- 
ized thereunder." — Dr. Hans Gudden. 

"A thousand individuals accidentally gathered in 
a public place without any specific object in no way 
constitute a psychological crowd. To acquire the 
specific characteristics of such a crowd, the influence 
of certain predisposing causes, of which we shall 
have to determine the nature, is necessary. The 
disappearance of conscious personality, and the turn- 
ing of feelings and thoughts in a different direction, 
which are the primary characteristics of a crowd 
about to become organized, do not always involve the 
simultaneous presence of a number of individuals on 
one spot. Thousand of isolated individuals may ac- 
quire at certain moments, and under the influence of 
certain violent emotions — such, for example, as a 
great national event — the characteristics of a psy- 
chological crowd. It will be sufficient in that case 
that a mere chance should bring them together for 
their acts to at once assume the characteristics pe- 
culiar to the acts of a crowd." An entire nation, 
or an entire religious sect, though there be no visible 
agglomeration, may become a crowd under the ac- 
tion of certain influences. A psychological crowd 


once constituted, it acquires certain provisional but 
determinable general characteristics. These vary 
according to the elements of which the crowd is 

A homogeneous crotvcl is one composed of ele- 
ments more or less akin, as sects, castes, races, etc. 

A heterogeneous crowd is one composed of dis- 
similar elements, and may be further sub-divided 
into crowds of an anonymous kind, such as street 
crowds, and crowds not anonymous, such as juries 
and legislatures. 

A heterogeneous crowd possesses certain char- 
acteristics. A homogeneous crowd possesses the 
same characteristics, but side by side with them 
possesses additional ones that are not possessed by 
the heterogeneous crowd. The more ways in which 
a crowd is homogeneous, the more strongly will these 
characteristics be possessed. Thus, an army go- 
ing to fight an enemy that all the individual mem- 
bers hate would be a homogeneous crowd, but if 
this army was in addition composed of individuals, 
all of the same race, same language, same customs, 
same religious belief, and same social class, then 
would it possess these same characteristics in a 
much more marked degree. 

''It is well known that, in a crowd, a sudden im- 
pulse will affect men and produce curiously concerted 
action. The knowledge of this 'psychology or 
crowds' has often been used by leaders of men. 
After all, an army is a crowd with a common train- 
ing, and therefore easier to move than any other 
crowd to unanimous action. Hence the spirit which 
impels an advance, or a passive defense, or a retire- 
ment, may well have been transmitted by the lead- 
ers." — Captain Orr. Von Moltke implanted the 
idea of the "spirit of the offensive" in the minds of 


the whole German army. The leader whose own 
ideas are not clearly defined and whose intention is 
vacillating will get only half-hearted action from 
his troops, while on the other hand, a determined 
man who has one clear idea will himself be surprised 
to see how the troops respond. '' * * * Above 
all, the personality of the commander will imbue a 
force with the determination to advance." — Balck. 

''A couple of months after the battle of Chancel- 
lorsville, when Hooker had crossed the Rappahan- 
nock with the Army of the Potomac in the campaign 
of Gettysburg, he was asked by General Doubleday : 
'Hooker, what was the matter with you at Chancel- 
lors ville? Some say you were injured by a shell, 
and others that you were drunk; now tell us what 
it was.' Hooker answered frankly and good na- 
turedly : 'Doubleday, I was not hurt by a shell, and 
I was not drunk. For once I lost confidence in Hook- 
er, and that is all there is to it.' " — ''The Campaign 
of Chancellor sville," Bigelow, page 477. 

To illustrate by everyday examples the actions 
of a crowd, let us take an election crowd and the 
theater. The speech of our election candidate causes 
storms of applause, while, should a man of the oppo- 
site party ascend the platform, and in a few sharp 
and decisive sentences, deny the assertions, he would 
be hissed and jeered. It is a fact, well known to us, 
that paid claquers in the theater can lead the whole 
house to applaud. 

In a crowd each individual becomes a grain in 
the heap. He loses all his former characteristics 
and assumes, individually, the characteristics of a 
member of the crowd. The disappearance of the 
known personality and the consequent suspending of 
feelings and thoughts (except insofar as they are 
part of the feelings and thoughts of the crowd). 


form the first fingermarks of the organized crowd. 
A general incentive may be instilled into thousands 
of separated individuals through the medium of 
newspapers or through word of mouth from house 
to house ; it is but necessary that this general incen- 
tive cause violent emotions for the fingermarks of a 
psychological crowd to at once appear. A few of 
these people coming together by mere chance will 
then act according to the manner of organized 

Effects of crowds can be traced everywhere at 
all times and in all phases of human life, whether 
political, religious or social. Not seldom, as in the 
French Revolution or the Crusades, have these ef- 
fects been felt all over the civilized world. 

Now what are the inborn attributes of crowds? 
We have already pointed out one of them. No 
matter what the individuality of the people forming 
a crowd, how similar or dissimilar their modes of 
life, their occupation, their character or their intelli- 
gence, by the mere fact of merging into a crowd 
they form a sort of collective soul, by means of which 
they feel, act and think in a manner different from 
what each individual would, if left to himself. 
There are ideas which appear in the collective mind 
of the c7^owd that do not appear in the minds of the 
individuals who form that crowd. 

'This explains how it was that among the most 
savage members of the French Convention were to 
be found inoffensive citizens who, under ordinary 
circumstances, would have been peaceful notaries or 
virtuous magistrates. The storm past, they re- 
sumed their normal character of quiet, law-abiding 
citizens. Napoleon found among them his most do- 
cile servants." — LeBon, ''The Crowd/' page 28. 

''The chief point to remember is that a crowd's 


mind is not the average of the sum of the minds of its 
individuals, but a combination followed by the crea- 
tion of neiv characteristics.'' — Captain Orr. 

This idea may well be explained by an illustra- 
tion taken from chemistry: 

Ammonia (a gas) and tincture of iodine (a 
liquid) can be combined with the result that a black 
solid, called nitrogen iodide, will be precipitated. 

You may pound ammonia or water impregnated 
by it with a triphammer and get no results ; you may 
similarly pound tincture of iodine with the same lack 
of result ; but after you have combined the two and 
produced nitrogen iodide you must be careful that no 
one slams the door of the room if you desire to avoid 
an explosion. 

Mix oxygen gas and hydrogen gas. Nothing 
happens. Add a spark to the mixture and there will 
be a loud report and a few drops of water left. The 
oxygen and hydrogen, as such, have disappeared. 
In any agglomeration of people the elements of a 
mob are present. Add the spark of suggestion and, 
with the suddenness of an explosion the mob is 

Several causes may be attributed to bring about 
the change from personal character to the character 
of the crowd, which latter is often in the utmost 
contrast to the former : 

The first of these causes consists of the fact that 
in each individual of the crowd there arises, based 
on the mere fact of being in numbers, a feeling of 
invincible power, which at once nullifies the feeling 
of personal responsibility and which may further 
lead to a line of action never thought of were the in- 
dividual alone or at his usual avocation, or which, if 
thought of, would have been curbed. The sooner an 
individual perceives that in the crowd he is un- 


observed and unknown and the more intense the 
feeling of the crowd is, the quicker disappear the 
last remnants of the feeling of responsibility. 

However, we must not lose sight of the fact 
that in each and every crowd there are numbers of 
individuals who call "Hurrah!" "Down with him!" 
"Crucify him !" and "Hosannah !" purely and simply 
because they are afraid that were they to keep still 
their neighbors in the crowd would think them 
cowards or possibly spies. Undoubtedly many pro- 
ceed from words to deeds for that reason alone. 

A crowd exercises a sort of hypnotic influence 
on its members. We have seen that "limitation of 
voluntary movement" is one of the necessary factors 
in producing the hypnotic state. "Nowhere else, 
except perhaps in solitary confinement, are voluntary 
movements of men so limited as they are in the 
crowd; and the larger the crowd is the greater is 
this limitation, the lower sinks the individual self." 
— SiDis, ''Psychologij of Suggestion," page 299. 

Much will power is required to oppose the action 
of a crowd of which we form a part ; only very few 
people possess that energy. Most people in a crowd 
feel that they are doing wrong, but do it because the 
crowd urges and drives. For these reasons acts are 
passed by legislatures and decisions reached by juries 
that would never have occurred had each of the in- 
dividuals been obliged to reach the decision by him- 
self. We all know that strong action comes from a 
single strong leader. As Napoleon said, "Councils 
of war never fight." 

The second cause of crowd-sentiment and crowd- 
treatment lies in imitation. Even with animals 
imitation plays a great role, and that, not only with 
animals, but also with the lower orders — for instance, 
ants. Scientists have observed the interesting fact 

that, in a mixed colony of ants, the ants of one 
species, by imitating the actions of another species, 
succeeded in catching bugs theretofore impossible to 
them. It is well known that the barking of a single 
dog immediately induces all dogs in the neighborhood 
to bark. The desire of imitation is so strong in 
monkeys as to be proverbial. The desire to imitate 
is not less strong in the human being than in ani- 
mals. In company one yawns; the others at once 
follow suit. This yawning in conjunction is an in- 
stinctive involuntary imitation and it may be found 
in everything else. "Society is but a web of similari- 
ties, produced by imitation in all possible forms, such 
as customs, sympathy, usage, instruction, education, 
etc." — SiGHELE. Imitation develops its most at- 
tractive power just where there is a crowd. In a 
theater or in a public assembly, at least for the time 
being, the clapping of hands or the hissing of a few 
persons decides the success of a play or an author. 

The undeniable fact of imitation, so closely 
interwoven with our daily life, is intimately con- 
nected with another general human characteristic, 
namely, the suggestibility or psychological power of 
contagion, which in many individuals amounts to 
hypnotism. Hypnotism and suggestion are merely 
new designations for appearances of the human soul, 
which had been practiced from time immemorial, but 
which up to recent times were screened by mystery 
and superstition and which have only gradually been 
stripped of their secrecy. In suggestion we have to 
treat tvith implanting a certain thing in a man's 

The same thing is true of hypnotism, only in this 
case there occurs a state of coma, in which the sub- 
ject loses all knoivledge of everything except %vhat 


is suggested to him by the manipulator, and in hyp- 
notism the subject has no power of reasoning. 

In prior centuries, when the degree of general 
education was very low, when there was an almost 
total absence of legal or social order, psychological 
infection was far more frequent and far stronger, 
so that we may well speak of psychological infection 
epidemics, which, like the other epidemics, were not 
without their unfortunate consequences. For in- 
stance, we will mention the children's crusade in 
1212, the main theatre of which was the southern 
part of France. At that time the minds of the adults 
were blunted by the experiences of four previous 
crusades and did not respond to the call for another 
crusade to redeem the Holy Land ; but on the other 
hand the accounts of events in those crusades and of 
the wonders of the Orient filled the minds and 
phantasy of the children, and the flame was fed by 
incendiary sermons. In the year 1212 there as- 
sembled, under the leadership of a young shepherd 
boy, Etienne, about 30,000 boys and girls disguised 
as boys, of all classes, imbued with the idea that the 
Scriptures demanded of them, the minors, the re- 
demption of the Holy Land. There was no holding 
them; all warnings were stifled by the call, *'To 
God, to God r 

They refused to obey all parental restraint, and 
those that were locked up to prevent their joining 
the crusade slowly pined away. 

To these unfortunate boys and girls, there at- 
tached themselves a lot of unscrupulous loafers and 
slave dealers. Of the seven ships on which the 
children took passage at Marseilles, ostensibly for 
transportation to the Holy Land, two foundered and 
the occupants of the other five were sold into slavery 
in Egypt. In similar manner ended the crusade 


which was made in two columns across Mts. Cenis 
and St. Gothard. A part of that crusade arrived at 
Brindisi, where the bishop prevented further travel. 
The remainder took passage in ships at Genoa, and 
also ended in slavery. There are a number of psy- 
chological epidemics of mature persons known to 
history. The most prominent of these are the 
"dance epidemics" of the middle ages. In the year 
1374 societies of men and women were formed, in 
Aachen first, later on in different places, who danced, 
hand in hand, for hours until completely exhausted. 
Many of the onlookers joined the dancers, increased 
their numbers and travelled around the country with 
them. Farmers left their plows, artisans their tools, 
women their kitchens, to join the wild dance and to 
spread the infection. This epidemic spread all over 
Europe. In Italy there was a curious offshoot of the 
epidemic which l6d to a belief that one bitten by a 
tarantula would die unless he kept dancing to a 
certain tune. This tune is called the "Tarantella," 
and the violent dance of the same name to this day 
remains in Italy, though no longer used as a cure for 
insect bites. (See "Psychology of Suggestion," 
page 326.) 

A similar dance frenzy is shown by the St. Me- 
dardus epidemic, lasting a decade, from 1729 to 1739, 
which was based on the rumor that several lame 
men had been healed by visiting the grave of a 
visionary, Francois de Paris, in the cemetery of St. 
Medardus. Crowds at once congregated at that 
cemetery and dance orgies took place. Some hopped 
for hours, other whirled without stopping, while 
others flayed themselves with slats. There were also 
cases of voluntary crucifixion. In vain the authori- 
ties tried to call a halt by closing the cemetery — the 
infection spread all over Paris. 


In a similar manner the Huguenot persecution 
in the mountains of southern France caused the in- 
ception of the so-called society of "Trembleurs." 
In their prayer meetings one would suddenly fall 
down with cramps and visions, and commence to 
talk incoherently. This movement infected children 
and adults alike and inspired the Trembleurs to 
resistance against the King's officers. In one place 
the people opposed the King's troops entirely un- 
armed, believing that they, supported by the Holy 
Ghost, could breathe away the troops, while the 
women sang hymns. The result was a terrible 

As very similar epidemics with a religious back- 
ground, may be cited the pilgrimages of the "Flage- 
lantes" in the middle ages ; the acts of the ^'Doko- 
bers" in Canada, who seek the Savior in the middle 
of winter stripped stark naked; in the snake dances 
of our American Indians ; and in the Voodoo dance 
of the African negroes. At Cassel, Germany, in 
1907, there occurred every day during July, religious 
meetings, the main features of which were trans- 
ports of ecstacy, illumination, or enlightenment, and 
the so-called "speaking with tongues." The crowds 
were drunk with religious ecstacy. With songs, 
with profession of religion, with confession of sins 
and speeches of repentance, there were mixed in- 
articulate sounds, wild murmurings, moanings and 
cries. There were seen many kinds of faces in 
agony, men sinking to the ground unconscious. 
Suddenly some one would start up and call out in an 
unknown tongue. This raised the excitement to the 
highest pitch. After a while the excitement became 
so intense that people began to get hurt. Then the 
police took a hand and suppressed the meetings.— 
Dr. GUDDEN. Nevertheless an article, written in 


1910, declares that the movement is not yet dead, 
but is actually extending. 

In these epidemics women seem more liable to 
contagion, on account of their more or less hysterical 
disposition, and women as a rule start the movement. 
Psychological epidemics in nunneries and other fe- 
male institutions may be counted by the hundreds. 
In these epidemics the first adherents have been 
hysterical, weak-minded persons or persons of a low 
degree of intelligence. Still we know of psychologi- 
cal epidemics not originated by hysterics or religious 
things, but by the ordinary human weakness of 
seeking quick and easy gain of wealth and by curi- 
osity. Here the originators know what they are 
about, and the first victims are uneducated or in- 
experienced persons. 

The "South Sea Bubble," started in England in 
1711, was a £10,000,000 company formed to corner 
the trade with South America. It never had any 
prospect of success, yet £100 shares rose to a value 
of £1,050 — then the bubble burst, and England had 
a financial panic. 

During the "tulip mania" in Holland in 1620, 
the value of one species rose as high as 13,000 florins 
— before the year was out the same species brought 
but 5 florins. The entire population had raised 
tulips, having sold farms, jewelry — all personal pos- 
sessions — in order to raise and speculate in them. 

The 1910 "rubber speculation" of England and 
her dependencies is the latest similar epidemic. 

Our "bucket shops" are worked on the same 
psychological principle. 

In large sensational trials we often see a number 
of witnesses who are so imbued with things sug- 
gested to them, by talks or reading the newspapers, 
that their own knowledge which they are called 


upon to testify to is colored or falsified, and they 
. insert in their testimony happenings which have 
not the slightest bearing on the case at bar, without 
being cognizant of their falsification. In the trial of 
one Berchold in Munich, not less than three women 
witnesses swore to having seen Berchold in a dress, 
which was afterwards proved to be mere imagina- 
tion, the witnesses having seen the dress in a fashion 

Psychology of crowds sometimes takes a humor- 
ous side. Lieutenant Hobson, after blowing up the 
Merrimac in Santiago, lectured in the States. After 
one of these lectures a lady could not curb her feel- 
ings and had to kiss Hobson. Thereupon, according 
to the papers, all the ladies kissed him. 

In Canada a few years ago there was a sudden 
furor because of a proposition for commercial reci- 
procity with the United States. It was widely de- 
clared that the United States was trying to annex 
Canada, and, in a burst of patriotic enthusiasm, the 
Canadians rejected the proposition. A few months 
afterward Mr. MacDonald, editor of the Toronto 
Globe, made the following statement about the matter 
in a lecture: "The people have returned to sober 
thinking and regret their action. The voters were 
swayed by the unintelligent action of the crowd. 
The annexation bugaboo was to blame for it all. It 
was just an evil rumor that got started and you 
could no more stop it than you could halt a tornado. 
People were swept away by it and acted rashly. 
They are now in a repentant mood."— Lecture on 
''The Man and the Crowd/' 

As to the ^'feeling" of a crowd, we may say 
that it is susceptible, impulsive and changeable. The 
murderers of the days of the "Terror" in 1792 never 
took the pocketbooks or jewelry of their victims, but 


turned them over to the authorities. In the same 
Terror days, a mob wanted to kill a prison guard 
because he had refused water to his prisoners for 
twenty-four hours before their execution; and the 
same mob murdered the same prisoners so as to give 
every one of its members chance to see what ven- 
geance could be taken on the aristocrats. 

As a rule, man, by merely belonging to an organ- 
ized crowd, descends in the matter of civilization. 
By himself he is an educated individual ; as a mem- 
ber of a crowd he has the fingermarks of the crowd. 
This is one of the main reasons why, what in strikes 
start out to be peaceable meetings to discuss griev- 
ances, sooner or later lead to mob violence. LeBon 
says of man as a member of a crowd : "He has the 
spontaneity, the abandon and also the enthusiasm 
and heroism of primitive peoples." This fact has 
been understood for hundreds of years. A Roman 
emperor said, "The senators are a courageous people 
— the senate is a beast." — Dr. Gudden. 

A German writer has said, "One is a man, sev- 
eral are people, many are animals." — Dr. GUDDEN. 

Schiller (in "Gelehrte Gesellschaften") says: 
"Anyone, taken as an individual, is tolerably sen- 
sible and reasonable. As a member of a crowd he 
at once becomes a blockhead." 

To get down to the things that are of use to us, 
I will quote from LeBon the way in which a crowd 
can be led (page 141 and the following) : 

1. When it is wanted to stir up a crowd for a short 
space of time, to induce it to commit an act of any nature — 
to pillage a palace, or die in defense of a stronghold or a 
barricade, for instance — the crowd must be acted upon by 
rapid suggestions, among which example is the most power- 
ful in effect. To attain this end, however, it is necessary 
that the crowd should have been previously prepared by 
certain circumstances, and above all, that he who wishes to 
work upon it should possess the quality, to be studied further 
on, to which I have given the name of prestige. 


2. When, however, it is proposed to imbue the mind of 
a crowd with ideas and belief— with modern social theories 
for instance — the leaders have recourse to different expe- 
dients. The principal of them are three in number and 
clearly defined — affirmation, repetition, and contagion. Their 
action IS somewhat slow, but their effects, once produced, are 
very lasting. 

Affirmation, pure and simple, kept free of all 
reasoning and all proof, is one of the surest means of 
making an idea enter the mind of crowds. The more 
concise an affirmation is, the more destitute of every 
appearance of proof and demonstration, the more 
weight it carries. The religious books and legal 
codes of all ages have always resorted to simple 
affirmation. Statesmen called upon to defend a poli- 
tical cause, commercial men pushing the sale of their 
products by means of advertising, are acquainted 
with the value of affirmation. 

Affirmation, however, has no real influence, un- 
less it be constantly repeated, and so far as possi- 
ble in the same terms. The thing affirmed comes by 
repetition to fix itself in the mind in such a way that 
it is accepted in the end as a demonstrated truth. 
(You will note that what LeBon here calls ''repeti- 
tion" is the same thing that was in the ''Psychology 
of Suggestion" spoken of as "frequency" — that is, 
the repetitions are not a monotonous use of the same 
words, with no let up, but a repetition of the same 
words at frequent intervals.) This power is due to 
the fact that the repeated statement is imbedded, in 
the long run, in those profound regions of our un- 
conscious selves in which the motives of our actions 
are forged. At the end of a certain time we have 
forgotten who is the author of the repeated state- 
ment, and we finish by believing it. To this cir- 
cumstance is due the astonishing power of advertise- 

When an affirmation has been repeated suffi- 


ciently, and there is unanimity in this repetition — as 
has occurred in the case of certain famous financial 
undertakings rich enough to purchase powerful as- 
sistance — what is called a current of opinion is 
formed, and the powerful mechanism of contagion 
intervenes. Ideas, sentiments, emotions and beliefs 
possess in crowds a contagious power as intense as 
that of microbes. This phenomena is very natural, 
since it is observed even in animals when they are 
together in numbers. Should a horse in a stable 
take to biting his manger, the other horses will imi- 
tate him. A panic that has seized a few sheep will 
soon extend to the whole flock. In the case of man 
collected in a crowd, all emotions are very rapidly 
contagious, which explains the suddenness of panics. 
Brain disorders, like madness, are themselves con- 
tagious. The frequency of madness among doctors 
who are specialists for the mad is notorious. 

For individuals to succumb to contagion, their 
simultaneous presence on the same spot is not in- 
dispensable. The action of contagion may be felt 
from a distance under the influence of events which 
give all minds an individual trend and the character- 
istics peculiar to crowds. 

Man, like animals, has a natural tendency to 
imitation. Imitation is necessary for him, pro- 
vided that the imitation is quite easy. It is this 
necessity that makes the influence of what is called 
fashion so powerful. Whether in a matter of opin- 
ions, ideas, literary manifestations, or merely of 
dress, how many persons are bold enough to run 
counter to the fashion? It is by examples, not by 
arguments, that crowds are guided. 

"In the danger zone which suddenly surrounds 
and startles him in war, the soldier feels, in the first 
place, a desire to have someone assure him that the 


seemingly critical situation in which he finds him- 
self is as it should be. His eye is naturally directed 
upon his officers. If the officer's quiet glance re- 
minds him that here, as in peace time, the first duty 
is obedience, and if he subsequently sees the officer 
advance fearlessly and vigorously, he will, as a rule, 
not worry about the why or wherefore." — Balck. 

At every period there exists a small number of 
individualities which react upon the remainder and 
are imitated by the unconscious mass. "Reason is 
incapable of transforming man's convictions." — 
''Psychology of Peoples." 


Great power is given to ideas propagated by 
affirmation, repetition, and contagion by the circum- 
stances that they acquire in time that mysterious 
force known as prestige. 

Whatever has been the ruling power in the 
world, whether it be ideas or man, has, in the main 
enforced its authority by means of that irresistible 
force known as "prestige." The term is one whose 
meaning is grasped by everybody, but the word is 
employed in ways too different for it to be easy to 
define it. Prestige may involve such sentiments as 
admiration or fear. Occasionally even these senti- 
ments are its basis, but it can perfectly exist without 
them. The greatest measure of prestige is possessed 
by the dead — by beings, that is, of whom we do not 
stand in fear — by Alexander, Caesar, Mahomet, and 
Buddha, for example. 

Prestige, in reality, is a sort of domination ex- 
ercised on our mind by an individual, a work, or an 
idea. This domination entirely paralyzes our criti- 
cal faculty, and fills our soul with astonishment and 


respect. The sentiment provoked is inexplicable, 
like all sentiments, but it would appear to be of the 
same kind as the facination to which a magnetized 
person is subjected. Prestige is the mainspring of 
all authority. Neither gods, kings or women have 
ever reigned without it. The various kinds of pres- 
tige may be grouped under two principal heads : ac- 
quired prestige, and personal prestige. Acquired 
prestige is that resulting from name, fortune and 
reputation. It may be independent of personal pres- 
tige. Personal prestige, on the contrary, is some- 
thing peculiar to the individual ; it may co-exist with 
reputation, glory and fortune, or be strengthened 
by them, but it is perfectly able .to exist in their ab- 

Acquired or artificial prestige is much the most 
common. The mere fact that a person occupies a 
certain position, possesses a certain fortune, or bears 
certain titles, endows him with prestige, however 
slight his own personal worth. An officer with his 
shoulder straps or a judge in his robes always enjoys 
prestige. The most unbending socialist is always 
somewhat impressed by the sight of a prince or a 
marquis. The prestige of which I have spoken is 
exercised by persons; side by side with it may be 
placed th^t exercised by opinions, literary and ar- 
tistic work, etc. Prestige of the latter sort is most 
often the result of accumulated repetitions. His- 
tory, literary and artistic history especially, being 
nothing more than the repetition of identical judg- 
tnents, which nobody endeavors to verify, everyone 
ends by repeating what he learned at school, till 
there comes to be names and things which nobody 
would venture to meddle with. 

Now I come to ''personal prestige." Its nature 
is very different from that of artificial or acquired 


prestige, with which we have just been concerned. 
It is a faculty independent of all titles, of all au- 
thority, and possessed by a small number of persons, 
whom it enables to exercise a veritable magnetic 
fascination on those around them, although they are 
socially their equals, and lack all ordinary means of 
domination. They force the acceptance of their 
ideas and sentiments on those about, and they are 
obeyed, as is the tamer of wild animals, by the beast 
that could easily devour him. 

The great leaders of crowds, such as Buddha, 
Jesus, Mahomet, Joan of Arc, and Napoleon, have 
possessed this form of prestige in a high degree, and 
to this endowment is more particularly due the 
position they attained. Gods, heroes and dogmas 
win their way in the world of their own inward 
strength. They are not to be discussed; they dis- 
appear, indeed, as soon as they are discussed. "The 
age of decadence of gods, institutions and dogmas 
has always begun as soon as they are exposed to 
discussion." — ''Psychology of Peoples." 

The great personages I have named were in 
possession of their power of facination long before 
they became illustrious, and never would have be- 
come so without it. An example in point is taken 
from Train, who cites contemporary memoirs as his 
authority, and gives an account of the arrival of 
Napoleon in Italy to take command of the army 
there. Remember that this was before Napoleon 
had won any victories. 

'The generals of divisions, amongst them Au- 
gereau, a sort of swashbuckler, uncouth and heroic, 
proud of his height and his bravery, arrived at the 
staff quarters, very badly disposed toward the little 
upstart dispatched them from Paris. On the 
strength of the description of him that has been 


given them, Augereau is inclined to be insolent and 
insubordinate (to one who is) a favorite of Barras, 
a general who owes his rank to the events of Ven- 
demiaire, who has won his grade by street fighting, 
who is looked upon as bearish because he is always 
thinking in solitude, of poor aspect, and with the 
reputation of a mathematician and a dreamer. They 
are introduced (into the ante-room), and Napoleon 
keeps them waiting. At last he appears, girt with 
his sword : he puts on his hat, explains the measures 
he has taken, gives his orders and dismisses them. 
Augereau has remained silent ; it is only when he is 
outside that he regains his self-possession and is able 
to deliver himself of a stream of profanity. He 
admits with Messena that this little devil of a gen- 
eral has inspired him with awe; he cannot under- 
stand the ascendency . by which from the very first 
he has felt himself overwhelmed." 

Later, in 1815, after Napoleon had acquired the 
prestige of all of his victories. General Vandamme 
said to another marshal as they went together up the 
steps of the palace : "That devil of a man exercises 
a fascination on me that I cannot explain, even to 
myself, and in such a degree that, though I fear 
neither God nor devil, yet when I am in his presence, 
I am ready to tremble like a child, and he could make 
me go through the eye of a needle, to throw myself 
in the fire." 

His prestige outlived him and continued to 
grow. It was his prestige that made an emperor of 
his obscure nephew. How powerful his memory 
still is may be seen by the resurrection of Napo- 
leonic history at the present day. 

Illtreat men as you will, massacre them by the 
millions, be the cause of invasion upon invasion, all 
is permitted you if you possess prestige in a suf- 


ficient degree and the talent necessary to uphold it. 
(This part on psychology of crowds is taken, some- 
times quoted, from LeBon's ''The Crotvd.") 

Effect of Mass of the Population on Armies 

History repeats itself : that is, a certain psycho- 
logical phenomena in the nation or the world with 
its accompanying results, is followed in turn by 
another and another till at last the circle has been 
completed and the round begins again. 

Isolated communities combine with adjoining 
ones for mutual protection and we have small states. 
Instead of suffering meekly, they combine to fight 
off their enemies. This begets the more prominent 
military virtues of courage and mutual confidence. 
Small communities more or less expect to protect 
themselves. Large ones rely on the state furnishing 
them protection. Team work is more to be expected 
between small communities and small states than 
among larger ones, and this characteristic extends 
to armies formed from their inhabitants. These 
small states combine with others till one is formed 
that, to its constituents, seems powerful enough to 
defy the world. Then, freed from menace from the 
outside, commercial pursuits become the sole en- 
thusiasm of the individuals composing the state ; 
luxury increases till men, voicing the cry, "I want 
what I want when I want it," lapse into effeminacy 
and selfishness and forget that the protection that 
the nation will be able to furnish them in their com- 
mercial pursuits is wholly dependent on a spirit 
among them of self sacrifice for the mutual good. 

"Selfish and worldly activity, looking only to- 
ward the gratification of all desires of the individual, 
undermines the foundations of higher moral philoso- 

phy and the belief in ideals. Fools arrive at the vain 
conclusion that the life object of the individual is 
acquisition and enjoyment; that the purpose of the 
state is simply to facilitate the business affairs of its 
citizens ; that man is appointed by an all-wise Provi- 
dence to buy cheaply and sell at a profit; they con- 
clude that war, which interferes with man's activi- 
ties, is the greatest evil. "" * * *" — VoN Moltke. 

The individuals seek personal advantage against 
the interests of the state or even against the state 
itself. The state has become decadent and it begins 
to break up or have portions of its territory taken 
by others. When this state of luxury and fulfillment 
of individual desires has reached a certain degree, 
then will a severe war break up the state entirely or 
else it will break up the individual's pursuit of 
luxury as a first consideration and make him turn 
to the preservation of the state as the essential. 

As it is not always the largest army that wins, 
so it is not always the apparently strongest state 
that wins. A long war is a test of endurance. A 
state composed of individuals who will suffer rather 
than yield may be exterminated, but it cannot be 
conquered. The soldiers of such a state are honored 
by the citizens, who, while they stay at home and 
produce the supplies necessary to the state, do not 
regard production and speculation as the sole honor- 
able means of getting a livelihood, but, if able-bodied, 
they expect at some time to change places with the 
fighting men. 

In modern times the highly-specialized soldiery 
of a century or two ago have given place to armed 
masses, proportionately greater in number, but not 
so highly trained. Whether these masses are volun- 
teers or conscripts, they come from all classes of 
society and consist of the bulk of all the able-bodied 


citizens. They are in constant communication with 
the rest of the population. Newspapers and electri- 
cal means of communication also produce unity of 
thought between the part of the population that is in 
the field and the part that is at home. Any psycho- 
logical manifestation in one part will almost certain- 
ly appear in the other with about equal strength. If 
those at home get tired of the struggle, the army 
will show moral weakness. Panic in the one will 
produce panic in the other. Accustomed to more 
luxury and less hardship than in years gone by, 
neither part will hold out to extremity as in former 
times. This is the reason that modern wars are 
expected to be short. A big reverse and both army 
and populace lose their nerve. Neither is willing to 
pay the price of success. 

While modern means of communication tend to 
reduce the time that a psychological epidemic will 
last, at the same time they allow one to spread more 
rapidly. A violent psychological epidemic that en- 
courages to war will spread like wild-fire and will 
reach the whole nation at the same time. 

The united front of Germany in 1870 or Japan 
in 1904 will be possible in any coming war. The 
side that has such intense feeling among all classes 
will be well-nigh invincible tvhile the thought wave 

One of the most likely results of these condi- 
tions is a sudden and resistless demand for war, 
everything carried to the top pitch of enthusiasm, 
that will force an unprepared government into war, 
followed after one severe defeat by an equally deep 
dejection that will culminate in an equally resistless 
demand for peace at any price. The people and the 
army are so bound up together that unless the mili- 
tary virtures of courage, mutual confidence and 


self-sacrifice for the good of the state are developed 
among the people they will not exist in the army, 
for in these days the populace is the army. 

Psychology of Races 

The psychologist distinguishes between peoples 
by their main mental, just as the naturalist distin- 
guishes between species by a few main physical, 
characteristics. The superior degree of will power, 
indomitable energy, great initiative, absolute self- 
control and strong sentiment of independence of the 
pure Anglo-Saxon distinguishes him from the other 
human beings just as fins and gills distinguish the 
fish from other vertebrates. A fish may be large or 
small; chunky or slim; red, white, blue, black or 
drab; live in salt or fresh water; have eyes or be 
sightless; and prey on others or not, but if he has 
fins and gills he is a fish. All the non-essentials 
may be changed by environment, but the essential 
characteristics remain, being subject to change only 
by the slow transformations of evolution that require 
countless ages for their completion. So the main 
mental characteristics of a race are their inheritance 
from countless generations of dead ancestors and 
change very slowly or remain unchanged under the 
influence of education and environment. 

"The influences of environment only become 
effective when heredity has caused their action to 
be continued in the same direction during a long 
period." — LeBon, "Psychology of Peoples," page 9. 

Applied to one Anglo-Saxon these main char- 
acteristics may be so hidden by changes in minor but 
more noticeable ones as to make one think the main 
ones have changed or disappeared. But applied to 
a thousand Anglo-Saxons anywhere, we will at once 


see that they are plainly noticeable. Applied to one 

Englishman or one what we consider the typical 

Englishman or the typical may seem to be 

imperfectly represented, but applied to a thousand 
of each we at once see the typical Englishman or 

typical in spite of all the minor changes that 

education or environment may have produced. 

Burbank may so change a fruit or a vegetable 
that the eye cannot detect that it is a member of the 
family from which it springs, but the one or two 
main characteristics of that family will remain un- 
changed, and the scientist will by these character- 
istics still unhesitatingly place it in the family from 
which it came. 

So with us "we are the children at once of our 
parents and our race." — ''Psychology of Peoples," 
page 9. 

One of the strongest forces that tends to produce 
a uniform trend of mind in any fairly homogeneous 
people is religious belief. We can plainly see the 
different mental attitudes of the Christian, Moham- 
medan and Buddhist. 

So great is the mental difference between differ- 
ent peoples that they can never fully understand 
one another. You think with not only a different 
brain but a different kind of brain than does your 
Filipino servant. The impression that a series of 
words or a series of events makes on your brain 
differs from that made on his brain by the same 
words or events. This is so marked that it is im- 
possible to accurately translate any idea from one 
language to another. For example the dictionaries 
give pan (Spanish) and bread (English) as equi- 
valent. To you the word "bread" brings to mind a 
mental picture of a large loaf, made without much 
if any lard and with a small proportion of crust and 


much soft interior, but to the Spaniard the word 
"pan" brings up a mental picture of a small hard loaf, 
all crust and made with much lard. 

In a similar manner events make different im- 
pressions on different kinds of brains. 

Education and environment may quickly change 
the more noticeable expressions of a brain, but they 
do not change its kind. 

In ten years a fairly intelligent Japanese can 
acquire all the education and exterior social graces 
of an Englishman. To transform the Japanese so 
that a series of events would give him the same 
mental picture that they give to an Englishman, a 
thousand years would not be sufficient. 

We think with much the same kind of a brain 
as does the Englishman. Given a particular set of 
circumstances, we can predict within one or two 
alternative lines of action just what an Englishman 
will do ; but what a Japanese, a Chinaman, a negro 
or a Filipino will do under these same circumstances, 
07^ ivhy, is entirely beyond our comprehension. By 
association with one of these peoples we may come 
to know more nearly what they will do, hut never 

When peoples of different mental characteristics 
mix and intermarry, three conditions may arise : 

First. — When the higher civilization constitutes but a 
small proportion it at once reverts to the lower. 

Second. — When the higher civilization is a large propor- 
tion of the whole the lower dies out and ceases to exist. A 
higher civilization can swallow up and entirely eradicate a 
larger proportion of the other than can a lower. In neither 
case do the two amalgamate and produce an average of the 

Third. — When two or more civilizations mix all in large 
proportion, still amalgamation does not ensue. On the con- 
trary, the different main mental characteristics mutually 
exterminate each other and a new civilization is formed. 
The old is gone and a new grows up from virgin soil. 

After the mixing is complete, generations will be neces- 


sary before a new civilization with fixed mental characteris- 
tics is fully established. 

In the United States at the present day we have 
the mixture that will soon eradicate the mental char- 
acteristics of the constituent parts, and if left to 
ourselves we will eventually produce a race and a 
civilization of our own, different in mental attitude 
from that of any of the constituent parts or an 
average of them. 

As a practical measure, however, we have today 
to deal with the mixture of many parts and with 
different kinds of peoples. 

The Anglo-Saxon and allied stock we had before 
the Civil War. We know them and know what they 
will do in war. Now for military purposes let us 
consider the rest. 

First, we have taken in the negro. There are 
something like 11,000,000 of him. By association 
we know something of what he will do, but as we 
think with a different kind of brain we do not per- 
ceive the why of his acts. In other words, we will 
not be able to get the best out of him as a soldier 
because we do not understand how to touch the main- 
springs of his character. 

Another large proportion of our population is 
made up from those who, through they have no par- 
ticular home on the earth from which to inherit 
their ideas, have peculiarities of physique and of 
mind that make them foreign in tastes and mental 
attitudes to all other classes of our population. In 
a cause that appealed to their peculiar type of mind 
and led by officers who had some insight into the 
ideas that heredity has placed in their heads, they 
may be used to advantage. Unless we can touch the 
latent mainsprings of their character they will be 
out of accord with the other elements of our army 

- 45— 

and may be counted of comparatively little use. A 
machine will not work smoothly the different parts 
of which are put in action by discordant impulses. 

Another large proportion of our citizens come 
from southern Europe. Their number is increasing 
each year. These men have the mental character- 
istics that Napoleon's soldiers had. One of the 
principal of these is the instinctive demand for a 
leader more than for a cause. The cause gets the 
vocal allegiance, but they follow a leader, not an 

The French demanded liberty and equality, and, 
though they made the Revolution to get it, yet there 
was even less freedom under the Republic than there 
had been under the kings. The names of all the 
old institutions were changed, but all the institu- 
tions themselves remained, with their characteris- 
tics essentially unchanged. The turmoil continued 
till another leader. Napoleon, arose. We laugh at 
the harangues that Napoleon made use of in order 
to raise his subjects to enthusiasm in his service, but 
we will now have in our armies a considerable pro- 
portion of men with just the mental characteristics 
of those same subjects. We do not understand their 
brains. From the same events or words we do not 
get the same mental picture that they do. 

The Anglo-Saxon fights stubbornly in defeat. 
The Latin makes a more enthusiastic and dangerous 
attack, but sinks into deepest dejection and hope- 
lessness under a reverse. 

A big war will now make it necessary to combine 
all these unf usible elements into one whole. 

One of the startling disclosures of the 1910 
census is that only 53.8 per cent, of our population 
are whites of native parentage. In the New Eng- 
land states less than 40 per cent, are of native stock. 


All of the northern states, except Missouri and In- 
diana, have more than one fourth of their popula- 
tion of foreign extraction. The percentage of for- 
eign stock has increased 40 per cent, since 1870 and 
that of foreign horn has increased 50 per cent, since 
1850. / 

The organization, the methods, the leaders that 
suit one part will be unsuitable to the others. 

In the Civil War the population of each of the 
contending parties was fairly homogeneous^ in race 
and character. Though neither side well understood 
the mental characteristics of the other, each well 
understood itself. Each had its physical strength 
pushed into action by a strong fixed idea. Today it 
is impossible to think of an idea which would make 
a strong mental and psychological impression on the 
whole mass of the population. It is therefore im- 
probable that the Civil War can furnish any reliable 
mformation as to what we may expect our people to 
accomplish today. 

Part II 


'7w all battles the eyes are vanquished first." — Tacitus. 
HEN in prehistoric times, the great god *Tan" 


still had his existence in the mind of a people 
rich in imagination and love of nature, a loving 
couple hidden in the forest or a wanderer overtaken 
by darkness and inclement weather believed they 
heard in the rustling of the leaves or in the other 
noises of the forest the steps of the angry god — when 
they in fright and fear ran out of the forest to the 
protection of the nearby huts, they experienced what 
the Greeks at that period designated as "fright of 

From this we get the derivation of the word 
"panic," the meaning of which, after centuries have 
elapsed, is still applicable to paroxysms of fright. 
However, the word "panic" has a somewhat differ- 
ent meaning today. By it we understand today the 
sudden, precipitate, unreasoning fright taking pos- 
session of a crowd which, unlike fear or fright 
originating in the depth of the individual human 
mind, cannot be combated or curbed by reasoning. 

Such a fright, which may have its origin possibly 
in an utterly unimportant happening in a crowd, 
suddenly calls into existence the crudest features of 
self-preservation, features which existed from time 

^Prepared mostly from an article in Revue d'Infanterie 
of November, 1907, translated in Military Information Do- 
cument No. 12149, of School Library File, and an article by 
Colonel Emil Pfluelf on the same subject, translated from 
the German. 


immemorial in the human race, but which we over- 
come by advancing civilization ; such a fright entirely 
fills the human mind by driving into the background 
every other feeling, governs the movements of and 
drives the crowd, causing each individual of the 
crowd to lose his power of judgment, reasoning and 
self-command, and leads it, incapable of resistance, 
into purely brute actions. This is what LeBon 
speaks of as a "psychological crowd." Once the 
same general incentive has taken possession of the 
minds of the individuals and the psychological crowd 
has become organized, it forms a "collective soul" 
which has not the psychic attributes of the separate 
individuals, nor an average of these individual attri- 
butes, but which takes on an entirely new personality 
— the personality of the crowd. 

In the psychological crowd, the individual is 
no longer himself ; he feels and acts, but in the sense 
of the "collective soul" and shares its peculiarities 
and desires. 

The general fingermarks of the psychological 
crowds are: 

The extinction of personal feeling or consciousness^ — the 
knowledge of being on^ of many in the crowd. 

The absence of any feeling of responsibility. 

Susceptibility to suggestion. 

An exaggerated independence. 

Subjection to being easily led. 

A certain willingness to do things, without regard to 
right, justice or consequences. 

That under such conditions all bounds set by 
education, culture and reason are driven into the 
background — that the "human beast" comes to the 
surface — is self-evident. 

Now, a body of troops, under certain conditions, 
is a psychological crowd. In a state of rest, during 
a lull of the battle, or while on the march, out of 


contact with the enemy, it may not be a psychological 
crowd, but in times of stress it will always be such. 

The more heterogeneous the elements that com- 
pose an army, the more susceptible it will be to the 
wild, unreasoning acts of the psychological crowd — 
the more subject will it be to panic. 

On the other hand, troops that are composed of 
individuals who are all of the same race, same class 
of society, same language, same political and reli- 
gious faith, and who are uniformly educated and in- 
structed till they have confidence in their officers, 
their comrades and themselves, will be little subject 
to panic ; but even these will sometimes have panics 
among them. 

''The primary condition of success is the soldier's 
capacity to withstand for a longer period than his 
adversary, not only material casualties, but also 
severe attacks on his morale. 

"Now, a mass of troops is, like all crowds, more 
easily swayed, more easily nervous and impression- 
able than a single individual. It is as easily infec- 
ted with panic as with heroism. 

"In the psychology of battle the efforts of com- 
manders must ever be directed towards preventing 
panic and towards raising each individual spirit." 

The study of cases of panic which have occurred 
at various times and in various armies show that 
if, in combat, the determining cause of the evil has 
always been the same, namely, a powerful sugges- 
tion in the form of a cry or gesture, yet the real 
cause, concealed behind the apparent one, is an un- 
expected modification in the physical or moral condi- 
tions affecting the troops — a modification which re- 
sulted in diminishing or destroying their resistance 
to suggestion. 

In campaign, this resisting force is subject to 

incessant fluctuations according to circumstances, 
the condition of the troops, and their sentiments. 
We shall see that these sentiments, even the best of 
them, are far from being able to balance this de- 
vastating and blind force of panic. 

Unfortunately the study of panics is rendered 
very difficult by the scarcity of records and by the 
lack of historical certainty in the official accounts 
submitted. There are perhaps no matters of his- 
tory v^here the truth, voluntarily or involuntarily, 
has been more perverted. The winner of a fight 
exalts the heroism of his troops, but does not hint 
at there having been a panic among the enemy. 
The facts are sometimes voluntarily suppressed by 
military commanders from considerations of hu- 
manity, because they wish to conceal, as a blemish, 
the weakness of the troops under their orders, and 
because they are unwilling to publicly dishonor men 
whose worth, courage and even heroism they knew. 
(The German official accounts of their own wars 
are known to have hidden all such facts as related 
to themselves through motives of public policy.) The 
real facts are not revealed sometimes because of the 
involuntary action of commanders, who are them- 
selves actors in the drama and have been subjected 
to the perturbing influence, the first effect of which is 
the loss of the faculty of observation. 

Therefore, if one wishes to extract from the 
past a few particulars of the truth on such a sub- ' 
ject, he should preferably consult the memoirs of 
subordinates and soldiers, who relate simply what 
they have seen or have experienced, without care of 
publicity. Even these must be subjected to strong 
historical criticism before being accepted. 

From no source do we find any attempt to ex- 
plain the characteristics of the phenomena of panic. 


At times experience has shown to commanders palli- 
atives of a moral kind, but generally the one remedy 
understood and made use of was sanguinary re- 
pression. In all ages military commanders have 
dreaded panic as a scourge. The tremendous and 
long-continued strain of the modern battle will tend 
to such terrible nervous and physical strain as to put 
troops in a psychological state that is highly con- 
ducive to panics. At the same time it will be less 
often possible to turn to account the sudden waves 
of enthusiasm, analogous to, but, of course, the direct 
opposite of panic, which lead to the most conspicuous 
gallantry. The modern fight calls for powers of 
nervous, physical and moral endurance which come 
only from sterling moral character, backed up by 
sturdy physical condition. Dash will be called for 
sometimes, but endurance will be the key to success. 

In the ancient battles, as DuPicq has shown, 
"panic was the inevitable issue, and he was victor 
who was able to resist it the longer." The ancient 
commanders attempted to conquer by instilling in the 
soldier the dominating fear of their own command- 
ers. It was necessary, according to a Greek com- 
mander, ''that the soldier fear his captain more than 
the enemy." In Rome, where an admirable esprit 
de corps existed, tactics were adapted to the moral 
character of the combatant; but in addition, they 
took extreme measures against fugitives. Every 
soldier who fled from the combat perished under the 
baton ; all troops guilty of cowardice were decimated. 

Indeed it is a fact that in war success often de- 
pends less upon the skill of the combinations than 
upon the stubbornness of the combatants. Still, it 
is necessary that this stubbornness be general, for 
panic of a few men can, in an instant, destroy the 
tenacity of the greatest number. 


We shall not study the psychology of the com- 
batant in rational and methodical flight, which is 
only combat in retreat; for there is a great differ- 
ence between flight — even disorderly flight — and 

Panic derives its birth and is developed in man- 
ners always identical, which can be described in a 
few words. Troops in the peculiar crowded state 
brought into being by the combat, in anticipation of 
the combat or later as the result of the combat, are 
broken up in consequence of a cry of distress that is 
repeated by a few men who accompany it with ges- 
tures of terror and run away in one or several di- 
rections, habitually away from the enemy, blind with 
fear and deaf to every voice. 

In this condition there are for these troops no 
longer any comrades, commanders, or colors ; and, in 
the fields strewn with abandoned arms, it is flight, 
howling and disgraceful, where each tries to procure 
his own safety — and where all find defeat, death, and 

Panic is not confined to man. Animals all have 
it. The nervous and excitable horse is even more 
given to causeless panic than is man. Panic in 
mounted troops spreads more rapidly and is even less 
possible to check than in dismounted troops. Panics 
are frequent among the horses by themselves. Only 
a few years ago there was a disastrous and cause- 
less panic among the animals at the British maneu- 

Such was the panic that seized the Prussians on 
the evening of Jena. At the cry, ''Save himself who 
can !" a sudden panic took possession of every soul. 
They took to running confusedly on the roads, seeing 
enemy everywhere and taking fugitives, themselves 
full of fright, for victorious Frenchmen. To in- 


crease their misfortune, they encountered that enor- 
mous quantity of baggage which the Prussian army 
always brought along with it. The cavalry turned 
out of roads and took to the fields by whole squad- 
rons. The infantry broke ranks, looting and over- 
turning the baggage. 

After the first Bull Run the beaten troops fled 
in utter route by the way they had come. They ran 
back by Sudley Springs, though they could have 
saved many miles by cutting straight across. This 
wild scramble kept up all night till they reached 
Washington. Yet no one pursued. The drawn fa- 
ces and utter exhaustion of the stragglers as they 
arrived in Washington have often been described. 
The physical exertion they had undergone would 
account for their personal appearance, but the de- 
scriptions of all other panics contain the same notice 
of the drawn faces and utter exhaustion of those who 
have been in a panic. In order to arrive at a con- 
ception of panic, one must consider certain phenome- 
na still little understood. These are illusion, hallu- 
cination, suggestion, and contagion. 

Panic is indeed a sort of collective hallucination. 
Illusion and hallucination are both at first individual 
and are manifested in the subjects who are the most 
nervous, the most impressionable, or the most de- 
pressed physically. By their gestures and cries 
they offer suggestions to their immediate neighbors. 
Then contagion does its work with frightful rapidity. 

Let us examine a few details of these different 

"Illusion is an error which simulates actual 
knowledge, evident in itself, or intuitive in the form 
of a perception of the senses." — SULLY. It has, 
therefore, for a point of departure a real impression. 
For example, a sentinel sees a bush and hears it 


rustle in the breeze. He really sees something, but 
believes that he sees an enemy sneaking up to kill 

After T-lu-ssu the defeated Russians were 
halted about twelve miles from the battlefield. 
There they remained the following day, but in con- 
sequence of rumors, it was decided to fall back still 
further that night. In the meantime the Japanese 
cavalry had made no pursuit— possibly due to the 
fact that at Te-lu-ssu they had been worsted by the 
Cossacks in the only mounted engagement of, the 

Of this night retreat, more than 24 hours after 
the battle, the British Official Account says: "As 
night fell, the troops, shaken by the conflict of the 
previous day, saw danger where none existed, and, 
seized with panic, fired upon each other. Indeed, to 
such an extent was the habitual stolidity of the men 
and their commanders overcome that some shots 
fired by a Cossack detachment about 3:30 a. m. 
caused the First Siberian Rifle Division to deploy 
and remain halted in position till daylight." 

A similar illusion was that which led the Rus- 
sian fleet to see Japanese torpedo craft in what was 
really English fishing vessels peacefully at work off 
their own coast. 

In hallucination, on the contrary, there is no 
real impression. A person who pictures to himself 
the face of a friend or of an enemy so vividly that 
he believes he sees him for a few moments is a vic- 
tim of hallucination. 

Under the influence of the nervous over-excite- 
ment of the battlefield such phenomena are frequent. 
Everyone who has gone to war has verified it. "It 
seems," says Montluc, "that for each one of your 


enemies you see ten before your eyes, like a drunk- 
ard who sees a thousand candles all at once." 

The commanders, themselves, being more imagi- 
native and having their attention constantly under 
strain, are frequently the victims of illusion and 
hallucination. That is what a French general wished 
to say in 1870, when he said to his chiefs of infor- 
mation: "You have Prussians in your eyes." No 
doubt most of you can recall similar results to se- 
cret service work in our own army. 

A curious example of hallucination in the chief 
is that of the brigade commander Felix. During the 
campaign of 1793, while posted in an advance posi- 
tion, he abandoned his detachment before the first 
shot was fired and fled whip and spur to headquar- 
ters (thirteen miles) where he asserted that his 
troops had been annihilated by the enemy. 

Now it cannot be admitted that this officer fled 
through treason, since he had already distinguished 
himself in several combats. Here is the official re- 
port that was made of the matter to the minister of 

"I have the honor to report to you that in the af- 
fair of the 13th, Brigade Commander Felix occupied 
with the 1st Battalion of the 44th Regiment and an 
independent company the post of Neukirch, quitted 
it at the instant his troops were attacked and fled to 
headquarters, distant from his post five leagues, to 
tell me, all out of breath, that his battalion was cut 
to pieces or taken prisoners as well as the colors and 
guns and that a very small part had escaped into the 
woods. As this report did not have the air of truth, 
I asked this commander to compose and collect him- 
self a little. Seeing that he still persisted in this re- 
port, I took him to General Hedouville, Chief of 
Staff, to whom he confirmed again what he had told 

me. As a commander should not quit his post, I 
had him arrested and made report to the representa- 
tives of the people, who, a few hours afterwards, pro- 
ceeded to the advance guard, where they learned 
with the greatest astonishment that every individual 
of this battalion had conducted himself like a hero 
under the leadership of their battalion commander/' 
Personally, the worst scared man I ever saw 
was a trooper who came back to camp about mid- 
night and reported that his outpost had been at- 
tacked and wiped out by bolomen. No shots had 
been fired, and the officers were skeptical; still the 
man stuck to his story and was full of details of 
the catastrophe. What had really happened was 
that his mate on a double sentinel post had stepped 
through a hole into a covered well and had made 
considerable fuss about it. 

In an army a few individuals become thus vic- 
tims of illusion or hallucination, and so are created 
the first germs of panic. 

Obsessed by the image he believes he sees and 
lost to all notion of the outside world, the victim 
immediately exerts all his energy and all his power 
to obey the feeling of attraction or repulsion which 
the image imperiously imposes upon him. When 
seized by fear, his features become convulsed; he 
conceals his frenzied eyes with his arms to escape 
the horrible vision, and his mouth utters cries of 
fright. It is then that is introduced the phenomena 
of suggestion. 

In order to understand the great power of this 
phenomenon, it is necesary to remember that a per- 
son may be put to sleep artificially and placed under 
complete control of another person, who compels the 
former to obey all his suggestions and to perform 
deeds diametrically opposed to the subject's will. 


'The most careful observations seem to prove 
that an individual merged for some time in a crowd 
in action finds himself — either in consequence of the 
magnetic influence given out by the crowd, or from 
some other cause of which we are ignorant — in a 
special state, which much resembles the state of 
fascination in which the hypnotized individual finds 
himself in the hands of the hypnotizer. The ac- 
tivity of the brain being paralyzed in the case of the 
hypnotized subject, the latter becomes the slave of 
all the unconscious activities caused by the reflex 
actions of the spinal cord, which the hypnotizer 
directs at will. The conscious personality has van- 
ished; will and discernment are lost." — LeBon, 
pages 34, 35. As we saw in the last lecture, the man 
on the firing line is in a state almost hypnotic in 
character, which renders him particularly subject 
to suggestion. 

This phenomena of suggestion is well under- 
stood by military commanders, who know that, con- 
formably to suggestion, soldiers will dash to the 
assault of a position with an irresistible impetuos- 
ity. The battle of Glisnelle presents a very extra- 
ordinary case of suggestion to troops. 

'*At the instant the order to retreat was given. 
General Gouvion perceived that instead of executing 
a retrograde movement, one battalion was advancing 
toward the enemy. He sent an aide-de-camp to 
enjoin it to return to the rear. The battalion re- 
fused to obey and continued to march forward. 
Gouvion, though admiring this exalted courage, then 
went forward himself and gave in an animated voice 
the order to retire. Scarcely had he begun to speak 
when a bullet struck him to earth. The soldiers of 
this brave and obstinate battalion, instead of being 
crushed by this depressing death, were rather ani- 

mated by the thought of avenging the loss of their 
general. They charged the Austrian battalions furi- 
ously. The first ones that they met were over- 
turned, but soon they were surrounded on all sides, 
and, refusing to ask quarter, they perished to a man.''' 
— Jean^ Lombard, ''Volunteers of '92/' 

Unfortunately, suggestion does not always come 
from chiefs and is not always directed in the channel 
of duty and the safety of the army. Nor is it of less 
effect on this account; for, under its influence— and 
this is a point to be noticed— the soldier will aban- 
don himself to shameful flight as well as to heroic 
assault. 'The specter of panic stalks by the side of 
enthusiasm." — Balck. 

In the crisis of the fight, the action of sugges- 
tion would not be so formidable if it could be local- 
ized and if it could be made to influence the minds 
of only the nearest neighbors. 

But this not the case by any means, for con- 
tagion soon intervenes to disseminate the influence 
with incredible rapidity. "It is a phenomenon, of- 
ten verified but unexplained, that every act, every 
sentiment in a crowd is contagious, and contagious to 
a point where the individual very easily sacrifices 
his personal interests for those of the collective 
body."— LeBon. In an instant contagion carries 
fright to the bravest hearts, destroys the faculty of 
reasoning, and brings all of the intellects to the 
same level. The troops, by putting together into a 
common being what scarcely exists in each one to 
the same degree— that is, instinct— form a morally 
compact mass. In this mass, every sentiment born 
of civilization and intellectual culture is immediately 
banished, and there emanates from it no longer any- 
thing but violence, ferocity and fear. 

Thus the reading of the accounts of dramatic 


panics depicts only the image of a furious, fleeing, 
unconscious beast, seeking an instinctive shelter 
from the storm in ravines, woods, villages and moun- 
tains, which nature and the industry of man have 
prepared for the refuge of beings threatened with 
an imminent danger. With men in a panic, they are 
seen, after being well started, to herd together in 
somber silence, their faces reflecting their sinister 
fright. After the first start, they press on in si- 
lence, their eyes cast obstinately on the ground. 
Crushed by fatigue, they throw away knapsacks, 
hats, rifles, canteens — anything that impedes their 
progress. The descriptions of all panics dwell more 
or less on the utter exhaustion of those who are par- 
ticipants therein. It appears to be a result, not of 
the physical exertion they have undergone, but of 
the nervous excitement and nervous strain. 

"During the night of Saint Privat," says Gen- 
eral Castex, *Ve were proceeding toward the Ban- 
Saint-Martin in the midst of retreating infantry 
columns wheri we were almost deafened by a strange 
noise like that of an earth tremor, which seemed 
produced far in our rear, but which was increasing 
in loudness. 

"Mixed with the clanking of arms, there were 
vociferations, cries, exclamations — a sort of infernal 
clamor. We were enveloped in a cloud of dust so 
thick that it obscured the sky and we had diflficultj^ 
distinguishing cavalrymen riding at a frantic gallop. 
Pressed together in a human mass, they seemed to 
flee before a terrifying specter as if impelled by an 
avalanche. It was a panic. How could it have 
been produced after the guns had ceased firing and 
after the battle had been completed? How many 
valiant commanders were unable, not only to subdue 


it, but even to escape themselves from this mad 

Here we see the panic before the final stage. 
Here are cries, inarticulate, but still human sounds. 
When a panic has continued for a longer time, the 
mass settles into somber silence, utter weariness and 
hurrying along in profound dejection, and is even 
less possible to control than when the first rush 

We have seen that troops seized with panic had 
received through suggestion an extremely vivid im- 
pression and that hallucination presents to the eyes 
of each soldier a frightful danger. 

Immediately, by a psychological law, the organs 
involuntarily react to avoid the danger and with all 
the more violence because the exciting influence has 
been most vivid. Then ensue disordered actions 
causing the man, in order to rid himself of every ob- 
stacle to his flight, to precipitate himself upon his 
neighbors with a frenzy that extends sometimes 
even to murder, and to hurl himself upon obstacles 
which he can neither clear nor overturn. 

'The psychological expressions of fear are 
quickened heart-beats, hurried breathing, pallor, 
goose-flesh, dryness of the mouth, dilation of the 
nostrils, protrusion of the eyeballs, contraction of 
the bladder and intestines, perspiration, trembling, 
and other disturbances."— T/te Psychology and Neur- 
ology of Fear;' page 23. 

It has been proved, moreover, that strong emo- 
tions lead to serious perturbations of the respiratory 
systems in consequence of a disturbance of the ner- 
vous centers, the mechanism of which is not known. 
''Moral impressions," says Dr. Lagrange, "as 
well as physical sensation can diminish the respira- 
tory aptitude only by reflex eflTects that happen to 


disturb the regular play of the pulmonary bellows. 
Under the influence of fear, the movements of the 
chest are sometimes seen to be accelerated immeas- 
urably, sometimes to succeed one another at unequal 
intervals, and sometimes to be retarded and momen- 
tarily suspended. The defect of coordination and 
the disorder of respiratory movements very much re- 
sembles that incoherent movement of the lips which 
prevents an excited man from clearly articulating 
his words." Thus are explained the cries, the sobs, 
the shrieks uttered by the fugitives who involuntari- 
ly favor the contagion of panic. 

Respiratory disorders likewise cause an ex- 
tremely rapid fatigue, even at the time when the 
troops have just begun movement, and the details 
of this fatigue fill the accounts of panic. We see 
soldiers strew unconsciously over fields — by a move- 
ment, so to speak, reflexive — helmets, muskets, knap- 
sacks, cartridges, precious articles, everything hin- 
dering them — everything adding to their fatigue or 
bowing them down. This thing is certain and is 
seen in every panic. 

It can be said, indeed, that from the instant 
when cries of fright become general, when all feel- 
ings and all thoughts are directed toward the one 
end — flight — troops have acquired a physiognomy 
entirely new, and there are manifested in them char- 
acteristics peculiar to this state. 

This annihilation of the intellectual faculties 
shows of what little importance, from the special 
viewpoint of panic, is the coefficient of intelligence, 
sometimes spoken of as one of the great advantages 
of our American army. Remembering that the ar- 
my that can longest resist panic is the victor and 
that crowds, and especially crowds under strong 
excitement, are the same, no matter what the grade 


of intelligence of the individuals composing the 
crowd, it seems that, except in the way of leaders, in- 
telligence is of little value in war. One might go 
further and say that in the fight itself — right in the 
scrimmage — that bullheaded determination or fana- 
tical enthusiasm is far more likely to exercise an 
influence than intelligence, even among the officers. 
In combat, qualities of character alone permit 
resistance to the wild current of the flood. If they 
are defective, panic becomes sovereign and everyone 
is swept away, chiefs and soldiers, in irresistible 
ruin. Troops seized by panic are so incapable of the 
least reason that even the sense of direction often 
leaves them; and it is not rare to see soldiers dash 
into the ranks of the enemy with such gestures of 
terror that fear overcomes the adversary also. Such 
was the case in the combat of Limbach, where the 
surrounded French delivered so opportunely two 
salvos of artillery against the Austrians advancing 
behind them, that the latter were put into utter 
rout and fled in all directions. "Manj^ of them," 
says an eye-witness, "came into our ranks and the 
melee became general. On both sides the astonished 
soldiers halted, looked at one another, and, much 
perturbed, disbanded, abandoning the battlefield." — 
Journal of a One Year Volunteer. Although the 
enemy may be in a situation as desperate as that of 
the fugitive, tt seems to the latter that the former 
possesses a great power — omnipotence. However, 
as intelligence has disappeared, no one perceives this 
fact. Troops overcome by fright are totally de- 
prived of the critical sense, and so one of the conse- 
quences of the loss of reason is the creation of an 
extraordinary credulity. It is thus that a rumor, 
known at once to be false if one stopped to think, will 
frequently turn a retreat into a demoralized rout. 


In panic the sentiments of each one are equally 
modified so that those of individuals are unrecogniz- 
able. Generally speaking, the traits of the primitive 
man appear with great power. These are violence, 
egotism, ferocity and fear. On the other hand, the 
sentiments which have been acquired or developed 
through civilization, such as devotion, pity, military 
honor, etc., are entirely annihilated. 

The absence of responsibility and a sense that 
there is no authority with power to punish contribute 
not a little to the unleashing of the primitive senti- 
ments, with an exaggeration of which only collec- 
tions of men can offer examples. 

It is not the courage of the individual which is 
changed into the most imbecile cowardice, but this 
change takes place in the mind of the crowd. The 
individual minds have ceased to exist — the crowd has 
a single mind of its own, separate and distinct from 
the mind of the individuals composing it. Troops 
composed of men of proved individual courage will 
not be inaccessible to collective fear. The gladiators 
of Sparticus, in revolt, were put into full rout by an 
army of soldiers of little individual courage, but of 
better organization and leadership. MacDonald, 
wifh a handful of men in the campaign of 1799, de- 
feated the Neapolitans. Thiebault says of this : 
"Armed and banded into troops of fanatics, these 
Neapolitans, who had taught us to dread them as 
men, were terrible, but from the moment they formed 
regular platoons, they became nobodies." 

It w^ould be as unjust to accuse the Neapolitans 
of cowardice and to brand them with the seal of 
infamy as it would the men whom the storm of panic 
had swept away. Everything depends upon sug- 
gestion, and the same troops may deliver themselves 
within a few days, often within a few hours, to the 


worst routs or of the most magnificent acts of 

We thus see that physical depression, loss of the 
faculty of reasoning, the unleashing of primitive in- 
stincts and sentiments, are the essential character- 
istics of men seized by the crisis of fear. They 
become easy prey to their adversaries, who need 
only to have enough physical power to strike in or^ 
der to slaughter them. 

Pursuit under these conditions becomes a sort of 
cruel play — a chase where the pursuer has no longer 
anything to dread for himself excepting fatigue. As 
DuPicq has shown us, in the ancient battles the 
winner lost a few hundred, the loser fifty or a hun- 
dred thousand. Here the losses must have been 
about equal till the break. Then one side, overcome 
by panic, fled, and the victors without further fight- 
ing had but to follow along and kill the helpless, 
panic-stricken mob. 

Factors in Panics 

In order that troops may be influenced in an 
irresistible manner by the suggestion of fear, we 
have said that it was necessary that they be placed 
previously in a condition favorable to the contagion 
of suggestion. This state of predisposition is 
brought about by two series of factors : 

1. Immediate factors, events almost always 
unforeseen, which often pave the way for a panic in a 
few minutes, without in themselves causing it. 

2. Indirect factors, those which, operating for 
a time more or less extended, have created a soil 
favorable to its development. 

Among the first may be mentioned treachery, 
the absence or scarcity of arms, the absence of the 


commander, surprise, and expectant waiting. 
Among the second, race, physical depression, and 
moral depression. 

At Custozza three troops (platoons) Austrian 
Uhlans, with a total strength of 105, attacked 
mounted against the head of the column of Cerale's 
Division in the defile at Monte Cricol and routed 
6,000 men. The squadron commander gave as his 
idea of the reason for his success that the Italians 
had been marching from 3:00 a.m. till 10:30 a.m. 
without a halt and then the head of their column was 

The definition of treachery we all know. When 
it occurs with troops while waging hostile battle, 
even if they have already accomplished prodigies of 
valor — even if they are in full victory, and even if 
treason be the act of only a few isolated individuals 
— yet demoralization becomes almost inevitable. 

It is a fact that the reasonings of collectives 
operate only by the association of images and by 
generalizations, often absurd. 

The image of treachery is first erected before 
the frightened soldier who sees himself surrounded 
to his ruin by maddened traitors. Let the cry of 
treason be raised and the deed is done; panic is let 

On April 20, 1794, the garrison of Cambrai and 
Bouchain, after having followed up from Cateau and 
from Villers-en-Cauchiers, the Austrians, whom the 
cavalry still pursued, were suddenly seized by panic 
in consequence of the defection, of a few hussars. 
They came back to Cambrai and Bouchain in abomi- 
nable disorder, demanding the death of the traitors, 
seven of whom were afterward executed. 

The lack of arms gives the soldier the impres- 
sion of being delivered over to the enemy with feet 

- 66- - 

and hands bound. We have a curious example of 
this in the combat of Saint-Hermagor, where Major 
Roulier was abandoned by all his men because the 
muskets were, on account of rain, no longer able to 
be fired. The enemy was, of course, in exactly the 
same fix. An individual would have known this at 
once, but the crowd, with the usual lack of reason- 
ing qualities inherent in crowds, and the extreme 
egotism of crowds, thought only of itself and its own 

The absence of chiefs disarranges the bearings 
of troops, accustomed to act only upon orders and 
having for direction only the will and judgment of 
the chief. The latter appears in the eyes of all as 
the one person who understands the military task 
and is capable of directing affairs. 

Action by surprise is recommended by all tacti- 
cians; for its power to demoralize the enemy is a 
considerable force in the hands of the assailant. It 
suppresses, indeed, in the one who encounters it, not 
only the possibility of maneuvering, but also that of 
measuring the extent of the danger threatening him. 
At the same time it removes the two factors neces- 
sary to all reasoning — time and calmness. Peril 
then appears all the more frightful, because it is 
sudden and apparently inevitable. Before having 
suffered even the first ill, troops are morally turned 
foot-loose and are ripe for panic, which is propa- 
gated by contagion in a very few minutes. 

The fight at the Carigan bridge, related by 
Montluc, illustrates, well the character of combat by 
surprise, and of the consequent panic. It was a 
question of seizing the bridge, defended by the Im- 
perialists, and of destroying it. Montluc had seized 
the bridge on a moonlight night and was aL work 
destroying it when about 200 of the enemy at the 


head of a column appeared and opened fire. About 
the time of the arrival of the enemy the moon had 
been hid by clouds and a mist arose. The French 
were surprised, started to form, and then suddenly 
broke. About the same time reenforcements ar- 
rived from the other side and opened fire indis- 
criminately on both parties to the original fight at 
the bridge. Montluc loudly cried his own name and 
"France, France!" He was able to rally about 
thirty young gentlemen who had been attached to 
his force. With these he charged the enemy's ori- 
ginal 200, who were at the other end of the bridge. 
They broke back, threw their supports into confu- 
sion and they also ran. In a few minutes Montluc 
and thirty men held the bridge while all the other 
troops on both sides were rushing to the rear in 
utter panic. Both forces were completely routed. 
Here we see circumstances especially favorable to 
panic. Both forces were of mixed nationalities. 
On one side French and Italians, on the other Span- 
ish, German and Swiss. Besides, they were engaged 
in night operations. A student of the psychology 
of war might have predicted just this result before 
the fight began. None of the French side came 
back during the night. On the Spanish side the dis- 
orderly flight was such that the commander of the 
town from which they had started reports that, 
after reaching the town on the return, more than 400 
jumped over the fortification and continued the 
flight beyond. 

Expectancy is the disposition of our minds to 
anticipate coming events, a disposition all the more 
active when the mental images associated with these 
events have an emotional character. **To expect a 
thing is to give an impulse to the active instincts, 
including the faculty of attention. It is to find 


oneself on the qui rive and to begin a general re- 
hearsal of the acts which the real occurrence of the 
event might create." — James Sully. 

The phenomena of anxious expectancy explains 
the numerous shots that sentinels in the field fire 
during the night at bushes and trees, which they 
take for the enemy's patrols. It explains also why 
reserve battalions during battle, having before their 
minds' eyes the spectacle, less the animation of the 
struggle, retreat without even waiting for their en- 
trance into the fighting line. 

The above are immediate factors of panic. They 
often influence troops independently, but often they 
are grafted on the indirect factors, which favor their 
action, and therefore take a preponderating part in 
the origin of panic. 

From this point of view, that unchangeable soil 
from which spring all our sentiments — race — has a 
capital importance. It is upon it that depend in 
great part the impulsiveness of troops, their varia- 
bleness and their susceptibility to suggestion. The 
Latin races are more peculiarly feminine, and if they 
are susceptible to great enthusiasm and to limitless 
devotion, they are also liable to the greatest weak- 
nesses and to the gravest disorders. There have 
been constantly opposed, in the history of wars, 
Russian tenacity and English coolness to the fury of 
the French, who are imaginative and nervous, all 
animation and excitement, irresistible in success, but 
frightfully depressed in reverses. 

We in the United States have a combination of 
these qualities to deal with. Some of our people 
have a mixture of these characteristics ; others have 
one or the other form in a pure or nearly pure state. 
Will our armies then have an average of these char- 
acteristics? A crowd does not have a character 


which is the average of the characters of the indi- 
viduals that compose it, nor is it always swayed by 
the same influences. It has a character of its own, 
independent of the individuals of which it is com- 
posed. If a crowd influence starts in a small group 
it will soon spread by contagion to the whole and 
will often cause individuals to act in a manner wholly 
foreign to their natural disposition. The predom- 
inating factor in our mixed crowd will then depend 
on which fraction first receives a strong moral im- 
pression and by suggestion disseminates it through 
the whole. Our army of mixed nationalities will not 
have an average of the characteristics of the races 
represented, but rather will tend to have the faults 
of all. 

Physical wretchedness is one of the most rapid 
agents of demoralization. By physical wretchedness 
must be understood, not only the absence of rations, 
but also the fatigues resulting from marches and 
combats and the anaemia that so rapidly overcomes 
troops in campaign. Among the causes that create 
a soil suitable for hallucination and illusion may be 
cited excessive fatigue, hunger or thirst, strong 
mental tension, profound mental or bodily exhaus- 
tion and morbidly emotional conditions, such as fear. 
Panic, the daughter of hallucination, becomes ex- 
tremely frequent with troops physically depressed. 

On the other hand, a certain amount of hardship 
seems to be good for the morale of troops. To a 
limited extent man enjoys hardship. If it were not 
so, people would not go hunting, fishing or exploring. 
The amount that a man will find beneficial depends 
on his previous experiences — his bringing up. As to 
ourselves, we may say that the amount which the 
average man is able to bear with equanimity has by 
the change in the mode of living been steadily de- 


creasing since the Civil War. An amount that in 
the Civil War was to a certain extent pleasurable 
and exciting would now be felt as terrible suffering. 
We must understand, however, that troops inflamed 
by victory and whose morale is exalted by success 
can endure cheerfully the greatest privations and 

However, when to physical suffering is added 
demoralization, when wretchedness breaks down the 
body and defeat undermines the courage, panic be- 
comes the uncontested mistress before whom the 
commanders themselves bow, repulsing the idea of 
battle, in order to avoid irreparable disaster. 

It has been justly said that the moral forces are 
the preponderating ones in war. Moral force, which 
gives to troops the will to surmount all obstacles, to 
dread no danger and to desire to conquer at any 
price springs from sentiments, varying according to 
circumstances, which animate soldiers and place 
them in a condition to be influenced by the suggestion 
of victory in combat. 

In a general way, these sentiments are religious 
fanaticism, patriotism, enthusiasm for a commander, 
disciplirie, and, most of all, confidence resultm^i_froM-~ 


After having reviewed the different causes of 
panic, there still remains for us to determine 
whether or not there are practical means for render- 
ing them less frequent, of lessening their effects, and 
of checking them after the evil has been produced. 

Among the indirect and immediate causes of 
panics, it is evident that several, such as race, are 
beyond control ; or such as treason and surprise, can 

—71 — 

not be foreseen. If known in advance, they could 
not exist. 

Against these two factors of panic, only general 
preventive measures, designed to render them less 
frequent, can be taken. We must, therefore, resign 
ourselves to submit to them as an inevitable evil. 

Other factors, on the contrary, depend on the 
commander, who is able, within certain limits, to 
suppress them. 

It is a question of understanding troops, of ad- 
ministrative diligence, of discipline ; and it is espec- 
ially in this respect that past experience imparts 

Thus the panic of the Tuillerie, in the battle of 
LeMans, demonstrates conclusively that it would be 
preferable to leave at home men who were neither 
armed nor instructed, rather than to lead them into 
combat, where they become a center of extremely 
dangerous demoralization. It is therefore most 
suitably the work of times of peace to make such 
preparation for war that means of giving the soldier 
in field resources to maintain existence, powerful 
arms and a skillful chief shall be provided; so that 
it may be possible to lead them into combat in such 
physical and moral condition that the chances of 
panic will be considerably diminished. 

These chances would be still further reduced if 
troops be drilled to fight according to methods appro- 
priate to their racial temperaments. It is necessary, 
indeed, that instruction, while taking into account 
arms, terrain, situations and numerical strength, be 
based upon the moral forces of the combatants. The 
penalty for doing otherwise is to find them useless 
on the day of battle. 

Man is but little changeable, but little trans- 
formable. It is therefore from perfect knowledge of 


him that tactics must especially be derived, and that 
mathematical theories must be met. 

Panic is an aberration of assemblages of men, 
an actual scourge of which tactics must take account. 

With this in view, the following principles can 
be deduced from what has preceded : 

1. Joint responsibility and confidence are two, 
essential factors for steadfastness of troops in com- 
bat, and for their resistance to panic. 

2. Troops must fight in the organization they 
are used to in time of peace, each man in his habitual 
place and with his proper unit. 

In order that a man or troops may fight energet- 
ically, without apprehension, it is necessary that 
there be protection on both sides and in rear. The 
Roman soldier fought thus, being concerned only 
with the adversary in front ; the men in the second, 
third and fourth ranks protecting him on the flanks 
and in rear and replacing him in the front rank if he 
were disabled. 

Consequently, reserves should not be too far dis- 
tant from the fighting line, in order that they may 
give the latter confidence by their promptness in 

3. The different arms must give each other 
constant support. The artillery, especially, the effect 
of whose fire is universally recognized, should sup- 
port the infantry from near points, and should 
march, so to speak, in the midst of them. The 
soldier in combat must never feel himself isolated or 
separated from his brothers in arms. 

Under modern conditions, the actual physical 
nearness of the artillery to the infantry will nearly 
always be impracticable, but the constant support 
by fire will have the same psychological effect. 

Artillery in combat, because of the grouping of 


men around immobile objects (the guns) and be- 
cause of the widely separated pieces, each with its 
little squad immediately under the eyes of its chief, 
is least subject to panic of all arms, and for that 
reason, artillery in action forms a strong supporting 
and rallying point. 

4. The best troops — those whose steadfastness 
is assured — should be placed on the second line. 
Those who are struggling directly with the enemy 
have in action a powerful deterrent from emotion, 
namely, the centering of their attention on the in- 
cidents of the fight, without it being possible for 
them to think about their own personality. 

On the other hand, the reserves have to endure 
the waiting, often for a long time, before their en- 
trance into the fighting line ; they have before them 
the spectacle of the battle and the sight of the 
wounded, and they are sometimes subjected to a fire 
to which they cannot reply. Troops with but little 
experience in war do not resist such emotions. 

If the best troops be placed in the first line, the 
least recoil on their part causes the disintegration of 
the reserves. 

5. Adequate ammunition supply is absolutely 
essential. Troops out of ammunition cannot and will 
not fight, except at the very closest range. Such 
troops will not only break themselves, but their panic 
will, by contagion, be spread to their neighbors. 

This is an affair to be thought out and practiced 
in time of peace, remembering that the less highly 
trained the troops the greater will be the consump- 
tion of ammunition. 

In the combats near Dijon in 1870, mobilized 
national guards, who were placed in the second line, 
were seen to flee by whole battalions, even though 
the first line was victorious. 


To avoid surprise at any cost, troops should not 
only cover themselves in aU jdirections from which 
the enemy may approach, but they should also, if 
possible, be warned in advance of the probable inci- 
dents of the combat. DuPicq observed that Hannibal 
was in the habit of thus treating the troops of the 
center of his line of battle, who, though always 
broken, nevertheless never fled. 

Morgan, at Cowpens, realizing that his militia 
was going to flee anyway, told them to fire a volley 
or two and then run. They did this, and thus every- 
thing being expected, they were so encouraged that 
they had the nerve to come back and materially 
assist in winning the victory. 

During the action, but not by any means during 
the preliminaries, the proper post of the chief is 
behind, not in front of his troops. It is under his 
eye that they must fight, the surveillance that he 
exercises being sometimes sufficient to repress the 
first faint desire for flight. In addition, the com- 
mander should take before the fight certain measures 
designed to diminish the chances for fright and suit- 
able for keeping men under fire. The orders on 
this subject given by General Chanzy on the 10th of 
January, 1871, at LeMans have been celebrated: 

"The approach of LeMans is formally forbidden 
to troops and officers of every grade. Any move- 
ment from front to rear on the battlefield must not 
be made at the trot or gallop. Each army corps will 
guard its rear by cavalry to pick up fugitives and to 
prevent all straggling. Fugitives will be brought 
back to the position and kept on the first firing line ; 
they will be shot if they seek to flee. If disbanding 
should happen to take place, the general-in-chief 
would not hesitate to have the bridges in rear of the 
lines cut in order to force the utmost defense." 


Some of the regular cavalry regiments were 
used in a similar manner during the combats of the 
Civil War. 

Complete supply and organization, providing 
largely against material wants, appropriate tactics, 
and instructed nuclei of the units are the elements 
in troops, other than valor, suitable for warding off 
panics. These elements, which, added to discipline, 
endurance and exalted morale, constitute an appre- 
ciable force, are still insufficient in themselves. Only 
joint responsibility, born of experience in war, can 
ever offer an impenetrable resistance to the con- 
tagion of fear. Therefore, panics among troops will 
occur, whatever the cares the commander may have 
taken to prevent them. Can they be stopped at the 
very moment of combat? Yes, if the chiefs are 
energetic and know how to take suitable measures in 

** Collectives are the playthings of all exterior 
excitants, and the latter's incessant fluctuations are 
reflected in them. They are the slaves of impulses 
they receive." It follows that troops influenced by 
suggestion to panic can, if a sufficiently strong will 
be imposed upon them, receive an absolutely con- 
trary suggestion, which they will obey with the same 
docility that they did the first one. 

History is full of deeds where the attitude of a 
chief, a happy word, or a gesture have changed in an 
instant the sentiment of troops. It was Caesar, in 
the battle of Munda, dashing afoot in front of his 
fleeing lines, who cried: "See what chief you are 
about to betray and on what occasion !" It was Ney, 
standing in his stirrups, calm and impassive under 
the musketry fire, who addressed his broken soldiers 
thus : ''Death strikes only those who hesitate ! Look 
at me ! It has not struck me !" 


Washington, at Princeton, rode out between the 
lines and sat on his horse fully exposed to the volleys 
of both sides, and this steadied his men. Also recall 
the effect of Sheridan's example at Winchester. It 
is not the words, which few if any hear, nor the 
gestures which more, but not a large percentage of 
the whole, see, that brings back the whole mass. It 
is the words or gestures that influence a few; then 
contagion spreads the effect through the mass, which 
knows no more why it turned back than why it first 
started to fly. 

Prestige is the flrst element of the habit of 
obedience. It cailses the acceptance of an idea with- 
out discussion or controversy. If the one from 
whom the idea emanates possesses prestige, the sug- 
gestion is received from the outset and appears 
most logical and true in the eyes of all. Orders 
given under these conditions partake of a peculiar 
force ; and it may be said that the best obeyed com- 
manders are neither the best instructed, the most 
intelligent, the most paternal, nor the most severe, 
but are those who have innate or acquired prestige. 
It is necessary, then, that prestige be the dominating 
quality in a leader of men. It is because of it that 
his suggestions take on an irresistible power, that he 
is able to throw his soldiers against the enemy in an 
enthusiastic assault, and that he can stop with a 
gesture the first fugitives, transforming them into 

So, for that moral aberration of collectives, 
panic, two remedies of a moral nature present them- 
selves:. Prestige of the commander, and joint re- 
sponsibility of the troops. 

Some have prestige inherently in their composi- 
tion ; others seem to have acquired it almost by acci- 


dent, while a certain amount of it is acquired through 
exterior surroundings. 

Military organization, in giving an officer uni- 
form, instruction and extensive powers, favors the 
acquisition of this quality, which he, nevertheless, 
cannot actually possess without a profound under- 
standing of the sentiments that animate his troops, 
without a surveillance of their persons and acts and 
without the worship of military honor. In addition, 
it is essential that he have the words and gestures of 
a chief. 

More difficult is it to inculcate in troops the 
sentiment of joint responsibility based upon mutual 
confidence. It can exist in a high degree only in 
soldiers who have gone to war together; for souls 
are revealed only in crises, and characters are veri- 
fied only in suffering and dangers. If no one knows 
himself until he has suffered, still less does he know 
others until he has suffered with them. Napoleon 
said of the soldiers at Waterloo: "They had not 
eaten soup together long enough." The important 
thing is not to eat in the same room and at the same 
hours, but rather at the close of the same fatigues 
and in the midst of the same dangers. This is be- 
cause the only means we hiave of developing joint 
responsibility among soldiers is to subject them to 
the same harsh proofs, which grow more and more 
painful, and which are wisely graduated and en- 
ergetically endured. 

Part III 


"Cowardice is fear yielded to; 
Courage is fear vanquished.^' 


IN APPROACHING this subject, the first thing 
to consider is the attitude of man when under 
the emotions of a fight.' 

Combat is the final end of armies, and man is 
the first weapon of the combat ; there can be nothing 
well understood about an army without an exact 
knowledge of its first weapon, man, and of his 
moral state during the excitement of the action. 

It often happens that those who treat of warlike 
things take the arm for the basis of the argument, 
thinking that the man called to serve it can always 
be counted upon and ruled by their precepts and 
regulations. But the combatant, as a reasoning be- 
ing, abdicating his mobile and variable nature to 
become a pawn in the game of war, is a creature of 
the imagination, not the man of reality. The latter 
is flesh and blood, of body and soul, though the soul 
has often dominated the body and forced a revolted 
and unwilling body into the maelstrom of destruc- 

It has been said that in our day war has become 
a thing of knowledge and calculation. Not so ; war 
— so long as there shall be war, and one risks his 

'Taken to large extent from "Psychologie du Combat de 
VInfanterie," by Lieutenant Louque, itself mostly made up of 
quotations. The greater part of these quotations, where used, 
have been verified from the originals. 


life therein — will be essentially a thing of instinct, 
of psychology. 

We will then commence by a study of the in- 

Man Under Fire 

In order to have all the data of the problem, let 
us first look into the state of mind of the man when 
the action begins. 

Torn a short time ago from his work, his in- 
terests, his affections, the volunteer — ^the element 
that makes the majority — has been brutally thrown 
into the chaos of a feverish mobilization, without 
having had the time to fully arrange his business 
affairs or the affairs of his heart. He has been 
rushed to mobilization camps or camps of instruc- 
tion. He has had some drill and gained some in- 
struction. He has also suffered from bad camps, 
selected for political considerations; from bad 
clothes, because we have no adequate reserve of 
clothes for issue and the contractor for war clothing 
can use poor workmanship and worse material with 
impunity; from bad food, because transportation 
facilities were paralyzed, deliveries delayed, and 
most of all because no one in his company knew how 
to use the ration ; worst of all he has suffered from 
loss of morale because the yellow journals have been 
publishing all kinds of stories of the horrors of war 
and the inefficiencies of his commanders. Added 
to this he worries over the family he left behind, 
perhaps to suffering and want during his absence. 

Now let us make as exact a picture as possible 
of real combat. 

"When one reasons in full security, after dinner, 
in full moral and physical contentment about war, 
about combat, one feels himself animated with the 

noblest ardor, and he denies the reality. Neverthe- 
less, if you take just such circumstances, how many 
would be willing at once to rise and risk his life? 
Then how about those who have been obliged to 
march in discomfort for days and weeks to reach the 
hour of combat — who, on the day of combat, have 
waited in a state of expectation for hours before the 
moment arrives ? If we are sincere, we can see how 
the physical fatigue and moral anguish have weak- 
ened the morale — how much less willing we would 
be to participate in an action than thirty days before^ 
just after a good dinner." — DuPiCQ. 

General Dandignac, in order to give an idea of 
combat, puts before our eyes the sad agitation of 
some, the depressed abasement of others, the silence 
of officers ordinarily loquacious ; the paralysis of wits 
which, habit not holding in place, are now not only 
incapable of leading, but of being led ; the weakness 
of the soldiers in whom emotion conceals all senti- 
ment and who crouch or lie down, and those, on the 
contrary, who have appeared timid and mild, but 
who now shine out suddenly as tranquil and brilliant 
and who will be the heroes of the action to the 
astonishment of everyone, including themselves; 
imagine the air filled with screaming projectiles, the 
zones of dust where projectiles strike between us 
and the sun ; the spat of a projectile striking a human 
body, the clatter of the gun of a man who falls. 

As the zone of artillery fire is entered, organiza- 
tions subdivide ; they advance into this zone and the 
subdivisions divide into groups. Bullets sing close, 
"I want you," "I'll get you." The sound is not re- 

Little by little ground is gained under the cover 
of accidents of the terrain. But the bullets become 
more menacing. Now it is necessary to advance 


small groups while the others fire. This is not easy. 
The men of advanced groups gain cover. Event- 
ually others come up. Again comes the cry, *Tor- 
ward!" The soldier is down behind cover and fear 
says ''Stay here" while duty should say "Go for- 
ward." This struggle in the soldier's mind goes on 
at each halt. Now the buzz of ricochets is more fre- 
quent; they can be distinguished plainly from the 
whistle of the high shots. What a demoralizing 
effect this has on supports that are suffering loss and 
cannot reply ! Finally in their turn they will arrive 
where they can shoot — but where is the enemy? 
Nothing can be seen. What has become of the sol- 
dier's old comrades? Who are his new neighbors? 
They are more numerous, but he knows no one. 
Where is the officer to whom he has always looked for 
orders? Who is this new chief? He is not alone, 
but he feels as if he were, and it is necessary that his 
morale be good, his patriotism great, for he feels 
that under the orders of chiefs that do not know him 
his glorious deeds will never be recorded — perhaps 
infamous deeds will never be recorded either. 

Each forward move requires great mental strain 
— takes perhaps hours to accomplish. Even the 
halts give no rest — no let up to the nervous tension. 
The men crouch in uncomfortable positions behmd 
insufficient cover, the deadly projectiles constantly 
singing in their ears and a knowledge that each 
movement constitutes an additional danger of death. 
The human organism is not constituted to endure 
danger of this intensity, and above all of this con- 
tinuous duration. "The fire of the defense does not 
destroy the assailant, but demoralizes him to such an 
extent as to suppress all effort." — Grandmaison. 

The duration of the test besides is considerable. 
In place of battles that lasted an hour or so, we now 


have battles that last a week or ten days. Night 
even gives no rest. Day succeeds day, and the 
struggle is eternally going on. The cessations in the 
firing are more terrible than the periods of activity. 
The nervous strain continues and the least exposure 
brings a hail of bullets. No one knows what turn 
affairs will take. The soldier cannot take his mind 
off this enemy, whose position, strength and re- 
sources of ammunition are unknown. He remembers 
the cartridges he has fired and the difficulty and 
uncertainty of their replacement. The cries of more 
or less distant wounded comrades strikes his ear. 
All this tends to break down his nervous system. 

The exhaustion of mind and body is complete. 
Troops even go to sleep on the firing line from sheer 

The Russian Captain Soloviev, speaking of the 
soldier in the Russo-Japanese war, says : 

"As a general rule, our soldier in battle has an 
astonishingly simple and everyday demeanor. He 
who expects to see something out of the ordinary, 
something heroic on his face at these decisive mo- 
ments — something picturesque and dramatic — is 
mistaken. The soldier remains the same ordinary 
man as before, only his face is somewhat paler, and 
its expression more concentrated and serious. His 
nervous and rapid firing alone betrays the inner 
struggle. It is at that moment that it is necessary to 
master the soldier's impressions and bring him to a 
normal condition, as far as this may be done in 
battle." — Soloviev. 

"Each eye-witness of battle may confirm how 
narrowly the men watch their ofl^icer. The soldiers 
judge by their officer the condition of affairs, the 
greater or less danger, the success or failure. * * '^^ 
Woe to the unit which in time of peace did not be- 


come impregnated with the spirit of_iron_discipline. 
It will pay dearly for it in war.~" 

"To quiet the men, it is useful to make remarks 
concerning the service alone. For example : 'Why 
are the sights not set in that squad? Squad com- 
mander, what are you thinking about? Examine 
and correct immediately.' If the commander is 
angry, reproves neglect — this means that there is 
nothing unusual — that everything is going as it 
ought and that there is no cause for fear. The men 
grow calmer and forget that bullets are whistling 
about them.'' * * — Soloviev. 

A threat or a joke may bring men to their 
senses. "But a threat must be serious and the men 
must feel that it will be executed if need be. Angry 
words and shouts can do nothing." — Soloviev. 

"It must not be overlooked that the soldier 
separated from his comrades in (a thin skirmish) 
line during the advance, and withdrawn from the 
influence of his officers, succumbs more easily to 
temporary spells of weakness and is more apt to re- 
main behind than the skirmishers in a dense firing 
line." — Balck. 

In South Africa the British used thin firing 
lines and failed. The Japanese used them as a man- 
euver formation to reach a position from which 
effective fire could be opened and then promptly 
thickened the firing line by sending successive thin 
lines to join it. 

Examples of Skulking 

Hohenlohe tells of crossing the battlefield in the 
war of 1870 and finding it covered with skulkers — 
whole battalions of them. Some were lying down 
with their guns pointing forward like skirmishers — 


evidently they had remained there when their com- 
rades advanced. Others were hiding in holes and 
ravines. All had an indifferent air. It seemed to 
be sufficient for them that the party of officers rid- 
ing by did not belong to their corps. Some cried 
"Look, here are some more who are going forward 
to get killed." 

Captain Culmann describes finding at Woerth 
five men in Indian file behind a small sapling, who 
had remained there several hours. 

Quotation from a French description of the de- 
fense of Saint Hubert, 18th August, 1870 : "Four 
hours ! Rain of bullets, all high. Ah ! Look ! A line 
of battle coming to support us, well aligned. The 
marshal in the center, the colonel on the right, 
Sourdrille on the left. It is the 3d Battalion. From 
my place I see holes made in the line, which soon 
reaches us and wishes to share our shelter — hardly 
sufficient for us. They get in two and three ranks ; 
the occupants refuse to yield the place which they 
have had all day. They need not have sent all the 
soldiers in the world. We needed only cartridges. 

"What it that? We are turned! No; our 
friends 200 meters in our rear are firing on us, 
taking us for the enemy. We sound 'Cease firing ;' 
we make the signal, but the fire continues. My un- 
der lieutenant asks permission to go over there ; he 
rushes forward through a storm of bullets, reaches 
their officers and finds among them some who ask 
if he really is a Frenchman. However, the fire 
ceased. That battalion rose up and rushed to join 
us. Where could we put them? Everyone got be- 
hind something and began to shoot. We were in 
ten ranks. The front rank cried that the fire of 
those in rear menaced them. I struck those nearest 
me with my cane and finally ended by turning my 

back to the fire of a Prussian battery which was less 
dangerous than my comrades." 

A Prussian captain wrote in 1870 : 
"I see many people occupied in trying to devise 
means to make the enemy's fire less effective, but I 
acknowledge with regret no one seems disquieted by 
the serious losses caused by men of the same troop 
firing on each other." 

We see above the demoralized individual. Pre- 
viously I have given you something about demoral- 
ized crowds, i.e., panics. 


"Courage is neither so common nor so invaria- 
ble as the public suppose. A person is very varia- 
ble as to courage ; he has his good and his bad days, 
depending on exterior circumstances, such as phy- 
sical or mental fatigue, cold, heat, hunger, thirst, or 
the news received. 

**As to the average — ^the ordinary man — it is 
necessary to flatter a little to appease public opinion. 
Without doubt he is capable of many fine moves, but 
subject also to strange reactions. It is said every- 
one is brave, but when one comes to the fact one 
finds few of uniform courage." — ''La Guerre et 
r Homme.'' 

"Of all animals, man is the most cowardly. If 
one studies the faces before the battle, he will realize 
this. For a man to sacrifice his life for the success 
of the end that the army pursues is a rare thing. 
Are there so few absolutely brave among so many 
brave men? Alas, yes. Gideon found 300 among 
30,000, and he was surprisingly lucky." "The abso- 
lute bravery that does not refuse to fight even against 
odds, trusting in God or destiny — ^this bravery is not 
natural to man ; it is the result of moral cultivation. 


and it is infinitely rare, for always in danger the 
animal sentiment of self-preservation bobs up ; man 
calculates his chances and makes how many errors? 

"Man has a horror of death. Among coj'ps 
d'elite a grand sense of duty, which they alone are 
able to understand and reach, sometimes makes them 
march forward ; but the mass always recoils al the 
sight of destruction. Discipline has as its end to do 
violence to this horror by a greater horror — ^that of 
punishment or of shame. But there always arrives 
an instant when this natural horror takes the upper 
hand of discipline and the combatant flies. When 
the combatant is long under fire, there is produced 
the selection of which Skobeleff speaks. The brave 
and the men of good intentions keep up ; the others, 
the cowards, waiting under cover, weaken themselves 
and the others, delaying the execution of orders, 
breaking up the movement and impeding the effec- 
tives. Fire, even from a great distance, has then 
produced disunion, material and moral." — DuPlCQ. 

"Fear is then an enemy that we have not taken 
into account, yet it is really more terrible than the 
real enemy, for it weakens the effective strength 
more than the latter." 

"Fear! Does it pass the chiefs or the soldiers 
by ? Those passed by are of a rare character. The 
mass shudders, for the flesh is weak ; and this shud- 
dering must, under pain of making a mistake, enter 
into calculation as a given essential in all organiza- 
tion, discipline, dispositions, movements, methods of 
action — all things that have for their end the sepa- 
ration of mortification and fear, to make it leave us 
and go to the enemy." — DuPiCQ. 

Patriotism, love of liberty, religious spirit, fana- 
ticism, armour-propre — these are all the factors, all 
the components which, added up, make the spirit 


of self-sacrifice. The spirit of sacrifice always en- 
counters an enemy — fear. 

Fear! That is the thing to vanquish in order 
to assure the victory. 

Battle is a terrible drama, a bloody tragedy, 
which unfolds itself to the hearts of all soldiers, 
from the humblest to the most exalted. It is a 
struggle of two moral powers ; the conquered are not 
those who fall dead or wounded, but those who fol- 
lowed and who rushed away because they were 
afraid. Fear is a very natural human sentiment. 
Those who are reputed to have been most brave have 
acknowledged it. 

Ney said: "The one who says he never knew 
fear is a compound liar." 

Grant said that he realized that the enemy was 
as afraid of him as he was of the enemy and that 
this thought helped sustain him through his battles. 

Turenne said to himself before a fight: "You 
tremble body! Well, you would tremble more if 
you knew where I am going to take you !" 

Skobeleflf, always admired for his coolness, even 
in the most perilous moments — always impassive 
under fire — said to a fried: "It is folly to believe 
that I am brave and that I fear nothing; I confess 
that I am a coward. Every time that I enter an 
engagement I say to myself that it will be my last." 
This confession of Skobeleff makes one think that 
the various stories of men foreseeing their death in 
the coming battle may be accounted for by the fact 
that many have Skobeleflf's feeling on entering a 
fight, and of course some of them are killed. 

Fear manifests itself by trembling. Under the 
influence of fear it is impossible to manipulate a 
small and complex mechanical device, for the fingers 
are trembling and convulsed. This is a reason why 


the mechanism of small arms should be very simple, 
and the trembling of human muscles in fear is one 
of the two principal reasons why battle scores are 
only from one fiftieth to one seventieth as good as 
target scores. Inability to accurately determine the 
range and uncertainty as to where the bullets are 
going is the other reason. Another authority — 
''Psychology and Neurology of Fear'' — says : "One 
of the physical expressions of fear is a paralysis of 
the motor muscles of the eye," and "All violent 
emotions cause changes of the physical system." 
(See pages 3, 10 and 32.) To go back to the first 
reason : Fear dilates the pupil of the eye and inter- 
feres with its focusing. It contracts the muscles of 
the chest and interferes with the breathing and- 
lessens endurance. The man who stays to fight and 
will stay to the end is not free from fear. His 
muscles tremble and the pupil of his eye dilates. 
The target is not clearly outlined because of the 
imperfect focus of the eyes and the rifle is not held 
steadily, because, though he grits his teeth and tries 
his hardest, still he cannot keep the muscles from 
trembling. Is it any wonder that battle practice is 
far inferior to target practice? Is it any wonder 
that foreign nations consider our refinements of 
target instruction as time wasted? 

"For what is perfection one should recall the 
Spartan. If ever man had been perfected with a 
view to war . it was he, and, nevertheless, he was 
beaten and he ran. Then, unhappily for education, 
moral and physical force has its limitations, since 
the Spartans ran away — they who should have re- 
mained until the end on the field of battle." The 
prominence of the story of Thermopylae shows how 
exceptional was the case when even a comparatively 
small force would fight on till the end. 


Modern combat is more terrifying than ancient 
combat. The losses suffered are perhaps less, but 
.the conditions are not the same. In ancient times 
the warrior who had confidence in himself and his 
neighbors could expect to come out unscathed. Now 
bullets are anonymous and come out of space to 
strike the brave and the expert as easily as the 
cowardly and untrained. Formerly losses came al- 
most entirely after the break; now they begin at 
4,000 yards from the enemy and may continue for 
days. In ranks the old warrior had little fear ; com- 
bat was not dangerous. He received and gave many 
blows, but nearly all were parried. If well trained 
and well supported by his fellows he had little to fear. 
Now the soldier feels isolated. He becomes separ- 
ated from his officers and comrades. Neither officers 
nor comrades can visibly protect him from the unseen 
blows of flying bullets. The length of the struggle 
and the feeling of contending with the unseen, com- 
bined with the sense of isolation, makes the strain 
of battle much more intense than formerly. 

During the long days of battle the man will be 
subjected to all kinds of discomforts, including diffi- 
culty as to subsistence. Often the wounded cannot 
be removed from the firing line till night. Their 
cries still further add to the depression. 

When high explosive shells burst the effect is 
small — almost nothing — against living targets; the 
pieces are too small, being almost dust. On the 
other hand, "It does but little damage, but the noise 
is fearful and its explosion throws up a great column 
of black smoke, mud, pebbles and fire which pro- 
duces a great impression upon inexperienced sol- 
diers. The moral effect is absolute." — SOLOVIEV. 

The results of fire will vary from nothing to a 
maximum. When the enemy is cool and has a good 


target, losses will be great and very sudden. At 
Magersfontein a British regiment returned the Boer 
fire for three minutes and then broke. It lost 10 per 
cent of its effective strength. It may be said that 
10 per cent is not an excessive loss, but 10 per cent 
loss in three minutes is sufficient to make any regi- 
ment break, for such quick and severe loss will at 
once give the enemy the ascendant morale. This is 
the argument for the use of machine guns. If they 
can be used effectively the losses they will inflict 
will be so sudden and so great as to break the morale 
of any troops exposed to their fire. 

Comparing a mounted to a dismounted action 
under modern conditions. Lieutenant Colonel de 
Maud'huy says : "The charge is a spoonful of bitter 
medicine to swallow. First one makes a face and 
then swallows it at a gulp. For infantry it is not a 
spoonful of medicine to swallow at a gulp — it is a 
large bottle to be taken drop by drop, and each drop 
is more bitter than the last." 

Method of Combat in Harmony with 

One of the impressions most regularly received 
from recent combats is the almost complete impossi- 
bility of conducting the fight on the firing line it- 
self. Subaltern officers, obliged to seek cover like 
their men, find their zone of influence to be very 

At a distance from the enemy officers are able to 
give precise directions and see that they are carried 
out, but as they close with the enemy these direc- 
tions become more vague and supervision of the de- 
tails of how they are carried out becomes impossible. 
The valor of the individual combatants becomes the 


principal factor of success. In reality all the officers 
can do is to exercise an influence toward decreasing 
the disorder and keep confusion from becoming 
worse confounded. 

Firing at split ranges will likely be found im- 
possible. The attention of the men cannot be gained 
enough to have the sights so set. Besides, the at- 
tention being so strongly held by the enemy, "under 
the influence of fear one can suddenly become deaf." 
— "Psychology and Neurology of Fear/' page 29. 

The officers, being human, follow the common 
rule — they are afraid, themselves. At a given 
moment they have felt that their men were escaping 
their influence, and they have been struck with the 
same feeling themselves. They dare not acknow- 
ledge that their men got out of hand. They do not 
like to speak of it, which is natural. Really they 
were not responsible. It was the peace-time edu- 
cation which made them believe in impossibilities 
that was responsible. 

We must learn to modify the mathematical and 
dynamic theories of material things when we apply 
them to combat; to throw out the illusions of the 
drill and maneuver ground where our experiences 
are with the man in his normal condition, calm, 
attentive and obedient, intelligent and docile. In 
combat the human instrument, from chief to soldier, 
is nervous, impressionable, distrait, excited. Com- 
plex movements are impossible to man in this con- 
dition. To order such a movement is to order the 
impossible — and, the impossible ordered, discipline 
is at an end. The effect is to disconcert both officers 
and men by the unforeseen and by the contrast be- 
tween exercises at drill and a real battle. Battle 
always has its surprises, but it is not therefore 
necessary to add these unnecessary surprises. 


At drills we have confined the soldier within 
bounds that we set, but in battle he escapes from 
these bounds and the officer feels lost. 

Truly, if to the causes of fright already de- 
scribed be added that of seeing at the time of test in 
war that the peace time formations dissolve and are 
useless, then will we have everything necessary to 
total demoralization. The soldier would have more 
confidence in chiefs that he accused of lack of fore- 
sight and incapacity. 

Xenophon said, "Anything, be it agreeable or 
terrible, the less it is foreseen the greater will be the 
pleasure or fear it causes." 'This is nowhere more 
true than in war where every surprise strikes even 
the strongest with terror." 

Physical or moral fear has its germ always pre- 
existing, and it is the sole true enemy, the cardinal 
enemy to fight, to master, to watch without ceasing. 
The least unforeseen event, the least surprise is 
always liable to unchain this contagion of fear which 
shatters all morale. 

One must keep abreast of his time. The army 
must progress in company with science and arma- 
ment. It is not possible to so progress when we have 
an iron clad ^'normal attack." Such a thing is as 
foolish as an old French idea of laying a drill-ground 
with stakes to mark the point for firing volleys, for 
extending to a flank, for changing to individual fire, 
etc., so that their drill-book could be exactly fol- 
lowed. Why teach an absurdity that any thinking 
man can see will be not only useless but dangerous 
to try to apply in reality? 

All this formality will inevitably crumble under 
the first hostile fire. 

In our service we saw enough in 1898 to con- 
vince anyone that normal formations of any kind 


were utterly useless and senseless and improvised 
something to take their place. The Franco-German 
war should have shown us that a highly centralized 
bureau system of supply would utterly break down 
in time of war. 

In 1898 we got a stronger hint to the effect that 
our supply system was not a thing of which to be 
proud. As Mister Dooley said, "The army cannot 
live on general orders." Now look at your file of 
general orders. It is a formidable looking volume, 
is it not? In fact that volume of general orders is 
getting heavier each year. In exactly the same 
proportion is the difficulty of transacting the ordi- 
nary everyday business of a troop or company in- 

Will those methods stand the test of war? 
Never. No company commander on active opera- 
tions could keep up this mass of required paper work. 
With the additional papers required by army, divi- 
sion, and brigade headquarters a company command- 
er with two clerks and a set of modern office equip- 
ment could not keep his papers up to date. He 
would need half an escort wagon to carry around the 
blanks and office devices necessary for him to make 
even a reasonable attempt to do so. What system, 
then, will be used in war? None; there will chaos 
and the most successful commanders will likely be 
those who entirely neglect the requirements of orders 
and grab any supplies they can get their hands on. 
That leads to still worse confusion, yet it will be 
simply a case of self-preservation to do it. 

Perhaps the next hint we get that it is time to 
change our supply and record system will be stronger 
— it certainly will if we go up against an enemy of 
any strength. In a severe struggle on our own terri- 
tory soldiers will starve to death and die from fatigue 


and exposure because their officers were absolutely 
unable to obtain proper supplies and have them de- 
livered, while at the same time ample supplies will be 
on hand, but at a point where they are not needed. 

Since the above was originally written our new 
Field Service Regulations have greatly improved our 
system of supply for war service as far as concerns 
the commissary and Ordnance Department. Though 
these new methods seem good in themselves, they 
will be new to the troops and are as yet untried in 
practice. We still lack a suitable system for the 
supply of shoes, clothing, etc., and most of all ive 
have absolutely no system arranged for replacing 
losses in men. 

The excuse for the numerous reports and re- 
turns and approved requisitions is that such a sys- 
tem insures the government against fraud. We all 
know it does not do so in peace, and in war, when the 
whole system breaks down of its own weight, the 
door will be opened for wholesale fraud that can 
never be detected. The ultimate insurance of the 
government against fraud is in the integrity of^its 
officers. We can never make war till we acknow- 
ledge this and base our system of administration on 
that alone. 

A French officer says : "In 1870 I had but six 
months' experience as an officer. I had great con- 
fidence in my captain, who had made the Italian 
Campaign. I told him of my feeling of weakness 
because of my lack of knowledge of military regu- 
lations. He replied, 'Reassure yourself — in war 
there are no regulations.' " 

To go back to my subject, the following state- 
ment about the necessities of modern battle seem to 
me reasonable: 

The firing line must be strong enough for the 


soldier to feel that the line is full and strong, thus 
inspiring confidence ; but it must not be overcrowded. 
Troops lying down under fire do not tolerate the 
near presence of reenforcements or of an officer 
which draws the hostile fire upon them. 

There is no danger in leaving considerable inter- 
vals between companies on the firing line. It is not 
like it used to be when effective range was 100 yards. 
Now no one can throw himself into these intervals. 
If it becomes necessary to reenforce, such intervals 
allow formed bodies of reenforcements under their 
own officers and with their own complete organiza- 
tions to join the firing line. 

These principles may be said to state the forma- 
tions best adapted psychologically to the battlefield 
of today. 

"Tactics is, has always been, or at least should 
have been, the art or science of making men fight 
with the maximum of energy, a maximum -which 
organization alone is able to develop against fear." — 

Moral and Material Support from Artillery 
and Machine Guns 

It takes very little sense for even a frightened 
man to realize that friendly shells that pass over his 
head on the way to do damage to the enemy are an 
advantage to him. If only he is not confused, and 
thus believes the shell hostile to him, such fire will 
strengthen, not weaken his morale. The man who 
is unaccustomed to the sound may make this mistake 
before he realizes that the shells are friendly. A 
panic may result from this mistake. For this rea- 
son it would be of advantage to troops to have a 
little drill with such fire passing over them. 


Here is what happened at Liao-Yang : "Kuroki 
had before him 300 pieces of artillery that fired with- 
out ceasing for eleven days. The consumption of 
ammunition was enormous and has been placed at 
500,000 projectiles, including fragments of the shrap- 
nel, fired by one battery in one day. Result, 750 
men were reached. That is to say each battery 
touched in some manner one man in a day. This is 
reassuring against danger, but not against fear. All 
those pieces did not kill as many as one would have 
believed; nevertheless they attained their end — the 
demoralization of the enemy, for the enemy did not 
know in advance what the results would 'be." — De 

Effect of Artillery Fire 

Attack on the vicinity of the "Bridgehead" at Liao-Yang 
August 30th-September 2d: 

Russian artillery intrenched and not greatly bothered 
by Japanese fire. 

Russians had 156 guns and expended about 89,000 shrap- 

Japanese lost during the four days 828 men from shrap- 
nel fire, being 7.98 per cent of the total loss on that part of 
the- field. That is 107 shrapnel necessary to disable one of 
the attacking party. Range 3,000 to 4,000 meters. 

Mukden, February 27th-28th : 

Japanese fired 3,500 shrapnel at Russian 25th Division. 
One shrapnel took effect, killing three and wounding three. 

Shaho, October 13, 1904: 

Three thousand two hundred shrapnel fired at Russian 
137th Infantry, posted in a trench. Russian loss, due to 
this fire, was three killed and seven wounded. That is 300 
projectiles to disable one man. 

Same writer gives many instances where positions were 
abandoned by infantry solely on account of the moral effect 
of the artillery fire to which they were subjected, in many 
cases the material effect having been almost nil. Especially 
so of heavy guns. — Russian writer on "Extent to which Field 
Artillery Influences Modern Battles'' General Staff Transla- 
tion No. 2358; College Library No. 12764. 

A Japanese general said to M. Kahn, war cor- 
respondent : "See that battery firing in front of us ; 
it aims at the Russian redoubts at 3,500 meters and 


it is composed of mountain guns. I am sure at this 
distance of not killing many Russians, but I have no 
doubt of the pleasure which our infantry, two kilo- 
meters in front of us, take in hearing the shells go 
over their heads." 

The moral support of machine guns, especially if 
permanently attached to the regiment, will be greater 
still, for the rattle of their fire, once heard, is never 

"The employment of machine guns was for the 
first time quite great in the Russo-Japanese War. 
Both sides have attributed to these machines a prin- 
cipal role, both in attack and defense. In moments 
of crisis they invariably constitute a strong point of 
support. These guns are free from the effect of 
trembling nerves and muscles, and for that reason 
are especially valuable in supreme moments." 

Right here we get a good idea as to the proper 
use of machine guns. In supreme moments their 
effect is great, their moral support being as great as 
the physical. If they are pushed too far forward in 
the attack or held to the last minute in defense "and 
thus are captured, still the material loss is small. 
Used too liberally during the action, such guns con- 
sume enormous quantities of ammunition — far too 
much — but used right, their support, both moral and 
physical, will be invaluable. 

Morale — How Developed 

To give a definition of morale is difficult. It is 
a compound of various sentiments such as self-con- 
fidence, confidence in one's comrades, in one's chief, 
solidarity, a sense of honor, etc., but it has its founda- 
tion in a previous moral education begun in the 
family, added to at school and completed in the regi- 

Improvements in firearms have increased the 
distance between the different arms in battle while 
their need of mutual support is still as great as ever 
—perhaps greater. The more one arm feels itself 
isolated the greater is its need of morale. This 
consideration applies particularly to infantry with 
respect to artillery support. Artillery is the sup- 
porting arm par excellence. It is composed of arms 
served by men, but here man is the second part. 
The material here unites the men, and the power of 
the piece is the reason for their being. The man 
fights only by serving the machine. 

Within certain limits losses of men do not affect 
the fighting efl^iciency of the battery. Trembling 
nerves and muscles do not diminish the accuracy of 
its fire — its sole fighting power. Even with severe 
losses it can continue firing, which suffers in effec- 
tiveness only as a frightened brain and trembling 
muscles cause errors in setting of sights and fuses. 
So the artillery constitutes as it were the bone 
of an army — its solid part. Its morale — and here 
we -may give morale its true definition, namely, re- 
sisting power — its resisting power, therefore, resides 
in its fixed position, its relative weight of metal 
thrown and in its collective employment. The artil- 
lery personnel is collected in one place and always 
under direct comand— that is, the individual artil- 
leryman never feels himself isolated. As a fighting 
engine the artilleryman as an individual does not 
exist — the fighting unit is a collective, not an in- 

From this it results that artillery, even with 
volunteer personnel, is capable of solidity, of com- 
plete fire control, of withholding its fire at the will 
of the chief. In artillery the men are capable of a 
unity of action that is not possible to the other arms. 


Cavalry, on the contrary, is the arm of move- 
ment, of rapidity and of improvisation. As de 
Brack says, "Its rapidity is its value." In mounted 
action cavalry has an advantage, due to the fact 
that horse and rider are one unit, and the horse, 
a headstrong and excitable member of this dual unit, 
is ever anxious to stay with his comrades. In mount- 
ed action there are no skulkers — if the officer's force 
is leaving him he can know it. In dismounted ac- 
tion, also, the horse helps to prevent skulkers. The 
dismounted cavalryman does not know where his 
horse is or how to find him. The captain does. The 
soldier feels the horse as a part and himself the 
other part of the fighting unit. Separated from his 
horse when the troop moves elsewhere, the cavalry- 
man will be left to shift for himself. He therefore 
desires to keep open the connection with his horse, 
and the troop commander being the connecting link, 
he stays with the troop commander. It is frequently 
stated in books that cavalry dismounted to fight on 
foot has less skulkers than infantry, and the above 
assigned as the reason. 

On the other hand, in reconnaissance the caval- 
ryman is habitually isolated and here he needs a self- 
assurance and morale that is greater than that re- 
quired of any other arm. This can only be de- 
veloped when a man is thoroughly at home on his 
horse, knows the capabilities of the animal and his 
individual peculiarities and has himself been thor- 
oughly trained. That is to say cavalry worthy of 
any confidence cannot be improvised — it must have 
long years of training. 

In infantry the human element dominates all 
the rest. Its essential is solid character, unity of 
action and mutual confidence. The man and the man 
alone makes the measure of these elements. All the 

power of the arm resides in the man himself. His 
solid personal character is his birthright; unity of 
action and mutual confidence come from the military- 
education his nation has given him. 

In this arm in battle there is no heavy and col- 
lective material to serve as in the artillery. Its 
strength is not due to position; armament is in- 
dividual, cohesion cannot be forced ; it is an affair of 
the will of the individuals. In the combat the 
mounts do not instinctively group themselves as in 
cavalry ; there is no headlong rush, but men, weighed 
down under the weight of human feelings, advance 
slowly and painfully by an intense effort of their 
own wills. It is the duty of the officer to educate 
his men to a morale capable of this mental strain. 
By instruction and example he can do this if the re- 
cruit in his childhood has had ideas of honor and 
duty to country instilled in him — otherwise not. 

Our children don't get the love of country in- 
culcated in them in the schools as we did ourselves. 
In the average family this is the case as well. We 
amuse the children by taking them to see the moving 
pictures— not by telling them stories of the deeds of 
our ancestors. We do not lay the foundation for 
strong, patriotic characters as did our fathers. Our 
population is becoming more and more mixed in 
character. ,No longer can we raise regiments where 
every man will be of the characteristic American 
stock, of the same general level of education and 
ability, of the same good average, honest, faithful, 
personal character. No longer can we count on our 
average man making the best of what he can get in 
the way of rations — instead we will try to furnish 
infinitely more and will meet much more grumbling 
for our pains. We could not hold an army together 
a month on the food of the Civil War. 


The education that an officer gives his men 
should tend to develop their morale by developing all 
the human faculties that inspire — 

Sentiments of duty and honor. 

A sense of the value of discipline. 

Love of country. 

A willingness to do his duty. 

Audacity and contempt of danger. 


A spirit of devotion and self-sacrifice. 

Confidence in his leader. 

Reliance on his comrades in battle. 

Before an action it is of use to say to the men a 
few words, that, if they do not inflame the imagina- 
tion of the men, will at least show them that their 
leader is there and that he is confident. 

At Pickett's advance, last day at Gettysburg, 
General Gibbon rode down the lines, cocl and calm, 
and in an unimpassioned voice he s&ld to his- men*: 
"Do not hurry, men, and fire too fast) let ^.heni-como 
up close before you fire, and then aim low and 
steadily." "The coolness of their general was re- 
flected in the faces of his men." 

The nature of these remarks, even the utility of 
making them at all, depends on the character — or 
better, the race — of the soldier. For a Frenchman, 
such attempts to inflame the imagination and excite 
enthusiasm might be continued at every halt during 
the deployment and even after the first shells began 
to arrive and crowned by a supreme effort just as 
the serious action began. This was the idea of 
Napoleon who used to ride along his lines at the 
beginning of an action to increase the enthusiasm of 
his men. With us a cool, cheerful, confident bearing 
of the officer — even a joke cracked at another officer 
— would better answer the purpose than a fiery 
speech. The main point is to keep the command 
from sinking into the silent, self-centered dejection 


that comes from letting each man have time to brood 
over his personal danger. In making any effort in 
this direction it may be well to remember that it is 
always easier to secure the attention of a crowd than 
of isolated individuals. 

Here arises one of our many difficulties in hand- 
ling our troops of today. We have a predominant 
percentage bf the typical American men, but we are 
yearly getting a larger percentage of people of dif- 
ferent mental characteristics. An harangue that 
would enthuse the people of southern Europe would 
not have any good effect on the typical American 
stock, neither would our officers be capable of such 
an harangue. It does not seem that we will ever be 
able to separate these elements into regiments ac- 
: cardinf to n,ationality, each with officers of its own 
'k4:nd of'pebplfe.' That makes a heterogeneousness 
^JhSfthrf^ttk s-.nd file that mitigates strongly against 
(i'eVdb'piil^'^'^ti^ong morale. A couple of instances 
of how morale can be quickly developed with our 
typical American stock may be quoted : Grant, when 
his men were constructing intrenchments under fire 
and fast getting out of hand, coolly walked to the 
top of the intrenchment and sat down in plain sight 
to smoke a cigar. That, without a word being said, 
was sufficient to steady his men. Another example : 
During the fight at the Zapote River in 1899, several 
companies for hours faced the insurrecto trenches 
across the river, but at very short range, holding the 
insurgents to the trenches while search was made 
for a passage for a turning movement. The Fili- 
pino fire was heavy, but inaccurate. One of our 
infantry companies expended a surprisingly small 
amount of ammunition and the company was in the 
best of spirits throughout because the company com- 
mander went along his line and assigned each' man 


a small area to cover and told him that that short 
stretch of hostile trench was his — that he could lie 
still with his gun at a ready, and when a head showed 
he could get it — also that any dead later found there 
would show how good a shot he was. In a short time 
this sniping at the other fellow's head became a sort 
of game ; all sense of fear was lost, each man trying 
to score a hit, and in becoming the hunter each man 
lost all thought of being hunted. When Grant at 
Donelson sent all his staff to spread the news that 
the Confederates were trying to escape and called on 
his men to prevent their escape, he showed a thor- 
ough grasp of the psychological change that would 
result from letting his men feel that they were 
the hunters, not the hunted. 

To continue with our subject: 

If you know a certain danger threatens it is 
better to warn yoiir men to expect it, for an expected 
danger is better withstood than one that comes as a 
surprise. The French regulations of 1809, made up 
by Napoleon, laid it down as a principle that the men 
should always be forewarned of the danger to which 
they were about to be exposed — that if an extraordi- 
nary effort was to be demanded of them they should 
be so told, but that in any case, though warned of 
the danger, it should not be exaggerated to them. 

A French author also suggests that any feeling 
of being in communication with the officers helps 
steady the men, and he suggests that for that reason 
it is advisable to make pauses in the fire and to have 
the men habitually trained to repeat and help to 
transmit the order to open or to cease fire. 

Physical exercises develop in the recruit a feel- 
ing of control over his own muscles— self-confidence 
that makes gymnastic and athletic exercises of bene- 
fit in developing morale. This is much more true in 

the dismounted service, as in the mounted service the 
practice of equitation is fully as good for the purpose 
and has the advantage of keeping the man and horse 
more in communion, thus developing mutual con- 

Again v^^e come back to the fact that morale 
begins in childhood, for exercises in athletics or 
horsemanship are of much greater and more lasting 
value when their practice was begun in childhood. 
In the practice of either, the child gets a certain 
amount of buffeting that serves to make him in after 
life feel more or less joy in privations and knocks 
that he would otherwise regard as terrible hardships. 
Night marches will be necessary in war. Per- 
haps our men will not see an enemy behind every 
bush if they have had a few night marches in time 
of peace. 

Similarly, the noise of blank cartridges, especial- 
ly artillery fire, in maneuvers in time of peace serves 
to accustom the men and officers to giving and re- 
ceiving orders in hubbub and turmoil that, while it is 
not as great as in war, is, nevertheless, similar to it. 
It is easier to write clear orders at your desk than 
to give them on the battlefield. 

In modern combats the supervision of oflficers is 
more difficult than formerly. Yet we can see that 
team play is necessary to win. This team play under 
such adverse conditions can be secured only when 
the men are instructed and also when they have a 
certain uniformity of mental characteristics. Man 
is still the essential weapon and his character does 
not change. Uniformity of action and confidence 
cannot be improvised. They are born only of mu- 
tual confidence based on a mutual knowledge of 
what constitutes honorable action, what makes unit- 
ed action, from whence comes a feeling of strength 


which gives courage to face and morale to surmount 
danger. Courage, which is the domina4:ion of will 
over instinct, makes victory or defeat. 

The element above all others which makes the 
combatant capable of obedience and susceptible to 
direction in action is discipline, which is his confi- 
dence in and respect for his chief and confidence in 
his comrades ; his fear that they will reproach him ; 
his spirit of emulation, that makes 'him wish to go 
as far as the others and show no more fear; his 
esprit de corjjs — in a word, organization alone gives 
these qualities. 

A surveillance which cannot be escaped ought to 
guarantee brave and concerted action among the 
men. To guarantee this, the surveillance must be 
of each man by his neighbor. Where the adjoining 
men all know each other, where they come from the 
same town and write to each other's friends, this 
surveillance of each man by his comrades furnishes 
a strong incentive against skulking. 

During the War of 1866, Prince Frederic 
Charles permitted friends and relatives to be placed 
in the same squad, irrespective of height. A com- 
pany formed in this fashion would not look so well 
on parade, but it could be expected to give a better 
account of itself in battle. — Balck. 

In former times a man could not fall down from 
a wound that was invisible from the outside. It was 
easier then to detect skulkers. DuPicq recommends 
the practice of calling the roll at every respite in the 
action, both in maneuvers and war, as a powerful 
deterrent to skulking^in maneuvers, to accustom 
the men to expect it and the officers to order it. In 
battle,, the benefit is evident, but it is likely to be 
forgotten. If such roll calls are habitually made, the 
skulker will know that his chance of manufacturing 


a plausible explanation of his absence will be small. 
The only excuse that could be accepted would be a 
note from an officer of another company to the effect 
that so-and-so had joined his company, stating he 
was lost, and that he had comported himself well 
while with the other organization. 

The Examples of the Leader 

So long as one goes forward, neither officers nor 
men become disturbed if they are directed; but be 
the combat a little warm, they should see their chief 
and know that he is near ; though he may be without 
initiative, incapable of giving an order, it makes no 

Be this understood: Thrown in the middle of 
destruction in the chaos of combat, man is com- 
pletely lost. Instinctively he turns to his chief. If 
the chief be new, still by definition the soldier knows 
that he is superior in knowledge by reason of stu- 
dies of war. It is then for the chief to justify this 
by personal example. 

The field service regulations (French) say: 

"The officers' grades should be well permeated 
with the idea that their first and greatest mission 
consists of giving an example to their troops. No- 
where is the soldier more obedient and more devoted 
than in battle. His eyes are constantly fixed on his 
chiefs. Their bravery and coolness will pass into his 
soul ; they render him capable of all exertion and all 

The new German regulations (paragraph 266) 
say : "The officer is the model for his troops. His 
example leads them forward, maintains among them 
the strictest discipline, leads them to victory among 
the greatest difficulties at the price of the most se- 


vere losses. He should be the faithful guide to his 
men, partaking of their joys, sorrows and privations, 
and thus gain their absolute confidence." 

The officer should harden himself and prepare 
himself, by a severe personal education in time of 
peace, for his high mission in time of war. 

Then in a group of men emotion predominates, 
the faculty of judgment diminishes and instinct de- 
velops. The latter is manifested by an unreasoning 
tendency to imitation. 

Thus example has a supreme importance. It 
can lead to enthusiasm or to panic. The soldiers de- 
ployed as skirmishers, instead of in lines of battle as 
formerly, are not so much in hand, and hence it is 
indispensable that the leaders give the example con- 

The officer should overcome his impression of 
fear and hold to his coolness. It is of prime impor- 
tance that he give the example of calmness under 
fire. He should have the energy and the strength 
of will to be obeyed, which by suggestion forces im- 
mediate obedience. This force of suggestion is the 
possession of strong character, of unconquerable 
wills. By virtue of their commission, officers should 
possess these qualities ; nevertheless, they will not be 
exempt from the emotions of the struggle. They 
will also find a powerful stimulent in their sense of 
honor; by the comprehension of the height of their 
mission, they will more easily conquer instinct. 

First Impressions in Battle 

"It is difficult to depict in words the impression 
made upon an inexperienced man by battle. The 
first projectile bursting alongside or the first bullet 
hurtling past awakens such varied feelings and im- 


"It is of the greatest importance to take oneself 
well in hand during the first moments of the fight. 
A great support in found in the consciousness of the 
thousands of soldiers' eyes studying one's first steps, 
and that the authorities likewise examine the 'new 
man.' The soldiers look especially intently at the 
new commander and form their judgment of him on 
the spot (a very critical judgment). On the other 
hand, the newness of one's impressions helps to 
drown the inner voice apprising one of surrounding 

"Modern rifle fire produces a strong impression ; 
the air seems to be literally filled with bullets ; their 
plaintive whistling pervades the atmosphere like a 
continuous moan — above, below, and everywhere. 

"As soon as the first shot is heard the soldiers 
grow serious, take off their caps and cross them- 
selves; all jokes and conversation cease. At the 
given order all march bravely as during maneuvers. 

"The courage and calmness with which the sol- 
diers go into battle produce a strong impression. 

"The infantry soon grows accustomed to rifle 
fire, but the artillery fire, especially the shells, pro- 
duces a decided impression. It seems to me that this 
is not due so much to the losses inflicted by artillery 
as to the ear-spliting noise produced by the explo- 
sion of the projectiles. The effect is produced only 
on the ear, but it is strong. The Shimose shells have 
a specially powerful effect upon the inexperienced, 
and the shrapnel upon those unaccustomed to battle. 
The young soldiers throw themselves face downward 
at each bursting of a shell. Thus the infantry, which 
suffers most from rifle fire, pays least attention to it ; 
the artillerymen, on the contrary, are much impres- 
sed by rifle fire. This may be explained by the fact 
that the men are accustomed to their own arm. 


''At the firing of the first shot the center of 
gravity is brought to rest on the officer and it is then 
that is manifested his true role and the enormous 
responsibility that rests on him." — Soloviev. 

The more the conditions of combat are punish- 
ing, the struggle bloody, the losses considerable, the 
more fatigue and tension of nerves are crying out for 
relief, the grander becomes the officer's role. 

The resulting action of his men depends entirely 
on the company commander. One might say that 
war of the present time is the war of company com- 
manders\ All ocular testimony to actual combat 
confirms this view. The soldiers observe their offi- 
cers with incessant attention. It is on his knowledge, 
his energy, his personal bravery, that all their exis- 
tences depend. 'It is from his attitude that the men 
judge of the situation, of the greater or less peril 
or the greater or less success or failure." — Solo- 
viev. The authority of the officer can raise itself 
high or fall very low. 

In war the officer himself will most often not 
have been under fire. He will be astonished on 
reaching the field of battle, but his previous military 
education, the studies he has made, the subjects he 
has thought about, all should exercise on his mind 
such an influence that the events which are taking 
place before his eyes have the appearance of having 
been seen before and that the measures to be taken 
seem natural enough for him to prescribe them with- 
out precipitation and almost without emotion. 

And if, besides, he gives proof at the desired 
moment of that reasoning bravery and coolness 
which is the true triumph of will over instinct, one 

^See DuPicq, page 51. "Caesar lost in this battle 200 
men, of whom thirty were centurians" — i. e., 15 per cent were 
company commanders. 


may be certain that he will have the confidence of 
his men and that all will follow him wherever he 


I would have nothing more to say on this subject 
if we had to lead only brave and honest men. Un- 
fortunately, as we have seen, one finds in all armies 
a certain percentage of cowards — weak perhaps — 
but whose pernicious examples will be felt by the 
rest unless we take care. These are the men that 
start panics. 

There remains for them a last means, of which 
I would have liked not to speak, but it is necessary to 
do so — I mean punishment. 

The Regulations give oflficers terrible but neces« 
sary rights in this respect. 

About discipline Soloviev says: "In combat, 
the ofl^cer must be more than ever a chief, a leader, 
and the discipline must be of iron. Never does the 
need of discipline manifest itself so much as in com- 
bat. Woe to the unit, which, in time of peace, has 
been only slightly imbued with the spirit of discip- 
line! In war it will pay dearly for it." 

Should measures of discipline be preventive? 
Must one warn the men before battle that punish- 
ment will follow cowardice? Certainly, yes. You 
say, "Our men do not like to work under threats." 
It is true. Nevertheless, but tactfully, though en- 
ergetically, one should remind them of the coercive 
measures which may be adopted. The good soldier 
will know to whom such threats are addressed. 

"It is necessary to warn the men," says Bu- 
geaud, "against cries of alarm in rear of ranks, such 
as 'Save himself who can,' *We are cut off,' etc. They 
should be warned that file closers and battle police 

have orders to run the sword through the hostile 
emissaries or bad soldiers who give out such cries of 

I cite this anecdote: "Turning toward the 
column, the colonel said : 'Major, march in rear as 
support ; the grenadiers are incapable of running a- 
way ; but if they do, fire on them and on me." 

On the same order of ideas, it is said that the 
Japanese turned machine gun and artillery fire into 
an assaulting column which had suddenly retreated 
in a panic. 

On June 10, 1871, General Chanzy gave the fol- 
lowing order : "Each army corps will have its rear 
guarded by cavalry, who will gather up fugitives 
and arrest stragglers. These fugitives will be taken 
back to their places and held on the front firing 
line. They will be shot if they try to run away." 

Let us hope that we shall not need to make use 
of this method, but let us be ready to make an ex- 
ample on occasion that will calm hesitation and often 
avoid a panic more terrible in its consequences than 
the death of a coward or two. 

Finally, above all other means, is the popularity 
of the war. The last war was not so in Russia, 
where few understood what it was about. With 
us that can never be. Our democratic regime for- 
bids to us all such wars of conquest ; it is, then, only 
grave insults to our national honor or our interests 
that will lead us to shed blood. In such case the war 
will be popular, and conviction of the justice of the 
cause, anchored in the minds of the combatants, will 
be not the least lever to support moral force. 

Opening of Fire 

Of all the incidents of modern combat, writes 
Maurice, the one that is the most difficult to conceive 


is the intense need of the simple fact of firing which 
seizes man almost like a catalepsy. 

It is, however, not difficult to conceive. "To 
fight at a distance is natural to man ; from ancient 
times, all man's ingenuity has been devoted to ob- 
taining this result." 

Napoleon said, "The instinct of every man is 
not to let himself be killed without defending him- 
self." And, in fact, man in the fight is a being in 
whom the instinct of self-preservation, at certain mo- 
ments, dominates all the sentiments. Discipline 
has for its end to dominate this instinct by a greater 
fear — ^that of shame or of punishment; but this re- 
sult can never be absolutely attained; it can be 
reached only to a certain point, that cannot be pass- 
ed. This point reached, the soldier must fire or he 
will run either forward or back. "Fire is then, so 
to speak, the safety valve of emotion." — DuPiCQ. 

This leads us to long distance fire. Is long dis- 
tance fire necessary? It is against the interests of 
the firers to suppress the losses which they can, 
or believe they can, inflict on their adversaries, by 
firing during all this time, if the supply of ammuni- 
tion permits ; so, in spite of all that is said or done, 
the men have always fired at great distances. 

Thus^ if one does not make the soldier fire, he 
will fire himself, in order to distract his attention 
and to forget danger. The fire of Frederick's Prus- 
sians had no other object; Marshall Saxe had well 
divined this fact. "The quickness with which the 
Prussians charge their guns," he tells us, "is ad- 
vantageous because it occupies the soldier and pre- 
vents reflection while he is in the presence of the 
enemy. It is error to believe that the last five 
victories that the nation gained in the last war are 
due to their fire, since it has been noticed that in the 

greater part of these actions there were more Prus- 
sians than of their adversaries killed by rifle fire." 

It is not always the conqueror who kills the most 
people ; the victory is to the one that gains the 
ascendent morale. At Trautenau in 1866, the Prus- 
sians, who were slightly superior in numbers, w^ere 
defeated with a loss of 3 i per cent ; the Austrian loss 
was 15 per cent. One should not count on the cool- 
ness of the men, and, as it is necessary above all to 
guard the morale, one must try to occupy them and to 
divert them; one means of doing so is to have them 
fire ; the effect produced is of no importance, and it 
will be perfectly absurd — impossible, furthermore — 
to require of them sufliicient coolness to fire only at 
long intervals, to set their sights carefully and to 
watch attentively. These words of DuPicq are con- 
firmed by Soloviev (page 111), who says: "The con- 
duct of fire (fire control) in battle is a very difficult 
thing. The men strive to open fire immediately on 
taking up their position, even without awaiting or- 
ders to fire, designation of the objective, range or 
kind of fire. This haste is, first of all, brought about 
by the desire of drowning the consciousness of dan- 
ger through increased activity, yet this is what most 
impedes the effectiveness of fire, the maintenance of 
order in battle, and fire discipline." 

It is then very difficult to determine the distance 
at which fire should be opened; it is a question of 

So long as troops have not suffered losses, so 
long as the men have not seen their comrades fall 
and heard their cries, it seems as though they should 
have enough coolness to keep from firing; but as 
soon as death shall have commenced its work, it will 
be necessary to ''open the safety value of the emo- 


tions." To wish to continue the advance without 
doing so leads to panic. 

Value of Battle Fire 

''The soldiers have emotions — fear, even. The 
sentiment of duty, discipline, self-esteem, example 
of officers, and above all, coolness, maintains them 
and keeps back the fear of becoming frightened. 
Their emotion does not permit them to see clearly, to 
more than partly adjust their sights, when they do 
not really fire in the air. 

"The rifle, like the cannon, keeps power, the 
faculty of adjusting sights, but the agitation of the 
heart and nervous system is opposed to the im- 
mobility of the arni in the hands ; the arm being sup- 
ported, takes part always in the trembling of the 
man. The latter is in haste to launch the shot that 
will stop the ball destined for him before it can leave 
the enemy's gun. And, for fear the enemy will fire 
first, this vague sort of reasoning, though actually 
never formulated in the soldier's mind, still leads 
him to fire without even bringing the gun to his 
shoulder." — DuPiCQ. 

General Trochu says : "From my experience, I 
am convinced that troops in the firing line, under the 
emotions of battle, never adjust sights, no matter 
how good the troops. They fire to the front hur- 
riedly, many of them hardly bringing the gun to the 

General DeNegrier says: "Of 100 men who are 
under fire for the first time, 95 do not even see the 
end of their gun and fire very high." He had con- 
siderable war experience. 

Under the influence of fear the pupil of the eye 
expands ; the man tries to distinguish the point from 


which he thinks danger threatens ; the eye is accom- 
modated to the long distance with such intensity 
that it can but vaguely see nearby objects. 

Of the 100 men, the five or six who remain cool 
see what they believe to be the point occupied by the 
enemy. Their bullets strike within a zone of 150 or 
200 j^ards — provided the range is correct. The 
others fire at all kinds of angles. Their bullets go 
everywhere, but principally in a zone from 2,700 
yards up. 

"The i^roportion of five men out of 100 who 
remain cool may seem extraordinary to those who 
have never engaged in a large battle, being them- 
selves on the firing line. It is nevertheless not ex- 
aggerated, and is sensibly the same in all armies,'' — 

At Gettysburg 24,000 loaded rifles were found 
abandoned on the field of battle ; of these 25 per cent, 
were loaded properly, 50 per cent contained two 
charges ; the remainder had from three to six charges 
— one had twenty-two charges. 

"A Summer Nights Dream'' says of the battle 
of Gravelotte: 

'*We were opposite to and about 500 paces from 
an extended position of the enemy, and under a 
brisk fire. My entire company had by this time been 
necessarily extended. With dismay I marked the 
growing uneasiness of my men without being able to 
do anything to stop it. Everyone was lying down 
and firing. I could see rifles whose stocks never left 
the earth. The upward direction of the muzzles was 
particularly noticeable at one part of the line. On 
looking closer, I could see that there was a little rise 
in the ground in front which prevented the men from 
seeing the enemy. This did not, however,- stop the 
men in question from firing away as hotly as the 

others, and sending all their bullets over the rise into 
space. To my great astonishment I saw among these 
madmen Lance Corporal Arnold. Full of anger, I 
rushed at him, seized him by the shoulder, and 
shouted: 'What are you shooting at? You can't 
see the enemy !' Not feeling certain that amidst the 
noise he understood my words, I accompanied them 
with lively and unmistakable gestures. Arnold 
looked around, but his gaze was vacant. Clearly, he 
did not recognize his own captain. Then, hearing a 
few shots whistle close by us, he flopped down again, 
to fire harder than ever. My anger got the better 
of me. I hit him with my sword so hard over the 
helmet as to make a great dent in it and to knock it 
off his head in spite of the chin-chain. This had an 
effect. The man sprang onto his knee as if struck 
by lightning. His face was deadly pale, and every 
limb was quivering. I could not understand what 
he said, but from his face I saw that he now recog- 
nized me. Never shall I forget his look, partly 
pleading, partly reproachful, like the look in a stag's 
eye when the hunter approaches to cut its throat. 
He fell down again in a heap, as though crushed, 
his eyes staring at the ground. This, however, 
lasted only an instant. He jumped up quickly, 
grasped the arms of the men nearest him, and en- 
couraged them to advance with him to the place I 
had indicated. As his comrades did not understand 
him at once, he crept forward alone, and although 
endangered by the wild fire of the men who remained 
behind, commenced a steady, well-aimed fire from 
the rising ground. After having, with trouble and 
by forcible means, induced the other men to move up 
to where Arnold was, I went off to the other flank of 
the company. I never saw Arnold again ; he fell in 
this fight." 


This is the way it is necessary to study psychic 
phenomena and learn their bearing on war. 

Quotations from Various Authors on the 

"All violent emotion automatically dilates the 
pupil of the eye." — Boissonnet. The opening then 
becomes too large and admits too much light; thus 
the vision becomes shadowy and deformed. The 
man sees as in a fog, his will being totally unable to 
rectify the pupil; this physical defect of emotion 
does not depend on the will. In this condition it is 
impossible to estimate the distances correctly, pos- 
sibly even to read the numbers on the sight leaf. 
Under these circumstances, the brain being as be- 
fogged as the sight, it is nearly impossible for a com- 
mander to attract the attention of his men. Strong 
emotions command the attention and are not com- 
manded by it. A strong image masks all others. In 
a word, the direction of the attention is then involun- 

"The dominant thing at this moment is the 
enemy who is firing at one; he turns the attention 
entirely from the chief in rear who is trying to give 
commands." — Blomdus. 

"The psycho-physiological troubles which are 
produced in the presence of danger habitually take 
the form of paleness or of trembling. If you wish 
more precise indications of the effect of fear from 
the physiological point of view, I will add : 

"1. Enervation of the voluntary muscles, trem- 
bling, stoppages in movements {i.e., undecided move- 
ments) which constantly become uncertain and 

"2. Stoppage of breath, oppression, rising of the 

gorge, from which involuntary oscillations result; 
the man losing mastery of his' organism. 

"3. Finally, there is spasmodic contractions of 
the blood vessels, causing paleness, collection of blood 
at the heart and dilation of the pupil. 

"The irrigation of the brain cells being modified, 
man is affected in his intellectual faculties ; associa- 
tion of ideas no longer takes place; his power of 
attention and judgment is diminished; the pupil of 
the eye is dilated, it no longer sees the sights clearly. 
He sees only the sight-stud — even sees only the end 
of the muzzle; he can no longer tell just which. 

''Man, dominated by emotion on the field of 
battle, fires precipitately, does not use his sights, 
sights with the end of the gun or fires from the hip. 
If the emotion becomes intense, under the action of 
the instinct of self-preservation he fires anywhere, so 
long as he keeps firing; his bullets go in the sky or 
in the ground a few paces away; he fires, whatever 
be the orders of the chief that he no longer con- 
sciously sees or hears ; he fires after the enemy has 
disappeared from his front and even fires on his 
comrades to the rear. 

"This is the fire of war. 

"I have wished to make a complete picture, 
perhaps even exaggerated, in order to show fully its 
characteristics. But do not doubt that it will pre- 
sent itself on our battlefields to a considerable degree 
and that no one is free from it." — Daudignac. 

Conduct of Fire 

After the above, one may doubt whether battle 
fire can be directed. 

"A man under fire has the impression as quick 
as thought that he is specially and personally seen — 


that they are after him. It is the logical reaction of 
the sensation of danger on an organism deprived of 
the faculty of thought. The observation is, more- 
over, well enough known and proved by experience. 
Under the influence of this feeling man tries to kill 
so he will not be killed, and it is one of the most 
powerful motives of the combatant. From this it 
results that he will necessarily fire, and, whatever 
happens he will fire on the ones whom he believes 
are firing at him — ^that is, on those clearly in front 
of him; this conviction that it is those seen, and no 
others, which menace him, being the direct con- 
sequence of a series of unreasoning impulses, will 
present themselves to his mind as evidence. The 
man himself will not often choose his objective — the 
objective will be imposed upon him. One sees how 
unreasonable it will be to count on always being able 
to direct his fire on any point one chooses." — Grand- 


Let us not expect under a hot fire to be able to 
use fire with counted cartridges or volley fire. Only 
when the firer is himself not in danger will telescopic 
sights and all the other paraphernalia of the target 
range be of any value. 

Only against an inferior enemy (like savage 
tribes) where the soldier feels himself safe will it be 
possible to use a knowledge of probable percentage 
of hits, split ranges or range-finders. 

"The efficiency of fire in time of war reposes 
above all else in the morale of the combatants/' — 

Absorbed as the commanders will be in leading 
their men, they will have little chance to sanely ap- 
preciate all the conditions that are necessarily taken 
account of in range firing. He will have all his 
faculties engaged in solving the tactical problem and 

the problem of leading his men, without going into 
the direction or intensity of wind, the direction of 
light, the temperature, the barometer, or even the 
use of the range-finder. Instead he will be seeing 
that his men keep some kind of formation, choosing 
the time for advancing, pushing the men forward, 
trying to keep control of the opening and cessation 
of fire, and above all in watching the enemy. 

Will he then always be in a state to transmit 
more precise directions ? Most often he will be lying 
among his men, or squatted behind the same shelter, 
in the tumult of the combat. His orders which must 
be passed down the line from mouth to mouth must 
be limited to the very simplest, such as 'TorVard" 
— "Commence firing" — "Lie down." 

How can fire discipline be obtained ? It will be 
physically and psychologically impossible to open 
and cease firing by command. We must admit, on 
the contrary, it may be utterly impossible to stop the 
firing when the men are under fire and believe it 
possible to hit the ones that are firing at them. 

We must then seek a practical method to employ 
for opening and ceasing fire. 

"Collective discipline, which lies almost entirely 
in indirect methods, relates much more to the con- 
duct of troops than to the conduct of fire. 

"It is necessary to demand only possible things ; 
it leads to bad discipline to teach men, in time of 
peace, things which cannot be executed in combat." 
Our firing regulations, which require the use of 
a battle sight which shoots from twenty to thirty 
inches high between 200 and 500 yards, are psycho- 
logically wrong. All practical experience in war 
proves they are wrong. At those ranges men under 
fire always shoot high. Then why in time of peace 
try to teach them to hold below the target — some- 


thing that we know they will not do in battle ? For 
target practice, all sights, battle sights or others, 
should be so arranged that to hit, the soldier must 
hold on the lower line of the object he expects to 
reach, but to expect him in battle to estimate twenty 
to thirty inches below his target and aim off the tar- 
get is to expect the impossible. 

We admit the following facts : When a man is 
under fire, he can be kept from returning the fire 
only by being placed in such a position that to return 
the fire is impossible or at least very difficult. 

"Under heavy fire the firing can be stopped 
only by making the men sink down behind shelter. 
This takes advantage of the instinct of self-preser- 
vation. If the morale permits, the fire can also be 
stopped by starting an advance." — Grandmaison. 

Against these views of the effect of fire, you may 
urge that still it is the rifle bullet that does the exe- 
cution in war. (In the Russo-Japanese war, 85 
per cent of all wounds were caused by rifle bullets.) 
That is true ; but the bullets that take effect mostly 
do so by chance, not by the good aim of the firer ; it 
is the shower of bullets that kills, as is shown by the 
frightful consumption of ammunition in that war. 

Captain Soloviev says (Soloviev, page 14) : 

"The fact is that the long range at which fire is 
opened, the entire mise en scene of modern warfare, 
when the enemy is often positively invisible, forces 
one to have recourse to intensity of fire to shower a 
rain of bullets on a certain area." 

But finally, you tell me, if we admit these facts 
— and it is necessary to admit them — from the testi- 
mony of those who know them to be so, is it neces- 
sary to conclude that it is useless to have instruction 
in target firing and fire control? On the contrary. 


we should insist on that instruction, to give the men 
confidence in themselves and in their v^eapon. 

The soldier must have both arms and morale. 
Lacking either, the other will not suffice, but it is as 
useless to teach dependence on the arm without re- 
gard to morale as it would be to keep up the morale 
and have no arms. In fact the possession of a good 
arm which is understood by handling, helps to greatly 
raise the morale. That is to be the final result to be 
gained by instruction in firing — the giving of a feel- 
ing of confidence to the troops. 

Psychological and Tactical Theory of the 
Decisive Attack 

Now I come to the assault. After the war in the 
Transvaal where the bayonet was little employed — 
one knows why — that weapon fell into disfavor. 
The theoretical believers in fire exulted, and the 
United States came even to suppress the real bayonet 
(which after the Russo-Japanese war was reestab- 
lished). In effect, that war has proved that more 
than ever assaults are necessary and possible with 
good troops. 

It has always been necessary to go in person, in 
flesh and blood, and to go after his hide and occupy 
the place of the other fellow before his opinion will 
change and he will acknowledge himself beaten. It 
is still the same today. Nothing is decided by fire 

The bayonet alone marks a determination to go 
to the end. It proclaims the necessary understand- 
ing of the situation. It states the distance at which 
the enemy must be met in order to accomplish the 

Let us now examine the state of mind — the 
morale — of the defenders of a position. 


In place for hours — for several days, perhaps — 
their passive attitude has only convinced them of 
their inferiority. They have suffered all the emotions 
of the preparatory combat ; volleys of infantry, ma- 
chine gun fire, shrapnel — nothing has been spared 
them. Their loss is not much, perhaps, but their 
morale is considerably lowered. 

The short bursts of regulated fire, even if in- 
efficient against a masked object, are absolutely 

DeWet, in his "Memoirs," tells us that on two 
different occasions his burghers ran away under the 
fire of artillery without having lost a single man. A 
combat is entirely an affair of morale. 

The wounded must most often remain a long 
time where they fall, it being impossible to remove 
them under fire, and their presence will only increase 
the skulkers. 

Further, the man realizes perfectly that the 
nervous trembling which he is unable to overcome is 
disarranging his aim, and that his bullets cannot hit 
the adversary who, step by step, is approaching him, 
bayonet already fixed, in order to make him feel 
what is coming to him if he waits. And that is 
precisely the reason why attacks succeed. 

(See ''Tactics" — Balck, Vol. I, page 87.) 

At Nicholson's Neck in 1900 the Boers crawled 
forward firing. The defenders fired also, but, while 
a storm of bullets swept over them, they could see 
the Boers getting nearer and ever nearer. The 
psychological effect of this uncanny crawling advance 
was so great that by the time the Boers were within 
300 yards the British soldiers were individually 
showing white handkerchiefs. The Boers feared a 
trap and continued the attack. Soon the white hand- 
kerchiefs were almost universal. When the Boers 


came up to them many of the British soldiers were 
weeping and their officers laid the trouble to the con- 
stant advance in the crawling line, against which the 
British fire seemed to have no effect.. 

At Chattanooga the Confederate soldiers left what 
their officers thought to be an impregnable position 
because of the moral effect of seeing Thomas' masses 
advancing toward them. (See Alexander.) 

"Whoever has made war and observed the 
events of combat knows that at some distance from 
the enemy losses are heavy, but by the time you are 
ready to charge they are so small as to be negligible.'' 
This is easily understood. If the enemy opens fire at 
some distance (say 800 yards), at 200 yards his fire 
has lost some of its intensity (some men out of am- 
munition — wounded — skulkers). The approach of 
the assailant lowers the morale : he presses forward, 
firing with the evident intent to charge; the enemy 
has not lowered his sights as the enemy advanced — 
probably he is not using his sights at all — and his 
aim grows worse and worse. 

To show that this has always been so, I will give 
a quotation : 

'*At the battle of Belgrade, in 1717, I saw two 
battalions, at thirty paces distance, lie down and fire 
into a body of Turks who tore them to pieces. Only 
two or three soldiers escaped. The Turks had thirty- 
two killed. 

"Before the force of the assailant's moral im- 
pulsion, the defender's troops are disturbed, fire in 
the air and disperse immediately before the assailant, 
who is emboldened by this ineffective fire to rush 
forward before a second volley can be delivered." — 

This shows us the grave risk of adopting a de- 
fensive attitude. 


Let us pass back to the side of the attack. After 
what I have just said, you will not be astonished that 
experience has shown that nine times out of ten the 
defender does not even wait for the assailant, and 
that the tenth time he is torn in pieces (if he has not 
taken the precaution to organize a counter attack). 

Then should a charge alone, unprepared by fire, 
succeed? Alas! No. In spite of all the chances of 
success which we have just enumerated, man is slow 
to comprehend that he can conquer by running 
straight into bullets. Thus it is that at the moment 
of the decisive attack the struggle between the in- 
stinct of the men and will of the chief becomes more 

''Our battalion is 100 paces from the enemy. 
What is going to happen ? This, and one has never 
seen and never will see with the gun anything else : 
If the battalion marches resolutely, if it is in good 
order, it is a bet of ten to one that the enemy has 
already gone; but what if the enemy holds? Then 
the man of our day, unarmored against iron or lead, 
no longer retains his self-possession ; the instinct of 
self-preservation takes command entirely. There 
are two means of avoiding the danger, not of the 
best : to run or rush. We rush. Well ! If the dis- 
tance is small, the time of exposure short, still in- 
stinct shows itself. We rush . . . But the greater 
part rush with prudence, with after-thought ; better 
let the most rash and intrepid pass to the front, and 
thus it is singular, but absolutely true, that we are 
at the least in broken ranks as we approach the 
scrimmage, and goodbye to the theory of the thrust ; 
and if the head is stopped, those who are in the rear 
allow themselves to fall sooner than to push ; and if, 
however, they do push forward, they allow them- 


selves to fall sooner than to advance. It is not to be 
disputed ; it is so." — DuPiCQ. 

"The Gauls and the Greeks believed in the power 
of mass — that those behind pushed forward the front 
ranks. They would not believe that the rear ranks 
are powerless to push forward the front rank when 
it recoils from danger — from death. Strange error ! 
Believing that the rear ranks are going to go for- 
ward in face of what makes the front rank recoil, 
while the contagion of recoil is so great that, the 
head stopped, those in rear retreat.'* — DuPiCQ. 

It is not then in mass — in physical impulsion — 
that we can seek for success in assault. 

It has been noticed that shock actions are very 
rare. Physical impulsion is in effect nothing; the 
sentiment of moral impulsion that animates the 
attacker is all. The sentiment of moral impulsion is 
the resolution which animates you, perceived by the 
enemy, and no one denies that this moral impulsion 
will be only so strong as one feels himself stronger 
than the enemy, whom he menaces with the most 
men, from which the column of attack is stronger 
than deployed men. 

Still it is necessary to understand what column 
here means, for the term ''column" does not mean a 
column of maneuver, but of more troops disposed in 
depth of formation and with variable distances. We 
will try to understand this. Behind the firing line, 
which has reached assaulting distance, the supports 
are approaching. The first line of the supports 
should be deployed in the sense of being in groups, 
according to the ground, behind the firing line. It 
may be said that two deployed lines, one behind the 
other, constitutes a vulnerable objective; true, but 
the true difficulty of our task in time of peace results 
from the obligation — if we wish to make useless 


work for ourselves — of subordinating even to details 
the technical elements to the psychological, so much 
harder to determine and on which it is impossible to 
directly experiment. 

The fact, for example, of avoiding material 
losses is only one means, and the end of utilizing the 
ground is only to lead within striking distance men 
physically and morally capable of combat. The most 
proper formations to avoid loss will not always be 
most advantageous. 

The reason for having supports in groups all 
along in rear of the firing line is to give the impres- 
sion to all the men, who see new comrades arriving 
around them and to their right and left, that they 
have received a strong support of men coming to aid 
them. Besides this the soldier must know that a 
formed support still further back is ready to inter- 
vene to his assistance at the most critical moment 
of the attack. 

Reason and experience are in accord. A few 
men here and there will never add the moral im- 
pulsion needed for carrying forward the final assault 
— formed bodies must here join. Lines of smaller 
groups will carry forward the firing line from halt to 
halt, but only a formed line will carry it forward to 
the final assault. This last rush of the formed line 
cannot be over too great a distance or it will be 
winded and will lie down on the firing line. So the 
assaulting troops must come up as far as possible 
under cover and then advance at quick time in line, 
under cover of the fire of the firing line, till they are 
within striking distance. Losses may be heavy, but 
should not be if the firing line has superiority of fire ; 
besides greater losses can be borne by marching 
troops than by those in position. 

Assaults should not be made on long fronts ; the 


breaking of one point decides the struggle. It is 
then better to attack on a relatively short front and 
make sure of having sufficient depth of formation to 
carry it through. 

The assault is not an act in which the chief 
launches all his men in one grand rush. It should 
be a premeditated act, well planned for. The diffi- 
culty is great, but, well organized, it should succeed. 

The most important question for the commander 
will be when and where has he gained superiority of 
fire, so he can put in his reserves, for to loose the 
reserves is to give up his control of the battle. 


"The weapon may change and with that the 
manner of using it, but the arm which employs it, the 
heart which animates that arm, remains eternally 
the same." — Dragonieroff. 

The last war, the Russo-Japanese, confirms the 
view that armament and technique may change, but 
man still remains the first tool of combat. As in all 
times, moral factors preserve a dominant importance. 

"You should try to count all the weaknesses. 
They will not keep you from going into the fight 
with confidence, if you have taken the trouble to 
develop the morale of the soldier, to prepare his 
heart and his mind, even sometimes his arms and 
legs." — Daudignac. 

If you have attached yourselves to your men, 
you will have gained their confidence ; it will be born 
of the affection and interest which you have shotvn 
in them, the superior intelligence which you have 
shown them you possess, and the examples which 
you set them. Then you will see how it is that on 
active service the soldier adores and has confidence 
in his chief. 


The role of leaders of men is above all to make 
them believe the faith for which they fight — give 
them a belief in the justness of their cause. 

Can the spirit of good infantry be made by some 
months or years of drill ? Let us say that the spirit 
of good infantry is first of all given by the first moral 
education of the man; it may depend on an ideal, on 
a fanaticism ; it is a function of the public spirit of 
the mass of the population.^ 

Infantry is nothing but the nation which feeds 
it; it is its faithful image. The nation is there 
reflected as in a mirror, showing its qualities, its 
faults, its passions. 

Has it been brought up from infancy with 
lessons of unity, of discipline in all degrees ? Has it 
been cultivated by the state? Has it an ideal of 
loyalty and of patriotism? 

It is in combat that we will find these qualities 
masters. Then that our infantry, placed between 
the instinct of self-preservation and the idea of duty, 
will go to victory and throw away all the encum- 
brances which it finds in its way as it strips for the 

The elbow to elbow fight no longer exists, and 
the soldier can no longer do his full duty if he simply 
possesses a sentiment of solidarity powerful enough 
to unite him to the other combatants, a sentiment 
that used to be reassuring in the hour of danger. 

"*It is not material things alone that shape the future, 
not questions of organization, armament and tactics, however 
important they may be of themselves. The decisive factor in 
the future will always be the moral force and the martial 
spirit of the nation, based on the bodily and mental soundness 
of every individual member in it. The materialistic outlook, 
which gains ground with the growing wealth of the nation 
and which kills all ideals, calls for serious consideration." — 
"Reorganizatiov of the Prussian Army, 1807-12'' ; in Recent 
Publications, October, 1910. 

Collective education given by society is the only 
means tvhich will assure to the army the cohesion 
necessary to march to victory. The task must be 
assumed by the mass of the people — in the home, 
the school, the workshop. The spirit of duty and 
discipline must be cultivated by the mass of the 
people or it will not exist in the depths of the being. 
Are our people doing it? 

F' • 



Causes of War 

IN ANTIQUITY, we may say that combination of 
forces in order to make war was the first sign of 
dawning intelligence. 

Primeval man fought as an individual. In an 
instinctive way he attacked anything he could eat or 
that ate the things that he needed for his own susten- 
ance. The animals that could kill and eat him, he 
shunned or ran away from, when it was possible to 
do so, otherwise he fought in self-defense. Always 
he fought from fear or from necessity, sometimes 
fancied, but nevertheless real to him. 

As intelligence grew, men learned that by com- 
bining their efforts they could overcome, where 
singly they would be vanquished. That was the be- 
ginning of war, which consists of combining all 
available force — natural, artificial and psychological 
— in order to obtain the ends we feel to be so neces- 
sary to us that we must obtain them in spite of the 
resistance of others whose interests clash with our 

The ability to make war presupposes the ability 
to think — to act in concert. Animals can fight ; they 
do not make war. 

We know that considerable battles took place 
thousands of years before Christ. They have con- 
tinued intermittently ever since, growing in size as a 
man's intelligence enabled him to make greater and 
greater combinations. 

The great principles of division of labor and in- 
dependence of function that have made our vast 

modern enterprises possible were first thought out 
and perfected for use in war. To a preponderat- 
ing extent the great mechanical improvements that 
have made the pronounced advances in the works of 
peace were also first thought out for war. The first 
shaped stone was a war hammer, the first ax was 
a war ax ; the first use of metals was for weapons ; 
and the invention of explosives was for the destruc- 
tion of one's enemies. After the way had been 
opened through the necessities of war, all these 
things became of the greatest use in peace. When 
war has not directly been the cause of mechanical 
development, it has promptly made use of such 
development and, in using, has greatly improved 
upon each new idea. 

Necessity is the mother of invention. When 
there is abundance to eat, to wear, and to make 
home comfortable, and no enemy threatens to do 
bodily harm, there is no spur to invention. The 
same necessity that breeds invention, breeds war. 
The desire to make the supply meet the demand that 
causes the attempt *'to make two blades of grass 
grow where one grew before" is akin to, and arises 
from, the same feeling of need, as does the belief 
that the neighbor has more than his share and 
brings the determination to take it from him. Pri- 
mitive man promptly attacked another who seemed 
to endanger the food supply. Civilized man first 
tries to increase the supply, but failing, he fights also. 
Reason says divide with the other, and both accept a 
share of the inevitable suffering ; but instinct, older, 
stronger, deeper, says "take what you need and 
throw the suffering on the other." Hidden under 
much sophistry, much exterior change from the 
rough ways of primitive man, the man of today is 


still intrinsically the same and is driven by the same 
emotions as his uncivilized ancestors. 

In each man there are two personalities one, the 
man we see in everyday life — peaceful, generous, 
even benevolent — the man of intelligence, moved by 
reason ; and the other, the man who comes into being 
in every crisis — the man of passion, hate and fury — 
the man whose actions are swayed by those deep- 
seated emotions that are deaf to reason, justice or 
humanity. Well could one of our divines, when the 
present European war broke out, exclaim, "Can it be 
that our religion has broken down in its psychology 
— that we have been addressing ourselves to a man 
that does not exist?" 

In his benevolence, he had been addresing, not 
a man who does not exist, but the man that exists 
only when all is well. The man who exists in every 
crisis is a different being — the man of emotion. The 
other is the man of mind. 

Those deep-seated emotions which sway the in- 
dividual powerfully are independent of his reason 
and many times stronger. With people in the bulk 
— that is with the crowd — these influences are much 
more powerful than with the individual. Why this 
is so, no man can tell; yet we know it to be true. 
Reason may dominate an individual ; emotion always 
dominates the crowd. 

Deep down in his being, these emotions influence 
man's acts just as they influenced those of his prime- 
val ancestors. They are an inheritance from count- 
less generations of primitive ancestors and are older 
and more powerful than education, intelligence or 
judgment and independent of them. 

There is an old saying: "Scratch a Russian 
and find a Tartar." Well may we amplify it and say : 
"Scratch a civilized man and find a savage." Civili- 


zation is but skin deep. When the crisis comes, all 
the outer veneer of civilization is stripped off, and 
down deep in his being man is responsive only to his 

Of all the emotions, fear v^as the first, the 
strongest and the most unreasoning. It still remains 
the strongest influence that governs man's actions. 

It was fear that made man first learn to use the 
club, the axe, the gun. Fear of bodily harm was 
early in man's existence joined by another great 
dread: that of starvation. There were times of 
abundance and times of want. Man began to hoard 
of what he had in times of plenty, in order to meet 
his needs in those future times, when, he feared, the 
supply might be less abundant. Fiercely he de- 
fended what had been stored up for the future. In 
times of famine, fiercely did the one without such a 
hoarded supply strive to wrest it from its owner. 
For numberless generations, man fought to preserve 
himself against bodily harm and to preserve the 
things to supply his bodily needs. Today the shad- 
owy remembrance of these primitive feelings exists 
somewhere deep down in his being. In fact, the 
form of their expression is less primitive, but never- 
theless they continually exist, and are shown in the 
demand for personal liberty and the fierce economic 
competition. The dangers are less imminent, the 
struggle less intense, but they are constantly jn evi- 
dence. Let the danger increase, the struggle be- 
come more intense, and at once these primitive 
emotions stand out clearly. Suddenly the passions 
and emotions of primitive man take command; 
savage instinct rules. 

Before birth and during childhood man passes 
through all the successive stages of the develop- 
ment of early man. Below the exterior refinements 


that come with education and living under civilizing 
influences are hidden away those primitive charac- 
teristics that came to man as a heritage from his 
ancestors. His dress, his manners, his customs — all 
exterior appearances change easily; but to change 
his essential characteristics, a strong force continu- 
ously acting in the same direction for many gener- 
ations is necessary. 

Early man's principal emotion was fear. Be- 
ing an emotion, it can not be reasoned about ; when 
at all strong, it can not be reasoned with. It is a 
sensation, an emotion — often unreasonable, always 
unreasoning. Beings incapable of reasoning are 
subject to fear. The most intelligent and most 
highly educated are also its subjects. Man may be 
guided by reason ; he is driven by emotion. 

How many people shed tears while watching a 
tragic scene in a play! There is no logical reason 
for these tears. Emotion forces them in spite of 
reason. We hate to admit even to ourselves that 
our reason is thus easily overcome by our emotions 
and produce plausible explanations for the acts which 
we commit under these hidden influences, but the 
truth is, that it takes comparatively little to arouse 
those emotions which cast out reason. 

It is not alone the weak and the ignorant that 
yield to emotion. The most highly-educated, the 
most intelligent, the clearest reasoners are equally 

There has been a perfect flood of articles justi- 
fying the course of one or the other of the contest- 
ants in the present great European War. These 
articles did not come from the ignorant or those of 
weak judgment, who without reason were led away 
by their emotions. They came from college profes- 
sors, men of letters, scientists and others represent- 


ing the best intelligence, education and reasoning 
power of the world. Yet each, his views colored by 
his emotions, reasons to the end that clearly justifies 
his own side. 

The German people, individually and as a whole, 
believe they are fighting desperately in defense of 
their rights, liberties — their very homes even. The 
allies feel just as strongly that the Germans wantonly 
attacked them. The best minds of both sides are 
submerged by emotion. You can talk culture, jus- 
tice, philanthropy, humanity to the man of reason; 
the man of emotion knows none of these. 

When the war is over, writers and historians, 
writing quietly in their studies, uninfluenced by the 
emotion of the conflict, will point out reasons that 
never existed. They will point out aggression, van- 
ity, pride, desire for self-aggrandizement or hope 
of political reward as the motive for acts that were 
prompted solely by patriotic fear for the country. 

Man in the bulk — the body politic, the crowd — 
is much more subject to these psychological influ- 
ences than is the individual by himself. Such phe- 
nomena are much more noticeable in sudden out- 
breaks ; but they may be just as strong and endure, 
even growing in intensity, for weeks, years or gener- 
ations. They are not usually well-defined, being 
overlaid by more noticeable superficialities, and for 
that reason are not well understood. 

Back in the inner being they may all be traced 
to fear — that panic of fear that strikes blindly but 
savagely at anything or anybody that appears to op- , 
pose it. • 

Under different aspects, we may discuss this 
vague shadowy fear that brings out man's emotions 
and . inspires his acts now, just as, for, number- 


less generations, it has been the source of the acts 
of his ancestors. 

These aspects are: 

Fear of bodily harm — now most evident as a desire for 

Fear of the unknown — now evidenced as religious an- 
tagonism and race antipathy. 

Fear of starvation — the milder evidences of which are 
now appearing to the world under the name of economic 


In the earliest times the defeated in any strug- 
gle were killed; later only some were killed, the re- 
mainder being held in bondage; and still later they 
were held in bondage only in that they were required 
to conform to the will of the victor in certain regards 
and to pay him tribute. The last, in a slightly mod- 
ified form, continues till this day to be the lot of the 

The fear of being killed, the fear of being en- 
slaved and the fear of political subjection are all of 
the same kind, and are all but a form of the first and 
strongest of man's emotions. The desire for politi- 
cal liberty is but a form of the desire for personal 

The wonderful progress of the last 400 years fol- 
lowed the great enlargement of the known area 
habitable by man, resulting from the geographical 
discoveries at the end of the 15th century, together 
with the great mechanical inventions that began to 
be introduced, beginning at about the same time. 
Together these made life easier for man than had 
ever before been the case. It is to be noted that 
they were coincident with the growth of liberty, 
both personal and political. 

From the earliest times slaves had been, em- 


ployed to do the hardest work. They cut and moved 
the stone for all the huge monuments of ancient 
peoples, made the bricks and dug the canals for 
Egypt and Babylon, and rowed the galleys for Phoe- 
nicia, Greece and Rome. They were the great ma- 
chines of ancient civiliations. 

Man takes pride in the great moral advance that 
caused him to free the slaves. But note well that 
this great moral advance did not take place till in- 
vention had produced machines that accomplished 
the work of slaves more quickly, cheaply and effi- 
ciently than human labor could do. Note also that 
slavery continued longest where the main industry 
was one in which machines could not replace human 

Machinery is still no great aid in growing cot- 
ton, sugar and rice. Where these were the main 
source of income slavery continued the longest. 

The man who had no need for slaves himself 
could see the injustice and moral degradation of 
slavery and agitated for its suppression. Not so 
the man who used slaves as the other used machines. 

Less than 60 years ago eminent divines in these 
United States preached eloquent sermons to prove 
the righteousness of slavery. They were not dis- 
honest. They believed what they preached. The 
community in which they lived found slaves neces- 
sary. The crowd mind was more powerful and less 
analytical than the individual mind. The individual 
mind of the clergyman was submerged in the mind 
of the crowd. Such has alw^ays been the case. Such 
will always be the case. The absurdities of the col- 
lective mind are proverbial, but its power is, never- 
theless, paramount. 

The great discoveries and inventions which 
made the world's supply abundant caused human 


slavery to become economically unprofitable and 
made possible the greatest advance in human iberty 
since history began. These same discoveries and in- 
ventions, having opened to the world an abundaftt 
supply, made it easier for the individual man to ob- 
tain an existence and in the same way made political 
liberty possible. 

In times of plenty the vast majority are humane 
and benevolent. It is when the pinch bears on the 
community that hate, cruelty and disregard of the 
rights of others are in evidence in the crowd mind. 
It is then that the unreasoning emotions hold sway ; 
then that man's reason, overcome by the stronger 
psychological influence that emanates from the 
crowd, governs neither his acts nor his words. 

Under the influence of his emotions he will utter 
words to justify his acts. These he calls reasons, 
but in times of stress they bear the impress of his 

Released from fear, man is a great consumer, 
his perspective is different, his desires grow, his 
ambitions know no limits. He takes more and more 
for himself. As we say, his standard of living 
rises. This is all to be commended, but it soon 
brings the demand up to the available supply. The 
slave consumed less than his master; the man on 
whose time and means all kinds of unjust exactions 
were made consumed less than does the man blessed 
with political liberty; the subject nation consumes 
less per head than does the free nation. 

Some leaders of the working man preach that 
everyone deserves and should have all the comforts 
of the man who receives $5,000 per annum. This is 
true enough, but where is the supply to come from? 
Take a few of the richer nations and see whether or 
not it is possible. 


The latest available estimates give the total 
wealth per inhabitant as follows : 

United States $1,300 per inhabitant 

France 1,600 " 

Germany '_ 900 " 

Great Britain 1,700 per inhabitant 

Belgium 1,200 " 

Russian Empire 240 " " 

Austro-Hungary 500 " " 

Assuming that each bread-winner supports a 
family of five, it is readily seen that, if the whole of 
the richest nation had the comforts of the man with 
an income of $5,000, it would consume the total avail- 
able wealth of the country in one year and eight 
months. For the whole world to have these comforts 
would consume the world's available wealth in two 
or three months. 

Man confronted with starvation, knows nothing 
of benevolence or humanity. A few select indivi- 
duals may retain some of these inspirations for a 
time, but man in the mass will not do so. 

In such times the strong deprives the weak of 
his goods, his liberty, even of his life. In extremity 
he has even been known to kill the weaker and eat 
him. Conditions make the character of the man. 
Civilized men, reduced to extremity by misfortune 
in Polar expeditions or shipwreck, have, in the most 
recent times, committed these unthinkable acts. 
Man is still a savage in his innermost being. The 
men that you and I know can be reduced by sufficient 
pressure to these acts of inhumanity. It is only a 
question of how much of the veneer of civilization is 
knocked off. The amount of personal and political 
liberty in any community is dependent on the avail- 
able resources of that community. 

M^n is by nature conservative and slow to 
change. This conservatism delays the giving of lib- 


erty after it becomes possible. It also delays the 
suppression of liberties till the internal stress is un- 
bearable and the necessity forces it. Then the weak- 
est member of the structure yields. 

When the community is weaker than its bonds, 
internal compression results ; we have strikes, mobs, 
and revolutions, till, after a time, the readjustment 
is accomplished. 

When the reverse is the case, natural or politi- 
cal boundaries are forced and the community spreads 
out. That another owns the land to which they 
spread makes no difference — ^the owner will be dri- 
ven out at the point of the bayonet if necessary. 
When the internal pressure is great enough the com- 
munity will spread out, and will use the necessary 
force to enable it to do so. 

Religious Antagonism and Race 

From the earliest times, man has feared the un- 
known, whether peoples, regions or forces. 

Growing intelligence discovered the reasons for 
many things and sought to explain those it could not 
fully understand. The explanation in all races was, 
that there existed some supernatural agency that 
was very powerful ; and man's egoism made him be- 
lieve that these powerful supernatural agencies took 
some special interest in him. Always awed by 
things he can not understand, he came to worship 
these agencies. 

Most primitive peoples worshipped directly the 
things they feared or hoped to propitiate — the sun, 
the wind, the rivers, etc. 

As races became less primitive, they began to 
understand natural forces to a greater extent; and, 


failing to find an explanation of the unknown in the 
action of these forces, they came to believe in in- 
visible supernatural beings that controlled both na- 
tural forces and human destinies. So, we can very 
well gauge a race's development at any period by 
the religious beliefs it held at that time. 

All religions contain an element of that most 
primitive emotion, fear ; in fact, "Religion essentially 
consists of man's apprehension of his relation to 
an invisible power of powers, able to influence his 
destiny, to which he is necessarily subject, together 
with feelings, desires and actions which this appre- 
hension calls forth."^ 

In connection with our subject it is not necessary 
to consider any particular creed, but rather the 
points that apply equally to all religions and all 

Part, at least, of the influence that creates be- 
lief in any religion is fear ; which is an emotion. All 
creeds have their greatest increase in numbers from 
children. The child's Reasoning powers are imma- 
ture, but his emotional nature is fully developed. It 
is for this reason that it is easier to lead a child than 
a grown person into belief. In grown people, re- 
ligious belief is usually brought about during a vio- 
lent disturbance of the emotions. In all cases, reli- 
gious belief is emotional in its origin. The adherent 
to any creed believes "in his heart" not with his head. 
"Reason is incapable of transforming men's con- 
victions."- "The enthusiast who is dominated by 
an idea, religious or otherwise, is incapable of reason- 
ing, however intelligent he may be."^ 

Any person can tell from his own experience 

^Library of Original Sources. 


that it was not logic, but the emotions that welled up 
inside his being, that caused him to believe. It was 
not logic, but strong emotion, that sustained the 
martyr at the stake. This is the common ground of 
all religions ; they are centered in the emotions. 

Once a religious idea is conceived, it is taught, 
not by logic, but by assertion. The crowd is led to 
believe in any idea by the continued assertion of it 
in short, clear phrases. Moses did not reason with 
the people to show them the physical and moral value 
of the ten commandments. Under dramatic cir- 
cumstances, which fixed the attention, he brought 
forth the tables of stone with the commandments 
engraved thereon. Short, clear, always asserted in 
the same words, these laws have had a tremendous 
effect in shaping human conduct for 3,000 years. 

The "Allah is Allah and Mohammed is his pro- 
phet*' of the Mohammedan has done more to give 
that religion 200,000,000 followers than any amount 
of reasoning could have done. 

In the same way people are led to believe in any 
political dogma. Different localities, classes and 
races have different ideas and interests, hence differ- 
ent political creeds. These political creeds are bound 
to clash one with the other, just as religious creeds 
clash. Both arouse people's emotions. 

Any emotion that is not stimulated will die out, 
but one emotion can be driven out only by another 
and stronger emotion. For example: the resent- 
ment at a sudden blow is effective in overcoming the 
tangled emotions of hysterics. 

A people that is composed of conflicting emo- 
tional elements is thus less forcibly affected by any 
one emotion, for it contains, within itself, the germs 
of the destroyer of powerful emotions — other emo- 
tions. Difference in emotional elements is exhibited 


by people of different races, classes and religious be- 
lief, so that the crowd action under the influence of 
any emotion is weakened in a locality that is not 
homogeneous in these respects. Thus uniformity of 
race and religious belief in a community tends to 
unite and strengthen its action in any emotional 
crisis, such as that which just precedes war. 

Centered in the emotions, religious belief is 
strongly allied to the other emotions ; under stress it 
manifests itself in the same impulsive ways ; and it 
is stimulated by the same influences. 

Each side prays to its God — frequently the same 
God for both — ^to guide and protect it and give it the 
victory. ' 

The causes which excite one emotion seem to 
have an influence on all the others. We hate the 
things we fear, etc. The times of greatest stress 
are those of the greatest emotion of all kinds. 

No belief engendered of emotion is tolerant of 
opposition. No religion is tolerant of any other ; in 
fact, it does all in its power to suppress the other. 
Still more, no strong believer in one creed is toler- 
ant of the ways of the believer in another. Having 
different standards, they each have w^ays forbidden 
to the other. Under any friction, they are intoler- 
ant of each other as well as of each other's ways. 
Any stimulant to the emotions will increase this 
intolerance. Whenever friction exists between two 
localities, difference in religious belief is just one 
additional cause likely to lead to an emotional crisis 
in which they will violently clash. Usually differ- 
ence in religious belief is only a contributing cause, 
though it may easily be the main one. 

Religion has always been more or less mixed 
with politics. In some of the states the head of the 


church and of the state is the same person. As soon 
as the church has temporal power it uses that power 
to force favors for itself and to oppress any rival 
creed. All kinds of abuses grow up. Religious dog- 
ma in control of affairs is more arbitrary and op- 
pressive than the most unlicensed despot. The most 
inhuman cruelties that history records have been 
committed in the name of religion. 

Let us suppose that the followers of Confucius 
began to proselyte in this country, and that China 
had acquired sufficient unity and military prepared- 
ness to be able to protect them to the extent that we 
protect our missionaries in China. There is no doubt 
that our animosities would be groused. If in addi- 
tion, China was one of our chief economic competi- 
tors ; insisted on our allowing her certain ports ; de- 
manded that certain of our laws conflicting with her 
religion be not enforced against her citizens; and 
that we allow her citizens unrestricted liberty to mi- 
grate to this country — with the faintest chance of 
successful resistance, do you think our people would 
submit? Would they not rise as a unit, overthrow 
their government, if in accordance with treaty stipu- 
lations or for other reasons it opposed them, and 
fight almost to extinction? 

With the requisite power, would China, under 
the press of economic conditions and a revival of re- 
ligious sentiment be likely to demand less ? 

It is futile to reason that wars will cease because 
this is a Christian world, when there are five other 
creeds, each having from 100 million to 350 million 
followers and when 19 centuries have witnessed the 
contrary and have culminated in a war in which 
65% of the Christian population of the world is en- 

Religious convictions have brought on many 


wars ; never yet have they permanently averted one. 

Race Antipathy. — In early times one race was 
unaccustomed to the appearance and ways of other 
races, and, man always fearing the unknown, there 
was mutual fear and hate. At present we know and 
see more or less of the external characteristics of all 
races, but there exists such an internal difference 
that there still remains a vague mutual fear that is 
expressed in a shadowy distrust and dislike which is, 
under emotion, quickly kindled into extreme passion. 

There is a sentiment of aloofness between an 
American and a Japanese, for example, which leads 
to distrust. Each regards the other's life and cus- 
toms as inferior to his own and this sentiment, like 
all sentiments in being impossible to analyze and ex- 
plain, is nevertheless very real and a strong factor 
in causing friction between the two races. 

Between races there are differences of sentiment 
and mental attitude just as great as of color, figure, 
and social customs. These different sentiments and 
mental attitudes are fundamental characteristics of 
the races and are nearly permanent, changing only 
under the influence of forces that continue to act in 
the same direction for many generations. 

One of the strongest forces that tends to pro- 
duce a uniform trend of mind in any fairly homogen- 
ous people is religious belief. We can plainly see 
the different mental attitudes of the Christian, Mo- 
hammedan and Buddhist. 

So great is the mental difference between peo- 
ples that they can never fully understand one an- 
other. You think with not only a different brain but 
a different kind of brain than does your Filipino or 
negro servant. The impression that a series of 
words or events makes on your brain differs from 
that made on his brain by the same words or events. 


This is so marked that it is impossible to accurately 
translate any idea from one language to another. 
For example, the dictionaries give *'pan" (Spanish) 
and ''bread" (English) as equivalent. To you the 
word "bread" brings to mind a mental picture of a 
large loaf, made without much, if any, lard and with 
a small proportion of crust and much soft interior; 
but to the Spaniard, the word "pan" brings up a 
mental picture of a small hard ]oaf, all crust and 
made with much lard. 

In similar manner events make different im- 
pressions on different kinds of brains. We are men- 
tally constituted on somewhat the same lines as the 
Englishman. Given a particular set of circum- 
stances, we can predict within one or two alterna- 
tive lines of action just what an Englishman will 
do; but what a Japanese, a Chinaman, a negro or 
a Filipino will do under these same circumstances, 
or why, is entirely beyond our conprehension. By 
association with one of these peoples we may come to 
know more nearly what they will do but never ivhy. 

With peace and plenty and nothing to excite the 
emotions many may think that race antipathy is of 
little consequence. To show that this is not the case, 
it is necessary only to cite an example or two. 

When the Asiatic laborer migrates to this coun- 
try and begins to compete with home labor, how long 
is it before our labor organizations are taking violent 
action to suppress the competition ? How long could 
race riots be prevented if the continued admission of 
Asiatics was forced? 

To make it a little more personal, how would you 
feel about having your daughter or your sister marry 
a black, yellow or red man? Such marriages are 
crimes by the laws of several of our states. These 
are white man's laws. Do you suppose they are 


accepted meekly by the other races? Though they 
also have their antipathies to us, do they not rather 
regard them as an insult? 

Race antipathy is in nearly every heart ; it takes 
but little to arouse it. 

The only basis of permanent harmonious rela- 
tions between peoples is community of interest. The 
more ways in which their interests are identical, the 
less the liability of that friction which arouses all 
their emotional differences. Between races, religions 
and the inhabitants of different climates, this com- 
munity of interest can never entirely exist. From 
conflicting interests come long discussions filled with 
exaggerations (or special pleading) on both sides; 
then jealousies and hatreds; then injuries and re- 
prisals of various kinds, such as tariff wars or emi- 
gration restrictions, till suddenly a psychological 
wave of emotion makes the opponents fly at each 
other's throats. 

Race antipathy is a mighty force and acts in 
conjunction with the other emotions as one of the 
most common causes of war. 

Economic Pressure 

The dawn of intelligence allowed man to realize 
the power of combination. When all members of a 
small community which possessed an abundance 
could combine their efforts they preserved their 
supply by keeping out all intruders. They had 
ample food and plenty of clothing and shelter. The 
great destroyers — starvation and disease — ^were 
checked. Well-nourished parents, able to give better 
Gare and shelter to their offspring, made more of the 
babies grow to maturity. The settlement grew in 
numbers, becoming more and more powerful. It was 


increasingly easy to keep out all intruders. Peace 
and plenty reigned till the increasing numbers 
needed more supplies than the locality furnished. 
Then the savage community had to ease the pressure 
by going further and further afield to hunt and fish, 
and finally the settlement had to spread out. Soon 
it spread to the limit of unoccupied territory and 
reached lands already occupied. Economic pressure 
had developed. 

In order to insure a sufficient supply for itself, 
one tribe had to oust the other. The neighbor was 
confronted by the same necessity. Neither reasoned 
much about it; the feeling was instinctive. Moved 
by fear and hate they fought fiercely. Such of 
the losing tribe as escaped destruction fled to 
search for some other place of existence not already 
occupied. Sometimes it happened that such a place 
was found, but it did not contain the things on which 
the fallen tribe had been accustomed to live. Wan- 
dering about, fearful, homeless, starving, they began 
to make use of things formerly unknown to them. 
They searched their world for anything that could 
be made to serve in maintaining their existence. In 
this way they found things, formerly unknown to 
either tribe, that were usable. They had been forced 
to change their standard of living. By adopting 
this new standard they could again maintain their 

Let us return to the victorious tribe. Some of 
them had been killed in the conflict, more territory 
had been made accessible for their occupation, the 
population was less dense and the supply was agam 
ample for the demand. The era of prosperity that 
follows every successful war was theirs. 

Today the struggle for existence is not so keen, 
we are less rude than our primitive ancestors, the 


exterior appearance is somewhat different, but the 
identical phenomena is evident all about us. There 
is but one difference: science has made the earth 
produce many times what it yielded for our ances- 
tors. Having learned how to make the earth pro- 
duce more abundantly, man first turns to that method 
of increasing his supply. Now the whole world is 
known and, more or less accessible. This being the 
case, the great fear of unknown lands has vanished, 
and man is willing to move elsewhere rather than 
fight. So the order of events is changed, but the 
events, in a less rude form, are perfectly evident. 
We will take them up in succession. 

Increase of Population 

In the last fifty years the population of the 
United States has doubled. Compared to the popu- 
lation of the area that was populated at the close of 
the Civil War, the total population under our flag 
has quadrupled. The populations of the British 
Isles, Belgium, Japan, Russia and Germany have in- 
creased 50% or more in the same period; those of 
other lands in proportion to their relative prosperity. 
In the past forty years, Europe as a whole has in- 
creased 52% in population; the greatest increase 
being in European Russia where it amounted to 
90%. Note that Russia is an exporter of products 
of the earth. She is the only large European country 
that produces more than she consumes. 

Compared to former times, there has been 
abundance and comparative peace for the last 400 
years. In such times, population increases. But, 
what was abundance for our ancestors, will not 
satisfy us. Man's desires increase with his pros- 
perity. As individuals, we use more than did our 


ancestors. Individually we require more. We have 
better food and clothing, a larger house and more 
and better transportation. For each individual a 
greater amount of raw material is consumed. 

Feeling safe and well cared for, man is filled 
with higher emotions. Pleased with his own lot, 
he is benevolent and philanthropic. He wishes to 
extend the blessings he enjoys to those less fortu- 
nate; to civilize the world. Always, of course, he 
wants the others to be civilized according to his 
ideas. He would not consider them civilized unless 
they imitated him. He is even willing to use force, 
on occasion, to make the "barbarian" accept his 
standards. They must accept his dress, his habits, 
his form of government, his religion, or he would not 
regard them as civilized. At home, the more wealthy 
also desire to help their less fortunate compatriots 
to greater prosperity. Better laws, education, the 
advantages to be derived from the advances of medi- 
cal science and sanitation, better clothing, food and 
houses, the prosperous man is ready and anxious to 
see extended to all humanity. 

Other blessings which make life better and hap- 
pier, benevolent man seeks to extend to the less for- 

He is especially anxious to see all these improve- 
ments introduced in lands where such development 
will open new markets for the things he has to sell. 
He is creating a market. Such a market really en- 
larges the area which gives his own country susten- 
ance; for it permits part of the inhabitants to ex- 
change the labor they put into the manufacture and 
transportation of the goods they export for the pro- 
ducts of the earth from the foreign country. The 
home country can thus obtain the sustenance for a 
population that its own resources would not support. 


Sometimes pride, self-sufficiency and self-ag- 
grandizement are mixed with his better impulses, 
but on the whole man's best and purest motives pre- 

Since the earliest times, those who had abun- 
dance and to spare have given charity to the needy. 
The Bible records it ; all tales of ancient peoples tell 

As intelligence grew and the ability to make 
greater combinations came about, man's view broad- 
ened, and it was realized that instead of relieving a 
few individuals in a haphazard way, the possessor of 
great wealth could do more good by gifts to the 
public in general. Ancient Rome, in her greatness, 
had plenty of wealthy and substantial citizens who 
made large donations to the public. Our wealthy 
philanthropists are but a type that appears with 
great prosperity. 

All these advances in civilization at home and 
abroad make life better, more enjoyable and longer. 
Under these conditions population increases. 

In time, these betterments for the human race 
bring about a condition that defeats their own ends. 
Increased consumption and longer life of the indi- 
vidual, together with increasing density of popula- 
tion, eventually bring the consumption up to the 
available supply. Now, man does not go backward 
in his desires. He ever wants more and more — 
never less. What were luxuries, partaken of spar- 
ingly by our ancestors, are necessities today. 

Uncivilized man, except in the coldest climates, 
gets along very well without shoes. Once he has 
worn them, however, they become necessities. 

As individual needs and density of population 
both increase, what was formerly abundance soon 
ceases to supply the needs. 


Man has ever loved his home. He does not leave 
the surroundings to which he is accustomed till he is 
obliged to do so. The first resort therefore is an 
attempt to increase nature's yield. Instead of allow- 
ing the domestic animals to shift for themselves they 
are fed and cared for ; better methods of farming are 
sought; the land is terraced and irrigation resorted 
to, so that otherwise unproductive land may be 
forced to yield crops; what was formerly wasted is 
utilized; and, by labor, articles unfit for use are 
turned into usable form. Eventually, manufacture 
is undertaken on a large scale and the population 
grows dense in those areas where trade and industry 
make the employment of large numbers necessary. 
These phenomena are not new. About 2200 B. C. 
Egypt had an artificial lake, used to control the floods 
of the Nile and regulate irrigation. It had a circuit 
of 150 miles and the remains of the dam, still in 
existence, are 150 feet thick at the base. About 
1350 B. C. a canal built for naval and commercial 
purposes, connected the Nile with the Red Sea. 

About 2000 B. C. Babylon had an extensive ir- 
rigation system covering a valley 300 miles long. 
Within the last five years German commercial enter- 
prise has been at work reconstructing this irrigation 
system so it could be again used. Increase of knowl- 
edge and better means of communication and trans- 
portation have rendered man's radius of action 
larger, so similar projects are more numerous and 
more magnificent than ever before and the distinc- 
tive areas are increased in size, but the manifesta- 
tions have existed before. They occurred in Bactra, 
Egypt, Babylonia, Rome and Ancient Mexico, just as 
they do today. They mean that the land is becoming 
filled to its capacity. 

Other symptoms, that are shown by each state 

in succession, as it ceases to expand in area and the 
population begins to use more than is produced at 
home — symptoms of internal pressure — are: 

Excessive crowding into the cities. 

High cost of living, accompanied by demands 
that the government shall ease the suffering of some 
class at the expense of others. 

Increased influence of women in politics, whether 
directly or indirectly. 

Sterility among the women of the upper classes. 

It is very hard to trace the connection between 
some of these manifestations and their cause. Why 
they appear we do not understand ; that they do ap- 
pear we know. They signify that the population 
has increased to an amount beyond the ability of 
existing resources to support in their present com- 
fort. Prosperity is not so rampant as it was, but 
still the supply can be forced to meet the demand. 
The struggle has commenced, but it is not so severe 
as to be actual hardship. The population continues 
to increase, but more slowly. 

Migration and Density of Population 

At length, finding his home country full to over- 
flowing, man's next expedient is to spread out over 
a greater area. 

In the past, he sometimes went to live in areas 
that were less densely populated; sometimes he 
sought and found uninhabited areas and there, as 
much as his new environment permitted, established 
his old manner of life. 

Since the geographical discoveries of the latter 
part of the 15th century, the expansion into new 
localities has been continuous ; prosperity, compared 
to former times, has been unbounded, and the popula- 
tion everywhere has increased enormously. This 
can not continue longer. The whole world from Pole 


to Pole is known, and, so far as it will naturally 
support a population, it is inhabited. Where one 
place is overcrowded, the only recourse is to expand 
into one less densely populated. 

In considering the population that an area will 
support, we must bear in mind its nature. The Arctic 
regions, the Sahara, the desert and marshy areas of 
other lands are by nature unsuited to supporting but 
an insignificant population. So, also, in any particu- 
lar country, there are areas that are very productive 
and areas that produce very little. Further, some 
areas are so located that industry and trade flourish 
there, and they hold a dense population that is sup- 
plied with necessities from elsewhere. Now, neither 
trade nor manufacture produce anything. Trade 
moves articles about. It increases human happiness 
by carrying to all the desirable articles which are 
produced only in restricted localities and by insuring 
against famine following the temporary failure of 
production in one locality. It increases human well- 
being and conduces to happiness, but, it not only 
does not produce a thing, it really consumes the ma- 
terials used in the construction of carriers, and loses 
or spoils a percentage of the articles it transports 
during the process of this transportation. 

Manufacture merely changes the form of pro- 
ducts. True, it renders some available for consump- 
tion that could not otherwise be of service ; but, also 
it makes others more acceptable and increases the 
rate of their consumption without greatly adding to 
the service they render ; and, it also uses up material 
in the construction of its factories and machines that 
is thus lost to other consumption. Those engaged in 
manufacture produce nothing, but they consume the 
products of other areas. Areas devoted largely to 
trade or manufacture are not self-supporting. They 


must be constantly furnished with products from 
without their borders, and, if this supply is restricted 
or ceases, they languish or die out. When the out- 
side supply begins to dwindle there is a cry for some 
force to compel a greater flow. If the raw products 
can be had from within the borders controlled by 
the same government, the cry is for laws to force 
them to be supplied. That such laws are ineffective 
can be seen from our own case, where since 1893 the 
stream of laws on this subject has been incessant, 
but the result has been inappreciable as shown by 
the continued increase in the price of necessities. 
All ancient civilization had this cry, Rome in par- 
ticular. All modern civilization now has it. Export 
laws, to keep needed articles at home ; tariffs to keep 
out competing articles that can be produced more 
cheaply elsewhere ; agrarian laws ; and laws against 
trusts are all signs that part or all of the community 
does not produce enough to supply its needs. 

When laws are enacted that help the industries 
of one country at the expense of those of another, 
resentment is great; popular feeling and prejudice is 
aroused; race antipathy and religious antagonism 
appear more strongly; in short, man's primitive 
emotions are beginning to show. The complacent 
benevolent attitude toward the neighboring country 
ceases. The struggle of force against force is be- 
ginning. If the stress increases, the change of at- 
titude will become more apparent, suspicion, jealousy 
and hate from time to time blaze up ; the emotions of 
both sides are more and more aroused. These are 
the materials of which war is made. 

Similarly, when laws that apply to the internal 
administration of a country bring out these antagon- 
isms, they array one faction against another. They 
are the beginnings of rebellion and revolution. Con- 


tinued increase in their severity will arouse the 
passions that lead to armed conflict. The Thirteen 
Colonies did not dream of separation from England 
till English laws were economically oppressive. 

''If the conditions of civilization aroused violent 
desires, without supplying the means of satisfying 
them, the result will be general discontent and un- 
rest which will influence conduct and provoke up- 
heavals of every kind." 

Internal discontent has been most marked in 
England for some years past. With this in mind 
look at the following table : 

British Isles produce as folloivs : 

Edible Grains 27% 

Meats 53% 

Dairy products 62% 

Poultry 58% 

Fruits 21% 

Vegetables 90% 

• of what they consume. 

At present. Great Britain, France, Germany, 
Belgium, Austro-Hungary and Japan do not produce 
enough to meet the needs of their inhabitants. They 
have to depend on the pay for the labor they expend 
in manufacture to secure for them the products of 
the earth they consume.^ 

Great Britain 53% 

Belgium 57% 

Germany 88% 

France 92% 

Austro-Hungary 98% 

The enlightenment of India and China will in- 
crease their wants; stable government and knowl- 
edge of medical science and sanitation will largely 
increase their population. They now consume all 
they produce and are as densely populated as they 

^Food products used that are produced at home: 

(Figures by U. S. Dept. of Agriculture) 


well can be. Their demand to be allowed to spread 
out is becoming increasingly loud and persistent. 

"The awakening of China is more marvelous 
than in Japan, and as these great people in China 
rise to the civilization of modern days and engage in 
manufactures and in production of all which man 
produces, we will enter into a series of competitive 
efforts with the Far East which have never been 
equalled in this world of ours."^ 

The following table shows the density of popula- 
tions : 

Acres Per Inhabitant 

United States ___ 23.9 with colonies___ 21.9 

France 3.34 with colonies 29.8 

Germany 2.06 with colonies 10.1 

Great Britain 1.72 with colonies 19.3 

Belgium .96 

Russia 33 

Austro-Hungary 3.26 

Japan (with Formosa) 2.25 

India 3.86 

China 6.84 

Mexico 33 

Argentine 97 

Brazil 98 

Sahara 1200 

Kansas 30 

Rhode Island 1.26 

Europe 5.9 ' 

Asia 12 

Africa 43 

N. America 47 

S. America 125 

Australasia 277 

Australia 351 

Whole Earth 21.9 

As a curiousity, note that the United States, 
with her colonies, has exactly the same average 
density of population as has the whole earth; also, 
that she is the only great nation that increased the 
density of her whole population by taking colonies. 
This latter may be the main reason why her colonies 

'Representative Mann. 


are of comparatively little value to her economically. 

Viewing the above table in conjunction with a 
consideration of the unproductive and sparsely-in- 
habited areas of all the continents, we see that 
Europe and Asia are now full to overflowing ; Africa 
and North America still have some room, but it is 
being rapidly occupied; while South America and 
Australia can well support a larger population than 
they now contain. 

While England rules the seas and the inhabit- 
ants of Australia evince their present firm intention 
of keeping Australia for the Australians and back 
that determination with force, we may leave that 
continent out of consideration . 

South America is the only place that offers a 
tempting location for the expansion of the over- 
crowded people of the more densely populated re- 
gions. Such expansion may be by immigration or by 
conquest. It will undoubtedly take place. 

At the present rate of increase the whole earth 
will be filled to capacity in less than 50 years. ^ 

'When I first made this statement, the person to whom I 
was talking seemed to doubt it, so a little mathematical de- 
duction is added to show why it is true. 

No one doubts that Asia is now filled to capacity. We 
will take Asia as a standard. She has 12 acres per inhabitant 
or over 52 persons to the square mile. 

If the population of the earth increases at the present 
rate of 611% for each fifty years, the results may be tab- 
ulated as follows: 

Present popu- If populated Difference 

Continent lation 4. 67J per as densely as , minus 

cent. Asia now is ' 

Europe 670,000,000 198,000,000 +472,000,000 

Asia 1,507,000,000 900,000,000 +607,000,000 

Africa 284,000,000 608,000,000 -324,000,000 

N. America _. 184,000,000 424,000,000 -240,000,000 
S. America __ 58,000,000 368,000,000 -310,000,000 
Australasia __ 13,000,000 182,000,000 -169,000,000 

Surplus, Europe and Asia 1,079,000,000 

Can accommodate (remainder of world) 1,043,000,000 

This leaves 36,000,000 people and all consumption over 


This filling up will be complicated by attempts 
of the inhabitants of particular localities to preserve 
their own piece of the earth for themselves and their 
descendants; by long standing antipathies of race 
and antagonisms of religion; in short, by those 
primeval feelings of fear, jealousy and hate that 
arouse the deep-seated emotions of a people and leave 
them to rely solely upon force to attain their ends. 
Witness the attitude of our western states toward the 
Orientals who are seeking to locate in their midst. 

The power of greater and greater combination, 
that has come with the increase of intelligence, will 
make the struggle a battle of giants. No longer will 
the fate of a continent be decided in an obscure plaCe 
in an engagement of 15,000 men, both sides included. 
The next struggle for South America will not be won 
by an Ayacucho — a battle so little known that I may 
well add that it was fought in Peru on December 9, 
1824, and is regarded as the decisive battle of the 
wars that freed South America from Spain. 

In order to bring out more clearly the exact re- 
lation between the standard of living, and the den- 
sity of population where that standard obtains, let 
us make a comparison. In so doing, we must re- 
member that our comparison will not be exact for 
the reason that many minor factors enter that can 
not be considered. 

It so happens that the density of population in 
the whole United States and in Kansas is about the 
same, Kansas being somewhat less densely populated, 
compared with the average for the country. 

Maine, Minnesota and Oklahoma are a little 
nearer the average, but, for other reasons, are not 
so well adapted to comparison. 

the Asiatic standard to be provided for by increased produc- 
tion of the earth. 


Kansas is a typical agriculture state that sub- 
sists on its own products or articles for which these 
products are exchanged. Very little labor, in the 
form of manufactures, is exchanged for products 
from beyond her borders. Kansas feeds herself. 
Besides being an average state in regard to density 
of population, Kansas may be regarded as a fair 
average in intelligence, education, wealth and stand- 
ard of living. She has about 30 acres for each in- 
habitant. It is average land, some good, some poor, 
but on the whole it will average as well as the land 
of the country. Her average yield is about 15 
bushels of wheat to the acre — not more, perhaps less. 
This is a great staple. Kansas produces many other 
crops, but she would not plant so largely in wheat 
if others were vastly more profitable. 

Counting on the proverbial family of five, the 
bread-winner in Kansas has 150 acres of land on 
which the sustenance for his family must be pro- 
duced. Not all of this can be cultivated. Some of 
it is covered by houses and other structures; by 
roads, railroads and electric roads; and by barren 
sands, marshes and the beds of streams. We must 
deduct an average of, say 20% or 30 acres for these 
areas that produce nothing. There is available 120 
acres that will each year produce 1,800 bushels of 
wheat, of a value of $1,800. For each member of 
the family, there is, roughly, a bushel of wheat per 

Manifestly, if the Kansan lived solely on wheat, 
or equally cheap and nutritious food for which he 
exchanged the wheat, he would not consume a bushel 
per day. 

If he lived in the cheapest sort of a house (such 
as a sod house) constructed by himself from mater- 
ials on his land, and dressed in the cheapest sort of 


clothing, he could exist on say eight quarts a day. 
Part he would eat; part would be exchanged for 
equally cheap and nutritious foods; and part ex- 
changed for absolutely essential fuel, clothing, bed- 
ding, furniture and utensils. A part he must pay 
for taxes. He would have no machinery. Under 
these conditions human labor is cheaper than machin- 
ery. For this reason, ships are now coaled in the 
Far East by endless chains of human hands. 

Now, this is approximately the standard of liv- 
ing of the Chinaman. With that standard, the Kan- 
san could be sustained on :[ his present number of 

China also exchanges little labor for products 
that come from without her borders. Considering 
the vast sw^amp and greater desert and barren areas 
in China, the average Chinaman has a smaller per- 
centage of his share of land in a form that can be 
used to produce things to meet his needs, but he 
makes use of little bits that the Kansan covers with 
fences, excessively broad roads, etc., or does not use 
at all. He has almost no roads, but the dykes that 
he uses for roads also cover a fraction of the soil. 

Out of his average of 6.84 acres per head or 34.2 
acres per family of five, we will deduct a little less 
than 20%, say 6.2 acres. This leaves 28 acres for the 
Chinaman's family of five, or a little less than i that 
allotted to the Kansan. This proportion approxi- 
mates the relative costs of their standards of living. 

Now, this demonstration is, of course, far from 
exact or conclusive; nevertheless, it gives a fairly 
clear conception of the case. If Kansas had four 
times as many inhabitants confined within her bor- 
ders, as China's inhabitants are confined within her 
borders, the standard of living in Kansas would ap- 
proximate the standard of living in China. 


Further, the standard of education and morals 
would soon degenerate to the Chinese level. The 
Chinaman, laboring 16 or 18 hours a day to main- 
tain his existence, has neither the time to obtain an 
education nor the means to pay for the necessary 
paraphernalia and instruction. 

What we call refinement is not synonymous with 
laboring in filth 16 hours a day, dressed in a rag, and 
going home at the end of that time to repose in a 
hovel among a company that sleeps in one heap, with 
the windows and doors closed to keep out the cold. 

Fuel, sanitation, ventilation, air-space, privacy 
in the toilet, and individual beds and bed covering, 
cost both in money to procure and time to use and 
keep in condition. Without these and other things, 
refinement does not exist. It is a luxury the China- 
man can not afford. 

Man is not born with high moral sentiments. 
They are developed through education, living in 
proper surroundings, association with others who 
are imbued with such sentiments, and reflection on 
moral principles. The average Chinaman's mind is 
occupied solely with the subject of maintaining an 
existence. His mind ceased to develop at an early 
age, when it became necessary for him to labor un- 
ceasingly to help maintain the family. He has no 
opportunity to obtain moral sentiments. 

Education, refinement and high moral senti- 
ments are a function of the time and money tnat IS 
spent on them. Under the same conditions, the 
average Kansan, in two generations, would degener- 
ate to approximately the same level. 

Now, as Kansas about typifies the whole United 
States, we may say, that with approximately four 
times its present population, and no tributary coun- 
try, the standard of education, refinement and moral 

sentiment in the United States would approach that 
now existing in China. 

You may say that Belgium has a population 
seven times as dense as that of China. True, but the 
soil of Belgium is vastly more productive than that 
of China, and, what is vastly more important, Bel- 
gium lives by manufacture. She is so located that 
her inhabitants can exchange their labor for pro- 
ducts that come from without her borders, and she 
has large colonial possessions. The British Isles 
are also populated three times as densely as China, 
but they live by manufacture and have a vast tribu- 
tary domain in which to dispose of their products. 
Considering her colonies, Great Britain has three 
times as many acres per individual as has China. 
Even this is not enough. The discontent and unrest 
in England is evidence that it is not enough. Rhode 
Island is settled nearly as thickly as Belgium. She 
also lives by manufacture. It was not chance, but 
industrial conditions, that made Rhode Island pro- 
duce the man,- who, above all others, stood out as 
the champion of laws to force a high price for manu- 
factured articles by a tariff that would keep out of 
the country the same class of articles produced more 
cheaply elsewhere. Rhode Island to exist must have 
markets. She demands laws to force the agricul- 
tural areas to help support her. The condition is 
not new. It existed in Ancient Rome, among other 
places, and, a greater proportion of the citizens of 
the Republic making the demand, it had to be satis- 
fied. The result was internal dissentions that 
brought about the fall of Rome. 

The results of such a condition will always be 
similar. If the demand is very strong and is not 
met, rebellion results; if it is met, and the action 


taken is sufficiently drastic in its effect on a foreign 
country, war results. 

Belgium, Great Britain, Germany, and all other 
localities where the population is dense, must find 
markets. Naturally, the markets are not unending. 
There is a limit to the amount of labor that can be 
exchanged for products of the earth. The first sign 
that the limit is reached is a rise in the value of the 
products — increased cost of living. Relief is to be 
permanently found only in an increased production 
of the earth or a decrease in the consumption. For 
the whole earth, such a decrease, at present, is more 
likely to be by a lowering of the standard of living 
than by a decrease in population. Resistance to 
having the standard of living forced down will al- 
ways occur, being prompt and violent. 

So many factors enter that calculation is but a 
guess. However, for the sake of illustration of the 
conditions now existing, let us take a view of the 

The world over, there is an average of 21.9 
acres per inhabitant. The total land area is divided 
as follows: 

Polar regions almost uninhabitable 10% 

Desert sparsely inhabitable S% 

Steppe (grazing land) thinly habitable 27% 

Fertile inhabitable 55% 

Compared with all the land on earth, the soil of 
the United States must be fully 50% more productive 
than the average. We may say that 16 acres per in- 
habitant, of land such as the United States averages, 
is what is required in order to give a standard of 
living that is an average of the standards that now 
exist on the earth. Compare this with the density 
of population in Europe and Asia. It is plain that as 
their standard rises, ours must come down. In spite 


of religious antagonisms, race prejudices and the de- 
sire to live in familiar surroundings natural to all 
men, the inhabitants of those continents are migrat- 
ing to less thickly populated localities, of which the 
United States in one. The time is coming when we 
can no longer afford to receive them. With our po- 
pulation of mixed nationalities and races, the sup- 
pression of immigration to our shores is bound to 
bring out great animosity, both at home and abroad. 

The thirteen original states, when they gained 
their independence had less than 4,000,000 inhabi- 
tants. They now have nine times that number, and 
average but seven acres per inhabitant. Their popu- 
lation has doubled every fifty years. 

The areas that have come under our rule since 
the Revolution increase in population at about the 
same rate. 

There is no need for violent alarm. As the po- 
pulation becomes more dense, the rate of increase be- 
comes less from natural causes; there are many, 
relatively small unproductive areas, that can be 
made to produce; and science may be able to make 
the productive areas yield more abundantly. On 
the other hand, as long as prosperity continues in 
any section, the population there will continue to in- 
crease ; every advance of medical science that makes 
man live longer increases the density of population ; 
and every enlightenment of a degraded people in- 
creases their consumption. 

The world's area will not grow. There is no 
second land crop. The density of population in the 
habitable world is greater on the average than in the 
United States. All over the world the internal 
pressure is beginning to develop. The average 
standard of living must be forced down as the popu- 
lation of the earth grows. In the civilized world. 


it must go down relatively in order that the increased 
demand of the uncivilized, who become more enlight- 
ened, may be supplied. This movement is now in 
its beginning. 

The rapid growth of socialism represents the 
white man's demand for laws to compel someone else 
to help support him. Strikes and acts of the Indus- 
trial Workers of the World are evidence that force 
will be resorted to unless the demand is heeded. 

The results of these forces, interwoven with 
many other motives, such as discontent at the flood 
of laws, which, however, good in themselves, result 
in the aggregate in a curtailment of personal liberty, 
the religious and race hatreds which grow under 
adversity, etc., are the symptoms of that friction 
which grow into those resentments which see in the 
use of physical force the only source of relief. 

The enlightenment of China, Japan and India is 
accompanied by an increasing demand for opportun- 
ity to spread out. The Russo-Japanese War is evi- 
dence that force will be resorted to if migration is 
otherwise impossible. The war in Europe voices the 
demand for markets and also for a chance to spread 
out. Germany demanded her ''place in the sun." 
Other nations could not afford to give up the place. 

The friction all over the world is increasing be- 
cause the stress that comes from supply failing to 
meet demand is being felt. 

There will be some who are constitutionally 
unable to understand this condition. The "pacifi- 
cists" who are thoroughly imbued with that particu- 
lar idea will be unable to understand it, particularly, 
if they are not participants in the heat of the econo- 
mic struggle. 

*'The enthusiast who is dominated by an idea, 
religious or otherwise, is inaccessible to reasoning. 


however intelligent he may be."^ The same rule holds 
true for those who will advocate the use of force to 
obtain their economic ends. Reason will be less and 
less effective against the emotions that are brought 
out by vague uneasiness for the future. The ever- 
increasing economic stress oppresses men's bodies 
and minds till it arouses tfiat most elementary of 
emotions, fear. The ever present fear, that bears 
on men's souls till communities are in that, almost 
hypnotic, crowd state that immediately precedes the 
time when, following some comparatively trivial in- 
cident, passion bursts forth in fury ; emotion reigns 
supreme ; and war is inevitable. 

'Le Bon. 






MAR 29 1934 

APR 2 1950 

MAR 30 1934 

APR n im 




m 26 mw 


b io 22 19 43 


^^^ 1 194;